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ABSTRACT
Since the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Latin American states have
attempted to incorporate in some way or another human rights concern into their
respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of human rights abuses and the return
of democratic political rule as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in
preventing such violations in other countries. Yet, while human rights have come to play
a non-trivial role in the contemporary foreign policy of many Latin American states, there
is great diversity in the ways and the extent to which they go about incorporating human
rights concerns into their foreign policies. Explaining the diversity of human rights
foreign policies of new Latin American democracies is at the heat of this project. The
main research questions are the following: Why do new democracies incorporate human
rights into their foreign policies? And what explains the different international human
rights policies of new democracies? To answer these questions, this research compares
the human rights foreign policies of Chile and Brazil for over two decades starting from
their respective transitions to democracy.
The study argues that states commitment to international human rights is the
result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the international
level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility
affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with different
ii

degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while necessary, are
an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not insubstantial
political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less likely to
actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the following
four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human rights
into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights
advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their
government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards international human rights and
the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
The International Human Rights Policies of Latin American Democracies
Since the beginning of the 1990s Latin American states have increased their
participation in international and regional human rights regimes and reinforced their
capacities to respond and aid states when they face human rights catastrophes. Most
countries in the region have attempted to incorporate in some way or another human
rights concerns into their respective foreign policies, highlighting a history of abuse
within their own countries as a trigger for galvanizing a commitment to assist in
preventing such abuse in other countries. These cases come from all the Latin American
Sub-regions (North- Central- South America) regardless of geography or relative power
in the international system. The majority of them are, however, states that ended up years
and in some cases decades of authoritarian regimes to undergo important transition to
democracy processes that led to consolidation years later.
In South America, Argentina represents a middle power that dramatically changed
its international policies to more adequately incorporate human rights concerns after the
end of the military rule. The trajectory of Argentina has been characterized as a transit
from being a “Pariah state to a global protagonist in international human rights” (Sikkink
2008). Among the many actions that Argentina took to protect human rights beyond its
borders, the country stands out for helping to define the very term of forced
disappearance and developed regional and international instruments to end the practice.
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Mexico, another middle power state and a country internationally known for its
traditionally absolute sovereignty focus, also started to open up to the international
human rights regime since the defeat of almost a century of one single party rule under
the PRI—Institutional Revolutionary Party in 2000. During President Fox’s years,
Mexico ratified all the major regional and international human rights treaties accepting
the oversight procedures of these Conventions and opening its door to external scrutiny
receiving multiple visits of human rights special rapporteurs from the United Nations
Special Mechanisms and the Organization of American States (OAS).
Smaller states such as Uruguay, Costa Rica, Guatemala and Chile have also
played a significant role shaping international human rights. Uruguay, for example, has
focused on increasing its peacekeeping capacity worldwide. UN Secretary General, Ban
Ki-moon in a recent visit to the country said that “Uruguay’s commitment to global
peacekeeping is without rival”, highlighting that “when adjusted for population, no
country contributes more troops than Uruguay ” (UN News Center, 2014). Costa Rica,
without undergoing major democratic breakdowns since 1950s, has a historical record as
a human rights champion. The country lobbied aggressively for the establishment of the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and became the first nation to recognize the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Court, based in San Jose. Costa Rica’s
influence in multilateral institutions has helped to frame and ratify treaties, create and
staff institutions, monitor and sanctions offenders, and introduce new understandings of
rights to the global agenda (Brysk 2009). Guatemala after 36 years of internal conflict
and the only genocidal situation in the region and despite continuous domestic
vulnerabilities also decided to include human rights as a central part of its new
2

democratic foreign policy. This Central American country brings to the table its own
knowledge as a peace-builder based on the positive experience of the United Nations
Verification Mission (MINUGUA) which performed a role as a third actor in the peace
negotiations and was subsequently overseer of the consolidation of the process. The
presence of the International Commission Against Impunity (CICIG) in the country is
also pioneering experience on an international scale, through which the United Nations
were involved in the strengthening of justice (Aguilera 2012). Guatemala as a nonpermanent member of the UNSC in 2012 had a leading role in the debates regarding the
protection of civilians in armed conflicts and was strong supporter of the concept of
Responsibility to Protect (R2P).
Chile is probably the best example of a small state actively promoting
international human rights. The country is among the few Latin American states that have
gone as far as to identify the international promotion and protection of human rights as
one of the fundamental goals of its foreign policy. After the end of the military regime,
the first democratic government quickly ratified all major international and regional
human rights treaties and reactivated its participation in international human rights
institutions. Since then, the country has engaged in strengthening international
institutions protecting human rights, being active, for instance, in negotiations for the
newly created UN Human Rights Council and the UN Peace Building Commission,
augmenting the presence of Latin American representatives in human rights institutions,
and sponsoring or co-sponsoring important UN resolutions on issues such as the right to
truth, the protection for all persons against enforced disappearance, the optional protocol
to the convention against torture, among many others. Chile has actively participated in
3

UN peacekeeping operations since the 1990s and clearly endorsed the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect internationally (Vargas, 2012; Aranda & Morande, 2012).
Yet, while human rights have come to play a non-trivial role in the contemporary
foreign policy of many Latin American states, there is a great diversity in the ways in
which they go about incorporating human rights concerns into their foreign policies and
in the priority assigned to these principles as part o their international policies. There is a
group of Latin American states that are more passive when comes to defending human
rights internationally and a few are still skeptic of the value and legitimacy of human
rights in world politics. Brazil has traditionally preferred to define its national interests
differently emphasizing the importance of absolute sovereignty, non-intervention, and
autonomy in international politics. In recent years there has been increasing criticism
against Brazil’s foreign policy in this area. A recent study comparing the six most
influential rising democracies1 in relation to their support to human rights at the
multilateral level, characterized Brazil as “ambivalent and often unpredictable” when
comes to voting behavior in key UN bodies (Piccone 2011:139). Yet, these studies also
have tended to downplay the fact that Brazil has been increasingly a more active actor,
for example, in the process of reform creating the new UN Human Rights Council and
has been at the forefront of important international initiatives at the United Nations on the
right to health, development and non-discrimination.
Nicaragua, Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador are arguable more reluctant
participants of the international human rights regimes and in several occasions they have

1

The study includes Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.
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denounced human rights principles as an unjustifiable intrusion into the sovereignty of
states. Venezuela, for example, withdrew its membership at the Inter-American Human
Rights Commission and Bolivia and Ecuador recently announced that they would follow
suit. At the international level, these countries’ tendency has been to abstain from
condemning human rights violations abroad. Recently, these states refused to condemn at
the UN General Assembly and at the Human Rights Council the atrocities committed by
Bashar al-Assad in Syria.
Research Questions
The precise etiologies of these diverse policies among states that at least
ostensibly have similar political values due to their experience with authoritarianism that
led to democratic openings and consolidation, are members of the same regional
institutions, and in some cases are at similar stages of economic development should be
susceptible to clarification. This research addresses the following questions:
1) Why do new democracies incorporate human rights into their foreign policies?
2) What explains the different international human rights policies of new
democracies?
Why this Research Matters
The current literature on human rights and foreign policy focuses heavily on
countries from the North—specially the United States and some Western European
countries—and pays too little attention to what and through which mechanisms countries
from different geographical areas and with different political and economic capacities are
doing to protect human rights internationally. Scholars have paid even less attention to
explaining why there is a great diversity in the way in which new democracies adopt
5

human rights as part of their foreign policies. This dissertation is the first one to
concentrate on explaining the extent to which newly democratized states in Latin
American support human rights beyond their borders and how and why their policies
differ.2
Of particular importance is the inclusion of Chile and Brazil as case studies in this
research. There is an emergent consensus that Brazil’s status as a rising power has made
the country an increasingly pivotal player in international relations. Yet, thus far there has
been relatively little debate with regards to the values guiding Brazil’ international
policies and the particular place of human rights in its foreign policy. Chile’s
international trajectory, on the other hand, illustrates how a small state emerging from
military rule can reconstruct its perception of national interests in order to incorporate
humanitarian concerns into foreign policy decisions.
The experience of Chile and Brazil also contributes to contemporary debates
about the means and circumstances in which states are likely to intervene in one way or
another to prevent or to terminate violations of human rights or to strengthen the
normative and institutional framework for defending human rights. Important policy
lessons can be extracted from the foreign policy experience of these two countries that
can serve as guidelines for government officials, local and international norms
2

To be sure, among the very limited literature on the subject it is important to highlight David
Forsythe’s volume (2000) on “Human Rights and Comparative Foreign Policy” and Alison
Brysk’s “Global Good Samaritans” (2009) both of them including some case studies from the
Global South. Also at a regional level, Natalia Saltalamacchia and Ana Covarrubias recently
published a book titled “Derechos Humanos y Politica Exterior: Seis Casos Latinoamericanos”
(2012) describing how six Latin American states have incorporated human rights into their
international policies. Yet, none of these publications focus on comparatively explaining the
different human rights performance of their cases and some of their chapters are largely
descriptive.
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entrepreneurs, NGOS and epistemic communities interested in the promotion of human
rights internationally.
What is a Human Rights Foreign Policy?
Democratic states have committed and also implemented international human
rights policies for almost half a century.3 Countries adopting such policies aim to improve
the human rights practices of a targeted government and or to prevent further human
rights violations in the future.4 The broader aim of human rights foreign policies is,
therefore, improving and securing the fundamental rights outlined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the two International Covenants (Civil and Political
Rights, as well as Economic, Cultural and Social Rights). In principle, this means that
states are “concerned about human rights violations, wherever they occur, and that
borders are not barriers for the protection of rights” (Sikkink 2004:5). In practice, the
weight that each country assigns to international human rights varies considerably
according to their foreign policy priorities, political and economist interests as well as
with the intensity of the violations. The policy instruments and means that states select to
achieve this goal are also diverse.
A human rights foreign policy has two related but analytically separate parts: a
bilateral and a multilateral policy. States have a multilateral human rights policy when
they decide to participate in global multilateral mechanisms that are part of the
international human rights regime. The latter is generally understood as a set of
3

In Europe and the United States human rights foreign policies were implemented in 1970s. In
Latin America human rights promotion started only after the wave of repressive regimes ended in
the mid-1980s and early 1990s.
4

In some cases the aim is simply deterring similar future violations.
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principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures that states and other
international actors accept as authoritative on the field of human rights (Donnelly
2013:14). A major aspect of participating in international human rights regime refers to
the ratification of international human rights treaties and a state’s acceptance of specific
mechanisms for multilateral supervision of domestic human rights practices. Of the
hundred or more treaties that address human rights issues, broadly understood, six are
usually taken to provide the core of international human rights law: the two1966
International Human Rights Covenants plus the 1965 Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women; the 1984 Convention Against Torture and
Other, Cruel, Inhuman, or Degradating Treatment or Punishment; and the 1989
Convention of the Rights of the Child (Donnelly 2013:14). In addition, there are
particular types of international human rights treaties that are especially powerful in the
sense that they have enforcement powers that permit a supranational institution like a
regional human rights court to oversee human rights practices. Examples of such treaties
include the European Convention on Human Rights, the American Convention on Human
Rights, and the Rome Statue of the international Criminal (Sikkink 2004: 10).
Apart from the ratification of international human rights treaties, a multilateral
human rights policy includes the participation in international organizations in particular
UN institutions with a human rights mandate. At the core of these organizations are the
UN Human Rights Council and the High Commissioner of Human Rights but it also
encompasses organizations with a mandate that centrally includes but is not limited to
human rights such as UNESCO, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the
8

International Criminal Court (ICC), and the UN Security Council and the UN PeaceBuilding Commission and UN Peacekeeping missions. Regional organizations are also
included in this list, in particular when they have a system of human rights enforcement
such as such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court. Participation in these
organizations involves activities such as founding and or joining these diverse
international bodies; drafting, sponsoring and supporting human rights resolutions and
initiatives; financing these institutions or any relevant initiative that they sponsor; and
providing personnel such as troops in the case of UN Peacekeeping missions.
Bilateral human rights diplomacy consists of state to state diplomacy. In other
words, “states have a bilateral human rights policies when their foreign policies
systematically takes human rights in other states into account” (Sikkink 2004:10). The
implementation of bilateral foreign policy can take many forms and can be legitimately
pursued using all the means of foreign policy—short of the use of force, which
contemporary international law reserves for self-defense (Donnelly 2013:140). These
means include a wide array of policies that can be arranged as a continuum from mild to
severe including: private diplomatic discussions, public diplomatic statements,
information generation and dissemination, reprioritizing aid decisions to decide on
human rights goals, human rights training programs, sanctions trade sanctions and arms
embargoes, among other initiatives.
States with both bilateral and multilateral policies can be considered as having a
comprehensive human rights foreign policy. In practice, only some states have both. The
United States has a strong bilateral policy and a very poor multilateral policy. Most of
9

Latin American countries have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights and others human rights treaties but only a few of them
have explicit bilateral policies. On the other end, Canada and some European Union
countries are the best examples of states having both bilateral and multilateral human
rights policies. Despite these differences, the historical trend shows a “gradual but clear
movement toward the adoption of human rights policies. Before World War II no country
in the world has a human rights policy”(Sikkink 2004:10). Today, the majority of
democratic states in all the regions of the world have more or less ambitious international
human rights objectives either in their bilateral or multilateral policies or in both. Even
non-democratic regimes support or at least tolerate some of the multilateral mechanism
discussed before. There is, however, a significant difference among states with respect to
the priority given to human rights into their foreign policies, the targets of human rights
pressures, the type of human rights that gain predominance in their respective
international agendas, and the means and instruments they use to implement policy.
Research Design
Selected Cases
This study is a comparative historical analysis based on case-oriented research.
The selected countries (Chile and Brazil) are suited to a comparative study based on the
logic of most similar system design (George and Bennett 2005; Della Porta and Keating
2008). These two countries share similar general characteristics including a common
historical experience of human rights abuses during their respective military regimes and
a transition to democracy that led to a process of consolidation in the mid-1990s. Both
countries have similar level of development and initiated processes of economic openness
10

either in the late 1980s (Chile) or in the 1990s (Brazil). Yet, they show important
differences when comes to their human rights diplomacy.
Chile since the beginning of its transition to democracy has actively incorporated
human rights policies into its foreign policy, ratifying major international treaties and
supporting international human rights institutions. On the other hand, Brazilian decisionmakers took more than ten years after the transition in 1985 to accept the legitimacy of
human rights in international affairs through the acceptance the external international
scrutiny of international human rights treaties and it is country that still remains a
reluctant promoter in many areas of the global human rights regime specially when
comes to denounce country abuses and the discussion on humanitarian intervention. This
study wants to explain this difference. Why Chile has been an active human rights
promoter while Brazil has a more ambivalent policy towards international human rights?
To explain the different foreign policy outcomes, this research focuses on four
independent variables that present an important degree of variation between the selected
cases. Chile ranks high on these variables while Brazil is significantly lower. The
variables are the following: a) Impact of international influences in accepting human
rights as standard of international behavior; b) Commitment to human rights of political
elites involved in foreign policy-making; c) Ministry of Foreign Affairs strength and
openness to international human rights; d) Civil society involvement on foreign policy
and human rights (more on this in the hypothesis section).
This case comparison is supplemented with within-country qualitative analysis
using process tracing to evaluate casual processes within cases. Process tracing—a
procedure designed to identify processes linking a set of initial conditions to a particular
11

outcome—has been acknowledge as an indispensable element of case empirical research
and especially useful for comparative historical analysis (George & Bennett 2005,
Vennesson 2008, Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003). Process tracing is particularly
suitable for this type of study because it provides way to learn and to evaluate empirically
the preferences and perceptions of actors, their purposes, their goals, their values, and
their specification of the situations that face them. This method requires document
analysis (official speeches, reports, journals) but also and very importantly in depth and
carefully structured interviews with key actors that help us to understand and to uncover
previously unknown relations between factors.
Fieldwork
The research entailed extensive fieldwork in the Brazilian cities of Brasilia, Sao
Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro and Chile’s capital, Santiago. In Brasilia, the librarians at the
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Rio Branco Diplomatic Academy provided
invaluable help to find official documents and relevant articles and other publications to
complete this study. In Santiago, representatives from the “Andres Bello” Diplomatic
Academy and its library provided invaluable logistic support and relevant documentation
to complete this work. The data collected during fieldwork was invaluable to systematize
the human rights diplomacy and the instruments used by these two countries to
implement these policies in the past twenty years.
On the other hand, almost thirty interviews were performed for this research with
government officials, diplomats, scholars, and civil society members. The majority of the
interviews were held personally while the rest were performed by telephone or through
written questionnaires that were previously sent by e-mail. Interviews were crucial to
12

understand actor’s motives, the context in which foreign policy decisions took place, and
to test the possible casual mechanisms operating in these two cases.
Timeframe
As for the time frame, this research covers more than two decades of Brazilian
and Chilean foreign policy. This provides a longer perspective on the domestic and
international changes conditioning the international human rights policies of these two
countries. The study starts with the respective transitions to democracy and continues
examining several presidencies until 2010. For the case of Brazil, the research covers the
following Presidential terms: Jose Sarney5 (1985-1990), Fernando Collor de Mello
(1990-1992) and Itamar Franco (1992-1994). Brazilian consolidation started with
Fernando Henrique Cardoso who was President of Brazil for two terms (1995-2002),
followed by other two terms of President Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva (2003-2010).
Chile’s time-frame covers the whole period in which the Coalition of Parties for
Democracy was in government. This includes four administrations: Patricio Aylwin
(1990-1994)6, Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006)7 and Michelle
Bachelet (2006-2010).

5

Jose Sarney was the first civilian President in Brazil since 1964.

6

First democratically elected President, after 17 years of military regime led by General Augusto
Pinochet.
7

There has been an intensive debate regarding when to mark the end of the Chilean transition to
democracy. Yet, in 1998 the detention of General Pinochet in London opened the space for a
further dialogue on pending human rights issues and civil-military relations. It also played and
important part in generating a consensus for constitutional reform in 2005, eliminating important
non-democratic areas of the text such as the existence of non-democratically elected senators.
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Assessing Human Rights Foreign Policies
This section identifies a state’s degree of commitment to the promotion of
international human rights—the dependent variable in this study. The aim is to
operationalize into measurable factors the variables included in this research. The
adoption of human rights foreign policies is often inconsistent; lack continuity over time,
and in many cases consist more of grandiloquent statements than the serious investment
of diplomatic capital.
Evaluating the actual performance of countries regarding their international
human rights agenda remains a critical component in the analysis of the foreign policy of
states. Systematic assessments are, in fact, very rare and this is even more so for countries
coming from the global south. The first objective of this study, therefore, is to elaborate
metrics for assessing the record and international performance of different states in the
promotion and protection of human rights. This systematization helps to identify critical
moments in which the foreign policies of these two countries differ, to trace the evolution
of the policies over time, and to identify the means used by each state in the pursue of
human rights diplomacy.
This assessment considers only the multilateral human rights policies of Chile and
Brazil. Bilateral foreign policies are not part of this study due to fact that much of
diplomacy takes place behind the scene and because Ministries of Foreign Affairs in
Latin America keep poor public records of bilateral initiatives on this subject. At the
same time, the majority of Latin American countries have explicitly indicated some sort
of commitment with multilateral human rights policies. Chile and Brazil, despite the
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different degrees of activism, have contributed in some way or another to the global
human rights regime.
The study considers four dimensions that altogether cover the core activities of
states participating in global multilateral mechanisms on human rights. These dimensions
are legal, human rights institutions, humanitarian protection and peace promotion,
financial assistance. (Table 1 illustrates the relevant dimensions included in the
assessment with specific variables per dimension and observations identifying the kind of
information on relevant data.)
(1) Legal. The legal dimension traces states ratification of international and
regional human rights treaties. It looks specifically at the numbers of ratified treaties, the
timing and process of ratification.
(2) Human rights institutions. This dimension evaluates states participation at
relevant human rights institutions. These institutions include the UN human rights system
especially at the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Council (established
in 2006) and when necessary it also highlights important landmarks at the United Nations
Security Council. At a regional level, the participation and responses to the InterAmerican human rights system are also included.
The participation at UN human rights institutions is evaluated by a number of
observations: number and type initiatives sponsored. These includes a wide array of
initiatives encompassing the whole spectrum of human rights: civil and political rights
along with economic, cultural and social rights; voting behavior when assessing countryspecific human rights situations; voting behavior in cases of massive human rights abuses
and humanitarian crisis; other high-profile human rights initiatives within the UN such as
15

Brazil’s “Hunger Zero” initiative at the UN. At the Inter-American Human Rights system
the observations concentrate on the Commission and include the following: number of
petitions submitted by countries to the Commission; responses to the recommendations
emanating from the Commission; number of commissioners that are Chilean or Brazilian
in origin.
(3) Humanitarian protection and peace promotion. This dimension evaluates
states participation in UN peacekeeping initiatives and responses to massive human rights
violations. The relevant observations include number of peacekeepers and type of
missions; responses to major humanitarian interventions such as Rwanda (1994); Kosovo
(1999), and Libya (2011); reaction to the idea of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and
initiatives in this subject.
(4) Financial assistance. Effective financial contribution to international human
rights institutions. This includes, for example, the contributions to the Office of the High
Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Democratic FUND
(UNDEF). At a regional level, the financial assistance to the Inter-American Commission
for Human Rights.
A country that ranks significantly high across these dimensions qualifies as
having a high degree of commitment to international human rights and, therefore, can be
regarded as an “international humanitarianist.” Ideally a country’s performance can be
examined each year examining each one of the relevant dimensions. Yet, this study
covers more than twenty years of human rights diplomacy and therefore will assess the
general performance of Chile and Brazil highlighting the significant differences and
continuities across time.
16

Note that this this research focuses exclusively on the factors that shape states to
commit to international human rights and in explaining the divergence in states’
performances, leaving outside of its domain of inquiry any questions regarding the
impact or effectiveness of these policies in the domestic human rights conditions of the
recipient countries (Landman, 2006; Landman & Carvahlo 2010; Cardenas 2007).
Table 1
Assessing Human Rights Foreign Policies: Chile and Brazil
Dimensions
Legal
Human
Rights
Institutions

Variables

Observations

- International and Regional
Human Rights treaties ratified
-Participation at the Human
Rights Commission and the
Human Rights Council (since
2006).

a) Number of treaties ratified, year of
ratification-timing, process of ratification.
a) Number and type initiatives sponsored. b)
Voting behavior when assessing countryspecific human rights situations.

-Voting patterns in other key
UN bodies (UNSC)
-Other relevant multilateral
initiates at the UN.

a) Support for UN resolutions against
‘pariah states” or states committing human
rights abuses. b) Relevant votes in cases of
massive human rights abuses and R2P
situations.
a) For example, Brazil sponsored the “Zero
Hungry challenge”.

- Participation at the InterAmerican Human Rights
System.

a) Number of petitions submitted by
countries to the Commission; b) Responses
to the recommendations emanating from the
Commission. c) Number of commissioners
that are Chilean or Brazilian origin.

-Acceptance of international
scrutiny on domestic human
rights issues.

a) External monitoring on local human
rights issues such as: acceptance of
UN/OAS experts (timing, topic, etc).
Peace
Promotion
and
humanitarian
protection

-UN peacekeeping missions.

a) Number of peacekeepers, type of
missions.

- Responses to humanitarian
crisis- mass atrocity.

a) Responses to major humanitarian
interventions: Rwanda (1994), East Timor
Kosovo (1999), Libya (2011). (political
statements and position of the country,
sending troops, humanitarian assistance,
etc.) b) Tracing each country’s response to
R2P.

17

Table 1 (continued)

Dimensions
Financial
Assistance

Variables

Observations

-Contribution to the HRC*/
OHCHR*** or other relevant
UN institution for human
rights promotion.

Monetary contribution by GDP percentage
of the GDP.
-Relevant initiatives that are cataloged as
cooperation for human rights.

-International Cooperation
*Human Rights Council
**Inter-American Commission for Human Rights.
*** Office of the High commissioner for Human Rights

Sources of International Human Rights Policies
There is an extensive literature on foreign policy analysis (FPA) dating from
1950s that seeks to explain why governments make the foreign policy decisions that they
do (Hudson 2007; Smith, Dunne, Hadfiled 2008; Beasley et all 2012). Researchers have
investigated how regime type, bureaucratic politics, interest groups, social and individual
psychology and a significant number of other variables influence government decisions.
However, current studies on human rights diplomacy do not originate from FPA but from
the intersection of IR theory with the specific domain of human rights. The IR literature
on the subject is basically divided in three main approaches— realism, constructivism
and liberal institutionalism—three of them emphasizing different ways of understanding
the role of human rights in foreign policy. This subsection reviews each of these three
approaches situating them within the broader discussion of human rights diplomacy,
analyses the current research gaps, and then draws hypotheses for this study.
Realism
Size, distribution of power, and the position in the international system are seen
by realists as the determinants of a state’s national interests. Jan Egeland (1988) in his
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book comparing Norwegian and U.S. international human rights policies, for example,
offers an explanation that focus on the international structure to explain differences
between these two countries: “small and big nations are differently disposed to
undertaking coherent rights-oriented foreign policies.” In the case of the United States, its
relatively modest international human rights policies are “because of, rather than in spite
off, her superpower status.” Furthermore, “the frequency and intensity of the conflict
between self-interests and (international human rights) norms seems, in short,
proportional to a nation’s economic and military power, as well as its foreign policy
ambitions.” Small states, with fewer constrains and international responsibilities, rarely
have to choose between human rights and other foreign policy goals and therefore they
based their strategies on multilateral institutions in order to exert international influence.
In sum, small democratic states are likely to be strong human rights promoters while big
and powerful states are skeptics or moderate human rights promoters.
Realists also emphasize that in the very unlikely circumstances that powerful
states decide to pursue human rights at some perceived political, economic or strategic
cost this is due exclusively to self-interest: human rights enhance the relative power of
the state or if human rights are used to justify certain acts in foreign policy. Human rights
promotion, therefore, becomes the product of “dominant nations or group of nations”
espousing moral principles that serves their own interest (Carr 1939:211; Morgenthau
1960). Most notably, when powerful states deem it necessary, they will employ coercion
or inducement to unilaterally spread human rights internationally.
Realist structural explanations, however, seem to be insufficient to explain the
many foreign policy differences regarding human rights. If it were only for “small” size,
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most of Latin American countries would be international human rights promoters. The
reality shows a region with diverse policies regarding its engagement with human rights
and the most “big and powerful” countries in the region (Mexico, Brazil. Colombia and
Argentina) are comparatively more inclined to participate in international human rights
regimes than middle size countries such as Peru or Venezuela, for example. No common
patterns regarding international human rights policies can de deduced from size,
geography and power alone. Realist predictions regarding the spread of human rights
internationally do not account for why less powerful states would accept international or
regional human rights regimes when they are not coerced to do so. In sum, realist
explanations do not seem to account for the differences in the human rights foreign policy
of the cases considered in this research.
Liberalism
Liberal approaches hypothesize that states pursue international human rights
because it is in the self-interest of states to comply with international norms and
institutions. Moravcsik’s work deals specifically with the human rights foreign policies of
new democracies. He attempts to empirically demonstrate that the participation in an
international human rights regime constitutes an act of political delegation that could be
used by governments to ‘lock-in’ and consolidate domestic policies, thereby enhancing
their credibility and stability vis-à-vis domestic political opponents. The pursuit of human
rights abroad in other words would be a result of political calculations at home. The type
of regime (democratic, authoritarian, newly democratic) becomes a crucial factor for
liberals in explaining and predicting the adoption of international human rights. For
Moravcsik, newly established democracies are likely to ratify binding international
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human rights commitments to protect their still unstable regimes against overthrows or to
reduce political uncertainty at home (Moravcsik 2000).
Liberal predictions when comes to the foreign policies of new democracies are at
the crux of this study. Thus, one of the purposes of this research will be to test this
assumption by addressing the specific question of whether the newly elected
governments of Chile and Brazil felt pressure to consolidate the credibility of the new
democratic regime vis-à-vis non-democratic forces in the society and commit to
international treaties and institutions as a means to reach their goals.
Constructivism
While liberalism focuses on how human rights norms alter incentives thereby
making it rational for new democracies to support international human rights (logic of
rational consequentialism), constructivism stresses the power of strongly held principles,
ideas about what is right or wrong.
A critical characteristic of political action in this area [constructivism] is that it is
‘‘principled’’—that is, the altruistic and moral motives of actors have persuasive
power in themselves. Accordingly, the most fundamental motivating force behind
human rights regimes is not rational adaptation, let alone coercion, but
transnational socialization—the logic of appropriateness. (Moravcsik 2000: 223)
In explaining state’s support for international human rights, some constructivist
scholars have looked to salient historical events or dramatic policy failures, yet recurrent
explanations comes either from the identity of states (who they are) or from the notion
that international norms and ideas have a powerful effect in shaping states’ policies.
Identity-based explanations focus on the democratic character of a state and or its role as
middle power. According to what Thomas Risse terms ‘‘liberal constructivism”,
established democratic governments seek to extend their domestic values abroad and
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recognize others who do so (Risse-Kappen 1996). The more democratic they are, the more
likely their espousal of human rights values. Democratic human rights foreign policy,
therefore, may be more direct expression of liberal democratic identity as a community of
values (Risse-Kappen 1996).
Other authors add state identities as “middle powers” as an additional explanatory
variable for the adoption of human rights in foreign policy (Cooper, Higgott, & Nossal
1993; Cooper 1997; Brysk 2007). Middle powers, from this approach are countries
defined by “[...] the tendency to pursue multilateral solutions to international problems,
the tendency to embrace compromise positions in international disputes, and the tendency
to embrace notions of ‘good international citizenship’ to guide diplomacy” (Cooper,
Higgott, and Nossal 1993: 19). Alison Brysk specifically uses the criteria of middle
powers to explain why certain countries decided to act as “Global Good Samaritans.” She
highlights that “candidate states [humanitarians] are usually globalized, democratic,
moderately developed, and secured middle powers” (Brysk 2007:5). The problem with
this definition is that it is so broad that it encompasses a wide spectrum of countries. In
the specific case of Latin America, the majority of the countries in the region would
actually classify within this category of Middle Powers. Yet, only some states in Latin
America are active human rights promoters while others have remained more reluctant.
In sum, identity-based approaches lack a substantive explanation of what a middle
power or a democratic identity means and how this identities project into the international
community and its specific effects on human rights diplomacy. This perspective have led
scholars to exclusively concentrate their work on demonstrating the link between the
social democratic values of a state (democratic identity) and/or its role as middle powers
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with the international promotion of human rights. The unintended result has been an
extensive focus on the human rights foreign policies of very few countries that possibly
fit the former explanation: Sweden, the Netherlands, Norway, Canada and to a lesser
extend Australia. The processes by which newly democratic states adopt human rights
foreign policies have been largely overlooked by identity-based explanations and
therefore the motives of a more extensive list of countries that decide to adopt
international human rights remains understudy.
Constructivist’s scholarship, however, have built an important research agenda on
norm diffusion and the persuasive power of principle ideas in bringing about political
change (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rice, Roop, & Sikkink, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink,
1998; Nadelmann, 1990; Klotz, 1995). This literature can offer further insights for this
research due to its focus on how international norms such as human rights have impacted
state policies. In what has been called the first wave of scholarly research on norm
diffusion, the main concern has been with international or regional norms that set
standards for the appropriate behavior of states.
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) introduced the concept of “norm cascade”, a
mechanism in which countries adopt new norms through a process of international
socialization that is driven by a need to enhance international legitimation, pressure for
conformity, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem. In the past
decade, scholars have generated important accounts of international legitimacy and on the
sources of legitimization in shaping state behavior (Barnett and Finnemore 1997; Clark,
2007). States also care about international legitimacy because it has become an essential
contributor to perceptions of domestic legitimacy held by a state’s own citizens.
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“International legitimation is important insofar as it reflects back on a government’s
domestic basis of legitimization and consent and thus ultimately on its ability to stay in
power” (Finnemore, M. & Sikkink, K. 1998:903).8 Conformity can be seen as analogous
to “peer pressure” among countries. Conformity involves a “social proof” demonstrating
that states have adapted to the social environment that they belong—they are part of a
group (Axelrod in Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998:903) Sikkink and Finnemore suggests that
leaders of states sometimes follow norms because they want others to think well of them
and the want to think well themselves (903). In this sense, “states care about following
norms associated with liberalism because being ‘liberal states’ is part of their identity in
the sense of something that they take pride in or from which they gain self-esteem” (904).
There is also an incipient second wave of norm scholarship that contributes to
previous literature by adding a new focus on the effects of international norms on state
behavior via domestic political processes. These perspectives emphasize the role local
leaders—political elites and societal groups— as “norm entrepreneurs” promoting the
legitimacy of international norms through a process of “accommodation or localization”
that bridge international with local understandings and experiences (Acharya, 2004;
Checkel 1998).
Checkel use the concept of “cultural match” to describe a set of preexisting
domestic understandings that condition the impact of transnational norms. According to
this scholar, diffusion is faster when ‘a cultural match exists between a systemic norm

8

The international legitimacy of military or authoritarian governments, for example, has been
signaled as an important driving force for regime transition in Latin American regions.
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and a target country, in other words, where it resonates with historically constructed
domestic norms.” Checkel further defines a cultural match as
a situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are
convergent with domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system
(constitutions, judicial codes, laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational
ethos and administrative procedures). (Checkel, 1998)
More recently, Amitav Acharya, proposes a dynamic explanation of norm diffusion that
describes how local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure that the norms fit with the
agents’ cognitive priors and identities. Acharya calls this process “localization” and it is
said to occur where there is contestation between emerging transnational norms and
preexisting regional and normative and social orders” (Acharya, 2004: 241). Specifically
he argues that successful norm diffusion depend on the extent to which they provide
opportunities for localization.
In parallel to the previous debate, constructivist highlights the process by which
these new norms are institutionalized. This perspective emphasize that ideas an norms
have a strong and continuous influence on state policy as they become embodied in
institutions and that institutions themselves can become autonomous and powerful
political actors (Barnett & Finnemore 2004). Cortell and Davis stress the role of institution
“as providers of the rules of the game for citizens and state officials, establishing rights
and obligation, identify what is legitimate or not, and, in the process, help national actors
define their interests domestically and internationally” (Cortell & Davis, 2000: 79).9
Another interesting example of the role of institutions is Legro’s (1997) perspective which
mixes a cultural and organizational theory that “focuses on the way that the pattern of
assumption, ideas and beliefs that prescribes how a group should adapt to its external
environment and manage its internal affairs, interests, and calculations”. Legro applied his
“organizational cultural approach” to explain the varying use of force in World War II.
9

25

Sikkink specifically emphasize that human rights principles acquire strong and
continuous influence when they become embedded in institutions (Sikkink 2004).
As explained before, constructivists have done very little research on the human
rights diplomacy of the Global South. This study adds to current constructivist research
by looking at both the role of domestic and international factors described in the two
waves of constructivist research described previously. These include assessing the
following variables: a) International dimensions: Human rights as international standards
of behavior as the possible product of socialization among states; b) Domestic
dimensions: the role of “norm entrepreneurs” (defined here as political elites and civil
society in this research) and political institutions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the
prospects for adopting international human rights. Looking at both domestic and
international dimensions simultaneously is an innovation of this study since the majority
of constructivist work focuses only in one dimension or primarily in one.
Gaps in the Literature and Hypothesis
The previous review of the current scholarly work on human rights foreign policy
reveals important gaps in understanding the process by which state adopt these policies.
This research seeks to fill these gaps.
First, when explaining why states adopt human rights the three predominant IR
approaches tend to focus on one level of analysis either domestic or international. This is
an important shortcoming considering that current foreign policy analysis is increasingly
incorporating perspective that see any state’s foreign policy as a reflection of the subtle
interplay of domestic and international conditions and pressures (Evans, Jacobson,
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Putnam 1993; Milner 1997). This study will look at the intersection of both domestic and
international factors to explain foreign policy outcomes.
Second, research on the domestic factors that drive new democracies to adopt
international human rights is very limited. Moravcsik’s work from the liberal front is a
potential good starting point to explain why new democracies adopt human rights in the
first place and this research will test this proposition. Still, an obvious shortcoming of this
perspective is its incapability of explaining why states’ commitment to international
human rights persists once democratic consolidation takes place. On the other hand,
constructivist research on the domestic processes shaping the adoption of international
norms into the foreign policy process is scant and the majority of it is still very much at
the theoretical level with little empirical work. This approach highlights the importance
of looking at “norms entrepreneurs” and institutions but without specifying which
specific factors to look at. This study focuses on political elites and civil society as the
“norms entrepreneurs” and identifies the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as the most relevant
institution when comes to foreign policy decision-making and implementation.
Domestic considerations are especially critical for the selected cases. The political
leaders of Chile and Brazil put forward a series of political, economic and social reforms
in order to move beyond the authoritarian practices of the past with the goal of securing
and strengthening the democratic regimes at home. In both cases— but with different
degrees—these domestic reforms conditioned foreign policy decisions. Simultaneously,
other domestic conditions such as institutional and bureaucratic practices, the
predominant ideology of decision-makers significantly affect the ways in which
international norms such as human rights are perceived locally.
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Third, when comes to the effects of international dimensions, structural realist
accounts provide very little value-added to understand the incorporation of human rights
into foreign policy due to its almost exclusive focus on material power in the
international system. Constructivist approaches are more appropriate to understand why
and how international human rights ideas affect the behavior of states. Yet, one of the
shortcomings of this approach is that it assumes that the process of socialization by which
states adopt human rights as standards of appropriate behavior affect all countries equally
or at least similarly. So far, states responses to international human rights are so diverse
that there seems to be no good reason to hold this assumption especially when comes to
new democracies from the global south. Understanding the different ways in which
international and domestic factors influence the foreign policy of states can provide a
better clue as to which are the causal mechanism affecting the adoption of human rights
foreign policies. This will allow scholars to better understand the possible ways in which
states especially those from the global south will engage with the international human
rights regime and to better account for their critiques and potential contributions.
This study builds upon the relevant literature on human rights foreign policy and
fills some of its gap. In light of the above theoretical and empirical discussion, this study
assess the following international and domestic variables as possible drivers for the
inclusion of human rights into foreign policy, testing the following hypotheses.
International Dimension: Human Rights as International Standards of Behavior
The role of international human rights ideas and norms in changing the perception
of a country’s national interest and in setting international standards for the behavior of
states has been documented by constructivist research on the subject. From this
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perspective, states adopt human rights foreign policy as a result of a process of
international socialization that is driven by the search for international legitimacy and
“peer pressures” for conformity (to be part of a group), and the desire of leaders to
enhance its credibility. Yet, international pressures and the normative force of
international human rights do not seem to affect all countries in the same degrees and
there is a need to understand the different ways in which states respond and adapt to these
influences.
Hypothesis: International influences affect the adoption of human rights foreign
policies differently depending on a state’s perception of what constitutes international
legitimacy and its international role.
Domestic Dimension
The democratic “lock in.” Liberal theories predict the adoption of international
human rights instruments in order to protect unstable new democracies or as a formula to
consolidate the credibility of the new authorities vis-à-vis domestic political opponents
(See next chapter). Thus, the question to be asked is whether governments of newly
democratic states feel pressure to consolidate the credibility of the new democratic
regime vis-à-vis non-democratic forces in the society and commit to international treaties
and institutions as a means to reach their goals.
Hypothesis: Political elites during the transition to democracy use international
human rights foreign policy instrumentally for domestic gains.
Elite leadership’s role. The personality, values and beliefs of a leader, or group
leaders, can shape the policies of a state. Characteristics of leaders are generally more
influential when they have significant latitude in shaping policy and in ambiguous,
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uncertain, or complex situations as is normally the case in process of transition to
democracy. In these cases, the leaders have a larger opportunity to act as “norms
entrepreneurs”, providing legitimization to foreign norms or ideas. In this particular case
it is important to assess if political leaders and decision-makers’ have an unusual personal
commitment to promoting and legitimizing human rights initiatives.
Hypothesis: Political leaders and decision-makers’ commitment to human rights
are important drivers for promoting and legitimizing human rights values into a state’s
international policies.
Foreign Ministry and its impact on the foreign policy process. The role of
domestic institutions has been often overlooked in the literature dealing with human
rights in international politics.10 The institutional dynamics and the prevalent ideas within
the bureaucracies that decide over foreign policy can critically influence the potential
inclusion of human rights policies. The identification of particular foreign policy
ideologies inside the foreign ministry will allow a better understanding of the potential fit
of human rights into the shared ideas and values that have historically motivated states
foreign policies. In other words, the attitude of Ministry of Foreign Affairs is
fundamental. Is it sympathetic or at least not hostile to a strong human rights foreign
policy? How do its history, structure, ethos and recruiting patterns affect the policy views
it communicates to political leaders? And what is the degree of influence it exercises over
the outcome of the foreign policy process?

10

Depending on the selected countries some state institutions are more critical than others to
understand foreign policy outcomes. This research focuses specifically on the role of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs due to the low impact of congress or other state institutions for these cases.
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Hypothesis: A high degree of fit between universal human rights and the
prevalent ideas motivating decisions inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs positively
impacts the commitment of a state to international human rights policies.
Civil society. Foreign policy scholarship is increasingly moving away from an
exclusive governmental focus towards looking at the role of societal groups in explaining
policy choices. The impact of domestic civil society when advocating for human rights
increases with the support of international actors. This has been sufficiently documented
by the work on “transnational advocacy networks” (TANS) (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
TANS—groups motivated by principled ideas and values rather than material concerns—
are critical drivers for policy change towards international human rights policies.
Hypothesis: Strong domestic civil society groups connected to international
human rights advocacy networks effectively pressure governments to commit to
international human rights policies.
Overview of the Argument
Existing International Relations approaches explaining state’s support of
international human rights fail to explain adequately why some new democracies commit
to human rights more than others. The empirical work on human rights diplomacy from
countries in the Global South is also very limited. To fill this theoretical and empirical
gap in the literature, I examine the domestic and international factors that determine the
commitment to international human rights of new democracies from the global south.
I find that the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition
and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with
different degrees of impact. International values and pressures by themselves, while
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necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to have not
insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be more or less
likely to actively include human rights in their international policies depending on the
following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of
human rights into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to international human
rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of
their government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards international human rights
and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process.
In the case of Chile, the higher degree of commitment to international human
rights was significantly shaped by the timing of its transition to democracy in the early
1990s, which coincide with the end of the Cold War and a new wave of democratization
across the region. The favorable external environment was combined with a pressing
need to recover Chile’s international credibility after years of being isolated from the
international community of states due to human rights abuses during the military regime.
At the same time, important domestic factors significantly pushed Chile to
commit to international human rights policies. The uncertain conditions in which the
transition to democracy took place and the lack of maneuver of the new authorities
prompted the government to use foreign policies for domestic purposes. But human rights
values were not use only for instrumental purposes. This new group of leaders also had
an unusual level of commitment to promoting and legitimizing human rights initiatives
due to their personal history of struggle during the Pinochet regime. This led to
development of new foreign policy ideas that were convergent with human rights values.
The limited bureaucracy of the Chilean foreign ministry and a civil society with extensive
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ties with international human rights organizations and the government further
strengthened this process. Finally, the same political elites were in power for more than
twenty years, further institutionalizing Chile’s commitment to international human rights.
Unlike Chile, Brazil’s international status and prestige did not diminish
significantly during the military regime and there were no significant foreign policy
changes during the transitional period. Brazil’s diplomacy maintained its traditional
suspicious attitude towards international human rights. However, starting in the 1990s
Brazil’s foreign policy experienced a strategic change as a result of the consolidation of
the democratic system especially during Cardoso’s Presidency along with the country’s
economic opening. The search for international credibility and legitimacy became only
during this period an important objective of Brazil’s diplomacy and the adherence to
international human rights and international human rights institutions played a role in
attaining those goals. Indeed, this study documents how Brazil’s foreign policy
experienced a shifted from a defensive posture to broadly accepting the role of human
rights in international politics. Yet, despite Brazil’s increasing acceptance of
humanitarian ideas, the country was still pretty much anchored on international strategies
privileging importance of absolute sovereignty and non-intervention in international
affairs. Domestic factors played a critical role explaining this variance. The Brazilian
case demonstrates that democratic transitions not always generate local incentives for
accepting international human rights norms. Most importantly, it highlights how history,
institutional and bureaucratic practices, and the kind of ideology of decision-makers and
political elites affect the ways in which international human rights norms are perceived
locally. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been dominated by a powerful and
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fairly autonomous Foreign Ministry that has been somewhat suspicious of international
human rights and that had tended to disregard humanitarian interventions as a cover for
great power involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. The lack of local NGOS 11
working on monitoring and influencing foreign policy decisions further constrained the
prospects of a more active inclusion of human rights into Brazil’s international policies.

Brazilian NGOS started monitoring Brazil’s foreign policy on human rights only during the
mid-2000s.
11
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CHAPTER 2: CHILE’S HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY
Following General Augusto Pinochet’s departure from power in 1990, one of the
first objectives of the center-left coalition in power (“Coalition of Parties for Democracy”
or CPD) was to actively promote the reinsertion of Chile into the community of
democratic states as a way of recovering the country’s international credibility that was
lost due to the multiple condemnations made by international institutions, states, and
transnational NGOs aiming to stop the human rights abuses perpetrated by the military
regime. Because the CPD continued to win presidential elections, holding office for four
consecutive terms12, policymakers were able to develop a consistent and coherent agenda
on foreign relations for over twenty years. They promoted the notion that a relatively
small country like Chile without geostrategic or economic prominence needs to search for
alternative sources of power actively participating in the creation and strengthening of
international norms and institutions and reinforcing Chile’s traditional emphasis on
international law and multilateralism as a way of leveling the playing field among
nations.
Chile’s historical preference for building multilateral institutions, however, is not
a sufficient condition for becoming an international human rights promoter. In fact many
small countries have active multilateral foreign policies in different issue-areas but are

12

President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), Eduardo Frei (1994-2000), Ricardo Lagos (20002006), and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010).
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less active than Chile on the realm of human rights. Among the conditions that were key
for Chile to commit to international human rights is the presence of domestic actors
willing to mobilize, promote, and legitimize human rights ideas into the foreign policy
process. A key element in this analysis is the unique role played by a group of highly
qualified experts in international relations with extensive ties with human rights advocacy
networks that entered as part of the new democratic government in key positions at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The similar political backgrounds of these individuals
enabled them to transform their personal ideals into more than two decades of effective
foreign policy. These actors shared common values, had similar beliefs about what
constitutes Chile’s national interest and, most importantly, developed concrete foreign
policy initiatives with an emphasis on international human rights and the promotion of
democracy.
Chapter two explains Chile’s support for international human rights and places it
within the context of Chilean foreign policy since the transition to democracy. The first
chapter provides a detailed assessment of Chile’s diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2010
in three arenas that are crucial for the promotion and protection of human rights: a) Legal
(ratification of International human rights treaties); b) Institution-Building/ international
human rights regimes (Participation in multilateral human rights institutions at the UN
and OAS); c) Peace promotion and humanitarian protection (UN peace keeping
initiatives and responses to humanitarian crisis especially massive human rights
violations) Chapter three discusses the international and domestic determinants that
explain why, and under which conditions, human rights principles came to be an
important part of Chile’s foreign policy.
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Chile’s Assessment13
Chile’s involvement with the promotion of universal human rights dates back to
the creation of what is today the international human rights regime after the Second
World War. Chilean diplomats along with a reduce number of leaders from other
developing countries particularly from Asia and Latin America were able to play a
significant role during the drafting of the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR). Chile’s Permanent Representative at the UN, Hernán Santa Cruz, was one
among the group of ten international figures who drafted the UDHR in 1948 (Sikkink
1993(b)/2004; Reus-Smit 2011). Chile was also active in the ensuing debate. Speaking in
the Third Committee of the General Assembly on the draft Declaration, the Chilean
Representative stated almost prophetically “no one could infringe upon the rights
proclaimed in it [the Universal Declaration] without becoming an outcast from the
community of states” (Reus-Smit 2011: 532).
The coup d'état in 1973 and subsequent military regime broke Chile’s traditional
engagement with the international human rights system. During this period, Chile’s
participation in the United Nations and other international and regional fora was
drastically reduced. Those very same international institutions that Chile had helped to
create were at the forefront of the fight against the massive human rights violations
There is very little written on Chile’s Human Rights Foreign Policy. It is also important to note
that the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not regularly publish or keeps a public record of
the country’s voting record at UN human rights forums. Unlike other countries, including Brazil,
there is no NGO or any other institution monitoring Chile’s foreign policy decisions on this
subject.
13
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perpetrated by the military regime. The United Nations condemned the Chilean
government several times, at critical moments of state repression. Following the coup
against President Salvador Allende, the United Nations established an ad hoc working
group (1975) to inquire into the situation of human rights in the country. This ad hoc
working group is generally perceived to be the first “Special Procedure” of the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.In 1979, this working group was replaced by a
special rapporteur and two experts to study the fate of the disappeared. This led to the
establishment of the first thematic Special Procedure in 1980: The Working Group on
Disappearances to deal with the question of enforced disappearances throughout the
world. The Inter-American Commission on Human rights also presented several reports
on the human rights situation of the country (Vargas, 2012).
By late 1970s and early-1980s, Chile was increasingly seen as a pariah state
within the international community and the country’s international image was at its
lowest levels. Chile’s relations with Latin American countries dramatically deteriorated
after the country decided to withdraw from the Andean Pact; some European countries
issued complaints against the country due to the killing of their nationals in Chile’s
territory—most notably Spain, and the lessening of United States’ support after the
killing in 1976 of the former Chilean Minister of Foreign Affairs, Orlando Letelier and
his American assistant, Ronni Moffit, in Washington DC significantly affected the
country’s standing within the international community. Agents of the Chilean secret
police planned and perpetrated this assassination, the first one of this kind committed not
only beyond Latin American borders but in US soil and with one local casualty. The
international repercussions of the killings were considerable and accentuated
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international criticism of the military regime. In the words of the Chilean diplomat and
scholar, Heraldo Muñoz: “…each time the government increases its authoritarian
measures domestically there will be a revitalization of the negative image of the regimen
externally and political isolationism will continue characterizing the foreign relations of
the military regime” (Muñoz 1982: 597).
The reestablishment of democracy opened an enormous window of opportunity
for the restoration of Chile’s diplomatic prestige. Consistent with its historical tradition,
and in light of the new democratic government’s redefined objectives, Chile’s most
immediate foreign policy objective was to re-insert itself into the international
community. Promotion of human rights became an integral part of the country’s
international strategy. The newly elected President Patricio Aylwin defined this objective
clearly in his 1992 State of the Union—a speech that traditionally has an almost exclusive
domestic focus— in which he explains the importance of human rights for Chile’s
foreign policy:
We consider that the defense of human rights is an ineluctable duty of any
government that is committed to peace, one in which there is no room for
invoking the principle of non- intervention. As a designated member of the United
Nations Human Rights Commission, Chile will act according to this conception.
(Aylwin in Morande and Aranda 2010: 95)
The first step toward the effective inclusion of human rights into Chile’s foreign policy
was the creation in 1990 of a Human Rights Unit within the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs—that later became the Human Rights Department (DIDEHU)— and the
appointment of a very well-known Chilean human rights lawyer, Roberto Garreton, as
Ambassador and chief of the new unit. The prompt institutionalization of human rights
issues within the Ministry of foreign Affairs signaled Chile’s commitment to human
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rights protection abroad. This decision also paved the way for the next three
administrations (Eduardo Frei 1994-2000, Ricardo Lagos 2000-2006 and, Michelle
Bachelet 2006-2010) to embrace human rights as a salient national interest.
Yet as comparative experience indicates, strong rhetoric and the creation of
governmental departments do not necessarily lead to diplomatic action (Farer & Fuentes,
2013). A State’s rhetorical and formal commitment to the promotion of human rights
does not lead invariably to consistent performance in this area. The following section
provides a detailed assessment of Chile’s international human rights policies and
diplomatic actions from 1990 to 2010 in three arenas that were explained in the
introductory chapter: a) Legal (ratification of International human rights treaties); b)
International human rights Institutions; c) Peace promotion and humanitarian protection;
d) Financial assistance.
Legal: Human Rights Treaties
In 1972, a year before the military coup against the elected government led by
Doctor Salvador Allende, Chile ratified the the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
While not withdrawing the nation’s signature from the two treaties, the Pinochet
dictatorship avoided ratifying them. So they remained dead letters until 1989 when
according to Chilean custom, ratification was effected through publication in the Official
Newspaper (Vargas 2012). Ratification of other important human rights treaties followed
rapidly (See Table 1). Thereafter, through successive administrations additional human
rights treaties were ratified as they became available. The present list includes the
International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention concerning Indigenous and Tribal
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Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO No. 169); the Second Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, aimed at the abolition of the death
penalty; the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death
Penalty; the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. As today, Chile has ratified all of the most important human
rights agreements.
Among that now considerable list of treaties one occasioned significant political
debate. The Statute of the International Criminal Court stirred controversy. Despite being
one of the first nations to sign the Rome Statute, the country’s ratification process was
delayed by a number of legal and constitutional difficulties and could only be ratified
after the Chilean Chamber of Deputies approved a constitutional amendment recognizing
the Court's jurisdiction.
At the Inter-American Level (Table 2), Chile ratified the American Convention
only a few months after its transition to democracy (August 1990). At the same time the
country recognized the contentious jurisdiction of the Inte-American Court of Human
Rights, that is to say, it accepted that the Commission or any other state party could refer
cases against the Chilean state to the Court. Chile followed the majority of the Latin
American states that also ratified regional human rights instruments in the early 1990s.
Brazil, however, was one of the last countries among Latin American States accepting the
jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court only in 1998.
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Table 2
Chile: Selected International Treaties
Treaty
Year of Ratification
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1972 (It came into force in 1989*
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
1972 (It came into force in 1989*
Cultural Rights
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
1989
Discrimination against Women
Convention on the Rights of the Child
1990
Ottawa Convention
2001
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
2008
ILO C169 Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention
2008
International Convention for the Protection of All
2009
Persons from Enforced Disappearance
International Criminal Court/ Rome Statue
2009
Sources: Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=35; Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en.

Table 3
Chile: Selected Regional Human Rights Treaties
Treaty
Year of Ratification
American Convention of Human Rights
1990
Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture
1988
Convention on the Prevention, punishment and
1996
Eradication of Violence against Women.
"CONVENTION OF BELEM DO PARA”.
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights 2008
to Abolish Death Penalty
Convention on Forced Disappearance of Persons
2010
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
2001
Discrimination Against Persons with Disabilities
Source: IACHR, http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/basic_documents.asp

International Human Rights Regimes
Chile’s involvement with international human rights is set within its broader
strategy of strengthening multilateralism. Table 3 summarizes the country’ involvement
with major UN institutions since 1990, in particular the ones with a human rights focus.
Chile has been elected twice to a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council in spite
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of an intense domestic debate on the possible political costs associated with such a post.
The country was recently re-elected to occupy a seat in the Security Council in 20142015. Chile actively participates in the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC),
even holding the presidency on several occasions. In addition, Chilean diplomats working
at the United Nations mission in New York under the leadership of Ambassador Heraldo
Muñoz, strongly supported the creation of the UN Peace-Building Commission in 2005,
holding the presidency of that organization for two years. It is important to note that
securing the election to the Security Council and to have a diplomat elected to a position
like the Presidency of ECOSOC or the Peace-Building Commission is an intensive
diplomatic task. Chile invested considerable political capital and significant diplomatic
efforts to be part of these organizations and to obtain the Presidency of some of these
international institutions.
Additionally, Chile incorporated the concept of human security into its foreign
policy, and correspondingly created a special unit within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
dedicated to bringing a human-security perspective to bear on diplomatic issues. Since
1999 Chile has been part of the Human Security Network14, a group of likeminded
countries that have made human protection an integral part of their foreign policy
concerns (Brauch & Fuentes 2009). Finally, Chile was one of the founding members of
the Community of Democracies15, a global, intergovernmental coalition of democratic

14

This network involves thirteen countries: Austria, Canada, Chile, Greece, Ireland, Jordan, Mali,
the Netherlands, Norway, Slovenia, South Africa, Switzerland, and Thailand.
15

The Community of Democracies was initiated by seven countries: Poland, Chile, the Czech
Republic, India, the Republic of Korea, Mali, and the United States. Today, this organization
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countries, whose goal is the promotion of democratic rules and the strengthening of
democratic norms and institutions around the world.
Table 4
Chile’s Participation in Multilateral Initiatives Related to Human Rights
UN Institution

Years of Participation (since the 1990s)
1996-1997
2003-2004
2014
Presidency 1993, 1998 (Somavia)
1998-2000
2002-2004
2008 (3 years)
2011(3 years)
Presidency 2009-2010
1999-Present Presidency 2001-2002
2000-Present, Presidency 2003-2005

Security Council

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)
UN Human Rights Commission
UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)

Peace-building Commission (PBC)
Other Initiatives:
Human Security Network
Community of Democracies
Sources: United Nations, http://www.un.org/; Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile,
www.minrel.gov.cl.

UN Human Rights Commission
The democratization process brought Chile back to its diplomatic work with the
UN human rights institutions and in particular to the United Nations Human Rights
Commission in Geneva. Chile’s participation at the UNHRC was significant during this
period. An assessment of Chile’s work at the UN Human Rights Commission from 1990
to 2005 (until the Commission changed to Human Rights Council in 2006) shows three
distinctive trends: voting behavior, resolutions and thematic motions, and creating and
improving human rights regimes.

consists of seventeen member countries. In 2000, in Warsaw, ministerial delegations from 106
countries signed the final declaration calling for the establishment of the Community of
Democracies.
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Voting behavior. Chile consistently voted at the Commission in favor of
addressing country-specific human rights situations as violations escalated in many
nations and regions. This is the case of resolutions regarding Cuba (with the exception of
one year), Iran, Iraq, Rwanda, Sudan, Myanmar, Belarus, Zaire (currently named the
Democratic Republic of Congo—DRC), and North Korea (Piccone, 2004).16 Chile has
systematically voted in favor of resolutions addressing abuses in the Israeli occupied
territories. One of the exceptions to the rule was the case of East Timor. Chile voted in
favor of the resolution in 1993 condemning the grave human rights abuses committed by
Indonesian authorities and encouraging Indonesia to invite a Special Rapporteur, but it
abstained the following year.17
Two cases particularly stand out, the resolutions on Cuba and on Belarus. In the
case of Cuba, the different resolutions generated political debate over the years within
and among the political parties that were part of the governmental coalition in Chile. Yet,
the country’s vote has consistently remained in favor of examining the violations
occurring in the Caribbean country. Cuba’s case has been very contentious among Latin
American states. Brazil always abstained on Cuba’s resolution at the Commission while
other Latin American states had a more erratic voting behavior. Argentina, for example,
voted in favor of a resolution on Cuba in 2001/2002/2003 but abstained in 2004 and

Note that the Ministry does not keep a systematized record of Chile’s votes with the
Commission or the Human Rights Council (at least up to 2010).
16

17

According to an interview with Roberto Garreton, the lobby from Indonesia was extensive and
reached important Chilean officials. After Chile voted in favor of the resolution in 1993,
Indonesia managed to propose a project at the Non-alignment Movement over Bolivia’s access to
the sea—one of the most sensitive topics for Chilean diplomacy. Under these circumstances,
Chile abstains the following year at the Commission.
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2005. Central American countries have consistently voted in favor, while Paraguay,
Ecuador and Venezuela have abstained in several occasions. Mexico has voted in favor
only since 2002. Internationally, the case of Cuba also generates controversy. A study
from the Democracy Coalition Project indicates that only 58% of Democratic states in
2005 voted in favor of the Cuba’s resolution at the UN Commission on Human Rights in
2005 while 21% voted against and 21% abstained (Piccone, 2004).
The different resolutions on Belarus also generated controversy at the Human
Rights Commission. Chile, once again voted in favor in all the instances in which this
case came into vote. Other Latin American countries such as Argentina (2004), Ecuador
(2005), Honduras (2005, 2005) and Brazil (2005) voted abstention in some of years in
which member states decided to take this situation into a vote. At the international level,
several countries decided to abstain or vote against resolutions on Belarus. In 2004, for
example, India, South Africa, and Russia voted against the resolution. The Democracy
Coalition Project indicates that in 2005, 33% of democratic states voted against or
abstained on the Belarus vote at the UN Human Rights Commission.
Resolutions and thematic motions. Chile co-sponsored several resolutions
addressing severe human rights situations in countries such as Burundi, Myanmar, and
Sudan as well as thematic resolutions. Due to Chile’s very limited staff working on
international human rights and lack of resources, the country joined forces with likeminded countries (particularly European countries) and co-sponsored some of their
proposals. It is also important to highlight that Chile was an active promoter of new
international human rights instruments, most notably it sponsored UN Resolution 60/127
on “the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
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Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law” and the then United Nations Commission on Human
Rights endorsed the Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human
rights through action to combat impunity (impunity principles).
Creating and improving human rights regimes. Chile actively worked on the
creation and the improvement of international human rights regimes. At the 1993 World
Conference on Human Rights (Vienna Declaration) Chile acted as one of the Vicepresidents and played a role in promoting the universality of human rights.18 Chile´s
delegation was also active on the attempted reform of the UN Human Rights Commission
in the course of its transformation into the Human Rights Council-HRC (Vargas, 2011).
During the discussion to create the HRC (and the review process that took place after its
initial four years of functioning), Chilean diplomats favored proposals to improve
controversial issues related to selectivity and membership. They also favored the
inclusion of procedural aspects such as quicker response to emergencies and ways to
strengthen of Special Procedures with the Council. For example, Chile along Argentina,
Mexico, and Peru, proposed a mechanism through which the Council would examine
situations formally brought to its attention by the High Commissioner (HRW 2011).
UN Human Rights Council
After the 2006 morphing of the Commission into the Human Rights Council,
Chile continued with its strategy of supporting institutions for the protection and

18

In an interview with Roberto Garretón in July 2013, Chief of the Chilean delegation, he recalls
that Chile was very active and that its contribution was internationally recognized as indicated in
the Journal “Liberation de Paris”, 26 June 1993.
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promotion of human rights within the UN. Indeed, Chile has been praised by Human
Rights Watch as one of the most influential countries from the Global South in the
promotion and protection of universal human rights internationally (Kenneth, 2009;
HRW 2010, 2011). Human Rights Watch latest report (2011) on the Council’s work
states that “Chile has a strong and coherent voting record at the Council. Its positions are
based on a principled approach to human rights, which is consistent and non-selective”.
Table 4 summarizes Chile´s participation within the UNHRC. The country has been
elected member of the Council twice (2008 and 2011) for three years terms and in 2009 it
was selected as Vice-president of the Council for one year to represent its regional group.
In terms of resolutions addressing country or special sessions considering urgent
situation’s, Chile systematically voted in favor of examining situations or resolutions o
Sudan, North Korea, Iran, Belarus, Sri Lanka, Congo and Syria (HRW 2011).
The Eleventh Special Session (2009) at the UNHRC on the human rights situation
in Sri Lanka was particularly interesting when comes to assessing the voting the behavior
at the Human Rights Council of different countries and Latin American states in
particular. Germany sponsored a session on behalf on behalf of 17 member states and 20
member states. Among these countries were Argentina, Chile, Mexico, Canada, Ukraine,
Uruguay and European Union member states. The majority of the states in the African
group, and NAM withheld support for the session. While consultations were held on an
outcome text, an alternative and largely self-congratulatory resolution was introduced by
Sri Lanka, the concerned country. This resolution included for example an explicit
reference to “the principle of non-interference in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of states,” a statement that directly undermined the central mandate
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of the Council to monitor human rights violations internationally especially under
situations of armed conflicts as it was the case in Sri Lanka (Piccone, 2004).
In response to this draft, Germany once again offered a set of amendments to
strengthening it. States were split between those who have called for the special session
and favored a strong role of the international community with regard to humanitarian
assistance and accountability, and those which did not support the convening of a special
session and supported the government of Sri Lanka’s prerogative to deal with the crisis.
Arguing that the amendments were an attempt to redraft the document, Cuba presented a
no-action motion. Cuba’s non-action motion on the amendments was approved by a vote
of 22 in favor, 17 against and seven abstentions. As it was the case on the vote in the call
for the session Argentina, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay all voted against the no-action
motion. A number of states including Brazil and Nigeria abstained.
Another example of Chile’s voting behavior vis-à-vis other UNHRC members
was the resolution in the Tenth session of the Council on the resolution on the
Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea (2009). The resolution strongly called the
government of the DPRK to stop the human rights violations occurring in the country and
to cooperate with special procedures. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 26 in
favor, six against and 15 abstentions. The Group of Latin American and Caribbean States,
the GRULAC group as it is known in the Council, were noticeable divided between those
who supported the resolutions and those which abstain or voted against. Chile, Argentina,
Mexico, Uruguay voted for the resolution while Brazil, Nicaragua, and Bolivia abstained.
It is important to note that in this particular vote, Brazil changed its position from support
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from the mandate from previous years to abstaining. China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia,
Nigeria, and Russia all voted against the resolution.
Table 5
Chile and the UNHRC 2006-2011
Years of Membership
Voting on relevant countrysituations/ resolutions

Other relevant thematic
initiatives:

2008-2011
2011-2014
In favor:
Sudan
North Korea
Iran
Belarus
Syria
-Sponsor resolution to mainstream gender throughout
the UN, especially within the Human Rights Council
and treaty bodies. Several initiatives to promote
women’s rights.
- Active member of the bureau of the Preparatory
Committee for the 2001 Durban World Conference.
Also on its review process in 2009.
-Supports the implementation of the Council’s
mandate to respond promptly to emergencies.
Cosponsor of the special session on Libya and also
sponsor the resolution on Iran, which led to the
creation of the special rapporteur mandate.

2009 (submitted) and also extended a standing
invitation to the Human Rights Council mechanism.
Source: HRW (2011), Office of the High Commissioner of Human rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/LACRegion/Pages/CLIndex.aspx.
Universal Periodic Review

In terms of initiatives on the HRC, Chile has been an important actor when it
comes to supporting the effective implementation of the Council’s mandate to respond
promptly to human rights emergencies. It was a cosponsor of the special session on Libya
and the only council member of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean countries to
sponsor the resolution on Iran, which led to the creation of the special rapporteur mandate
(HRW 2011). In a note to the UN General Assembly presenting its candidacy for
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reelection to the Human Rights Council, this point was made fairly clear by the Chilean
delegation:
We believe that, as part of the Council’s action, there can and must be a
strengthening of the procedures for the early warning of and response to situations
of mass violations of human rights in a particular State, including special sessions,
on-site visits and stronger resolutions on such countries. (Permanent Mission of
Chile at the General Assembly, 2011)
Chile is also among the states that regularly advocate for the strengthening the
Council’s mechanisms and in particular the independence of the special procedures, as
well as promoting NGO participation (HRW 2011). In the same concept, Chile’s
delegation indicated:
We stressed the importance of improving the Council’s working methods. We
also stressed the need for it to be a principal organ of the United Nations system
and for the review process to be conducted using transparent, inclusive and open
procedures, with the participation of non-governmental organizations, the
Council’s special procedures and the organizations and agencies of the United
Nations system. (Permanent Mission of Chile at the General Assembly, 2011)
Thematically, Chile promoted at the Commission and later in the Council initiatives
mainly on civil and political rights. Several interviewers indicated that there was not a
deliberate policy to focus on these rights but that the recent transition to democracy
combined with the depth of the human rights violations perpetrated by the military
regime marked the country’s international commitment with the promotion of political
and civil rights. Chile has sponsored or cosponsored relevant initiatives in the Council
and other UN mechanisms to offer reparations to victims human rights violations, the
right to truth, the protection against forced disappearances, among others.
For the past decade, in particular, Chile has been a strong advocate of women’s
rights. The country sponsored the Commission on Human Rights resolution on
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integrating the human rights of women throughout the United Nations system and
cosponsored the resolutions on maternal mortality and the elimination of discrimination
against women. Chile´s human rights agenda also included efforts to combat racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance. It participated actively as a
member of the bureau of the Preparatory Committee for the 2001 Durban World
Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, at
which it was one of the Vice-Presidents. Before that, in December 2000, Chile had hosted
the Regional Conference of the Americas in preparation for the 2001 Durban World
Conference.
Finally, despite of the relatively small size of the country, a considerable number
of Chileans have occupied relevant positions within the UN human rights machinery as
special rapporteurs or in special procedures of the Human Rights Commission and
Council (Vargas, 2012).19
The Inter-American Human Rights System
Only a few months after the democratic government of Patricio Aylwin took over,
the American Convention of Human Rights was ratified, also recognizing the jurisdiction
of the Inter-American Court over contentions cases. According to Felipe Gonzales,20

19

Just to mention some Chilean experts at the UN human rights system since 1990: Cecilia
Medina, member of the Committee for Civil and Political Rights; Alejandro Gonzalez y Claudio
Grossman, Committee against Torture; Marta Mauras, Committee for the Rights of the Child;
Maria Soledad Cisternas, Committee for Persons with Disabilities; Maria Magdalena Sepulveda,
expert on the issue of human rights and extreme poverty; Roberto Garreton, Special Rapporteur
for the CDR and member of the Committee for Arbitrary Detention; and Jose Bengoa, member of
the UN working group on minorities.
20

Felipe Gonzalez is today a member of the Inter-American Comission of Human Rights.
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Chile reposition itself within the Inter-American system very quickly, assuming
during the first years of the transition to democracy a protagonist role in the
strengthening of the system, calling in the different OAS forums for states to
implement the mandates of the Commission and the Court. It also played and
active role in the preparation of the Inter-American Convention on Forced
Disappearance that was finally adopted in 1994. (Gonzalez, Felipe 1997: 11)
Yet, “Chile’s attitude towards the Inter-American system started to change as soon as the
Commission questioned the country against certain cases” (Gonzalez, 1997: 11).
In the 1990s and the early years of 2000s the Commission issued several
decisions on specific cases against Chile, which the state either did not obey or took
several years to do so. There were two group of cases in which the Commission declared
the Chilean Amnesty law to be contrary to the American Convention. No action was
taken by the state at the time, and it was only years later that Chilean jurisprudence would
change in this regard (Gonzalez 2010). The latter does not come entirely as a surprise
considering that when Chile ratified the American Convention of Human Rights in March
1990—probably foreseen future controversies with the Commission due the Amnesty
Law in place in the country since 1978 by the military regime—it was signed with a
special reservation. The Chilean Delegation explicitly declared
the Government of Chile places on record that this recognition of the competence
and jurisdiction of the Commission applies to events subsequent to the date of
deposit of this instrument of ratification or, in any case, to events which began
subsequent to March 11, 1990.
In the end of the 1990s there was also the case in which the commission decided that
appointed senators adversely affected the political rights of Chilean citizens. It took six
years to respond to this decision (Gonzalez, 2010: 11).21
Chile, however, was more active in implementing the Court’s decision in the case of The Last
Temptation of Christ.
21
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Experts have criticized Chile’s involvement with the Inter-American human rights
system particularly during the 1990s because “the Chilean state did not engage in
amicable settlements during proceedings at the Commission, in contrast to the trend
among other states that were interested in supporting the Inter-American system.22”
(Gonzalez, Felipe 2010:167). Yet, since the turn of the century, Chile’s attitude towards
the Commission has been more positive. The government has engaged in more
negotiations that have led to some amicable settlements and “generally playing a role
more consistent with that of a state that allegedly supports the enhancement of the InterAmerican system” (Gonzalez, 2010: 168).
Finally, it is important to note that a significant number of Chilean lawyers have
been selected to part of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the Court.
Chile is one of the countries with the highest number of Commissioners in the past
twenty years. Since 1990 the Chilean selected member of the Inter-American
Commission of Human Rights includes: Claudio Grossman, Jose Zalaquet y Felipe
Gonzalez. Three Chilean judges have been members of the Inter-American Court:
Maximo Pacheco, Cecilia Medina y Eduardo Vio.
UN Peace Operations and Humanitarian Protection
Chile’s response to the international intervention in Kosovo in 1999 was cautious.
The government did condemn the atrocities perpetrated in Kosovo but at the same time
explicitly manifested their concern about NATO’S decision to intervene without UNSC
approval. This position is probably due to the coincidental arrest of General Pinochet in
22

Moreover, during the 1990s Chile repeatedly argued before the commission that it had not
responsibility for actions of the judiciary (invoking the separation of branches in power).
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London and the need to be consistent with the notion advanced by the government that
prosecuting Pinochet outside Chilean jurisdiction was not in the interest of Chile, a
sovereign state capable of judging him at home. Domestically, the low Chamber of the
Congress issued a declaration on April 19, 1999 addressed to the Chilean Minister of
Foreign Affairs declaring their opposition to an illegitimate intervention lacking the
support from the UNSC (Serrano 2000).
Yet, despite Pinochet’s arrest and unlike other Latin American countries such as
Mexico that were up front defenders of an strict notion sovereignty, the Chilean Mission
at the UN explicitly manifested that respecting sovereign integrity does not precludes that
under exceptional circumstances and under the right authority the international
community should contemplate the possibility of intervening for humanitarian reasons
(Serrano 2000). Chile ultimately decided to participate in peacekeeping and policing in
the area when solicited by the United Nations Peacekeeping Unit in 2000.
Chile also contributed to peacekeeping operations in Iraq, Cambodia, and El
Salvador, among other missions (see Table 5). However, it was not until 2010 that Chile
drastically increased its participation in peacekeeping, sending troops to the Multinational
Force for Haiti and later to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH). With more than 500 troops on the ground since the beginning of the
mission in 2004, Chilean officials see participating in MINUSTAH as one of its greatest
contribution to the protection of human rights, human security and regional peace. The
latter point is continuously emphasized by Chilean delegates, which indicate that this
operation is at the core a regional one. Two Chilean diplomats have been selected as
Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and Head of Mission since the
55

beginning of the mission in 2004. Additionally, since 2010 Chile’s International
Cooperation Agency (AGCI) has been implementing programs on education and
development in the Caribbean nation.
Table 6
Chile’s Participation in UN Peace Operations since 1990















UNIKOM (Iraq – Kuwait), 1991-1993
UNTAC (Cambodia), 1992-1993
ONUSAL (El Salvador), 1992-1995
MOMEP (Ecuador- Peru), 1995, 1999
UNSCOM (Iraq), 1996-1998
UNMIBH (Bosnia Herzegovina),1997-2002
UNTAET (Timor Oriental), 2000-2002
UNMOVIC (Iraq), 2000-2003
UNMIK (Kosovo), 2000-Present
UNFICYP(Chipre), 2001-Present
UNMISET (Timor Leste), 2002-2003
MONUC (DRC), 2003
UNAMA (Afghanistan), 2003-2004
MINUSTAH(Haiti)2004-Present

Source: CECOPAC-Chile, http://www.cecopac.cl/chile_en_opaz/contribucion.html.

Chile has also been one of the leading countries in the region to support the
concept of “Responsibility to Protect” (R2P) as conceptualized by the International
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty’s (ICISS) in 2001 (Fuentes &
Fuentes, 2013). Unlike a substantial minority of Latin American governments that claim
that R2P is a threat to their sovereignty or represents a new form of interventionism,
Chilean leaders have insisted that no country is less sovereign because of its willingness
to accept an international responsibility to respond to mass atrocities. Chilean policy
makers explicitly state that R2P is a legitimate alternative for responding to humanitarian
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crises (Fuentes & Fuentes 2013). In fact, this is one of the reasons why Chilean
delegations have been supportive of the UN Human Rights Council’s mandate to respond
promptly to human rights emergencies.
Chile clearly stated its position in relation to R2P during the 2005 UN World
Summit, when the country supported the inclusion of specific international commitments
endorsing R2P in the Outcome Document. As expressed by the former Chilean Minister
of Foreign Relations, Ignacio Walker, at the Sixtieth Session of the UN General
Assembly,
When States are unable or unwilling to act, this organization cannot remain
indifferent in the face of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes
against humanity. We have an international responsibility to protect that which we
cannot ethically shrink. (Walker, 2005: 2)
During the Summit, the Chilean delegation insisted on its interpretation of the
Responsibility to Protect as a “continuum,” which included the international
responsibility to prevent and assist (Labbe, 2005). It argued that efforts to prevent
genocide and other crimes against humanity needed to address root causes, such as hatred
among ethnic groups and inequality among various groups within a country.23 Finally, in
accordance with the UN Charter, the Chilean delegation concurred with the idea of a
collective international obligation to take timely and decisive action when needed. The
concept of decisive action included the provisional use of coercive tactics only under
certain extreme conditions and only with the collective consent of the Security Council.

23

Yet, there is no evidence of Chile, or of any other Latin American country, taking a global lead
in generating international or regional initiatives specifically aimed at preventing mass atrocities.
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Financial Assistance
The financial contribution to international human rights organizations is also
another indicator of a state commitment in this area. Since 2000 the contribution of Chile
to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights (OHCHR) is limited but
constant across the years. According to the annual OHCHR reports, in 2011 Chile
contributed US$ 25,000 leaving the country according to OHCHR´s donor ranking per
capita in the place 52 out of 71 states (OHCHR, 2011). The United Nations Democratic
FUND (UNDEF) that was created in 2005 is another UN institution providing grants to
civil society groups for democracy promotion. Chile is among the 39 countries
contributing financially to UNDEF with a total amount of US$320,000 from 2005 to
2013. Mexico, Peru and Argentina have also contributed to the UN Democratic Funds
while the rest of Latin American countries have never been donors.
Regarding Chile’s assistance to the Inter-American Human Rights System, the
country has been a longstanding contributor to the Commission’s special budget. In terms
of numbers Chile’s contribution is not that significant24 (IACHR, 2012) (US is the main
contributor to the Human Rights Commission, financing more than 75% of the budget).
Yet, Chile along with Costa Rica and Mexico have consistently contributed to the
Commission’s budget every year and they have recently indicated that they will increase
these funds. In contrast, Brazil, has not contributed any funds in several years
(2007/2010/2011/2012).

Chile’s contribution is not more than 3% of the budget total that comes from the IACHR
member states. Information available only from 2006.
24
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Conclusions
The transition to democracy that began in March 1990 prompted Chilean foreign
policy officials to start a process of international re-insertion with the objective of
recovering the country’s lost prestige within the international community of states due to
the massive human rights abuses committed by the military regime for seventeen years.
This process included coming back as an active participant at the very same international
and regional human rights institutions that were at the forefront of the struggle against
General Pinochet during the dictatorship. The fast signature and ratification of many
international human rights treaties in which the country was not part due to the military
regime’s policy of not accepting international scrutiny over domestic issues were part of
this process. The ratification of the American Convention and the jurisdiction of the
Inter-American Court, for example, were made only three months after the newly
democratic government took over.
The politics of re-insertion also included the participation in multilateral human
rights institutions such as the UN Human Rights Commission. What is more striking is
that these policies continued after the government of Patricio Aylwin ended in 1994 and
long after Chile had left behind its stigma as an international pariah. Moreover, human
rights were integrated into the foreign policy of the three following governments of the
Coalition of Parties for Democracy up to 2010. The assessment of Chile’s human rights
diplomacy from 1990-2010 can be summarized as follows:
Chile was an active player at the multilateral level, especially within UN human
rights institutions. At the Human Rights Commission and later on in the Council the
country evidences a consistent voting behavior when comes to country-specific
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situations. In other words, it voted on the basis of the facts rather than calculations of
political advantage. It has been a significant promoter of international human rights
instruments and thematic initiatives and is permanently searching for mechanisms for
strengthening these institutions. At the Inter-American, it has supported the system
politically and also economically, but it has been weaker when comes to implement
recommendations from the Commission. When it comes to humanitarian protection,
Chile has increased its participation in UN Peace operations with a special emphasis on
of Haiti (MINUSTAH). At the same time, it’s supportive of the concept of the
Responsibility to Protect emphasizing the need for displaying a continuum of
mechanisms and instruments to prevent and effectively respond to human rights
emergencies.
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CHAPTER 3: UNDERSTANDING HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHILE’S
FOREIGN POLICY
Contextualizing Foreign Policy
In explaining why Chile became an international human rights promoter, we first
need to situate it within the larger international and regional context of post-Cold War in
which this nation’s transition to democracy took place. Second, to understand the
domestic drivers of foreign policy with a focus on the shared national experience of the
military regime’s rule and the way that the transition to democracy took place in Chile—
what is called the mode of the transition. Finally, locate the discussion as part of the
general objectives and priorities driving the newer, democratically elected government’s
foreign policy.
International and Regional Context
Only a few months after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the demise of several
communist regimes across Eastern Europe, Patricio Aylwin took over as the first Chilean
President after 17 years of military rule. The new government arrived at the outset of a
new international order, a world with a power dynamic and a normative structure far
different from the one which faced the last democratically elected President, Salvador
Allende in 1970. As a Chilean historian aptly puts it:
Between 1989 and 1990, it seemed that Chile was confirming international
tendencies…Chile was a protagonist within itself of the end of the Cold War,
even before it (the Cold war) disappeared from the international scene.
(Fermandois 2004: 494)
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International changes came hand in hand with regional ones. The democratic transition
initiated in the Southern Cone (Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile) was coupled with the
pacification and democratization process developed in Central America during the 1990s.
Between 1978 and 1991, “no fewer than fifteen of the twenty countries returned to or
established elected civilian governments after experiencing one form or another of
authoritarian rule” (Scott Palmer, 1996). The depth of the democratic wave in each one of
the Latin American countries, at least in terms of establishing electoral democracies,
paved the way for the creation of a regional system for the promotion of democracy at the
regional level.
Domestic changes together with the vastly decreased salience of ideological
rhetoric in US-Latin American relations, due to the end of the Cold War, opened the
political space for better Inter-American relations and for strengthening democratic
governance in the Americas. As Tom Farer has written, the end of the Cold War “sharply
reduced the risk that resolutions endorsing hemispheric action on behalf of democracy
would be treated as licenses for the pursuit of political ends related only loosely (if at all)
to the consolidation and preservation of representative democracy” (Farer, 1996:15). In
June 1991, the OAS adopted the Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal
of the Inter-American System and an accompanying resolution on representative
democracy. It provided that the interruption of a democratic or constitutional form of
government would trigger a process of consultation to consider measures for restoring
democratic legitimacy. Moreover, through the Protocol of Washington of 1993, the OAS
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Charter was modified allowing for the suspension of non-democratic states (Acevedo &
Grossman, 1996).
Liberalism became the reigning orthodoxy in the economic as well as the political
sphere. During this period the so-called “Washington Consensus” drove economic
reforms in Latin America. Leading orthodox economists from the United States and
within the region pushed for an agenda of deregulation of capital markets, free exchange
rates, privatization of national companies. Almost all of the countries in the Americas,
and numerous others outside the hemisphere, followed important parts of the policies of
the Consensus during the 1990s and many continued to do so afterwards. Chile was at the
forefront of these economic reforms and initiated an aggressive policy for market
liberation as described in the next section.
By the beginning of the next decade, many of these economic policies and even
democratic principles have been significantly challenged fundamentally due to the
incapacity of many Latin American governments to overcome increasing levels of
economic and political inequality that are so pervasive throughout the region (UNDP,
2010). The beginning of the new century also brought important international changes as
the rise of other powers—most importantly China— and the advent of a multipolar world
became more evident. Yet, Chile´s international policies up to 2010 present no significant
shifts as a result of these new international developments.25 As the Chilean case goes, the
fundamental tenets of its foreign policy were developed at the beginning of the 1990s and
25

Several Interviewers with different policy makers (including some that are part of the electoral
campaign of Michelle Bachelet who is running to be in office by 2014) said that there is lack of
thinking on Chile´s foreign policy agenda and future goals in light of the current international and
regional agenda.
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since then its international policies have remained very much shaped by the national and
international context in which the transition to democracy took place.
The Mode of the Transition
One of the key characteristics of the transition to democracy in Chile was the
highly constrained condition under which new democratic authorities took office on
March 11th 1990. The military regime imposed an institutional framework (accepted by
the opposition as a condition of the armed forces’ toleration of a democratic transition
that allowed for very few reforms without the approval of the right-wing forces, which
still by and large supported General Pinochet. For instance, the Constitution (1980)
established that the head of the armed forces and the chief of police had fixed
appointments of four years, and that the president could not remove them without the
approval of the National Security Council (NSC). However, the military controlled the
majority of votes in that Council (4 out of 7 votes). Two members of the NSC could call
a meeting if they considered the state to be under threat. Moreover, through the NSC, the
head of military institutions appointed four senators and two members of the
Constitutional Tribunal. Military institutions also held seats in regional and municipal
development councils, the Council of Cinematography (responsible for revising and
censuring movies and TV programs), and the National Mining Company (CODELCO)
(Fuentes S. 2006). Due to the aforementioned system of appointed senators, conservative
sectors controlled the majority of the Senate between 1990 and 2005. Thus, any
substantive reform promoted by the new government necessarily demanded the
agreement of the right wing parties in congress.
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These constraints led the first democratically elected president of the transition,
President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994), to adopt a very cautiously incremental approach
toward the policy agenda. After March 1990, incumbents decided to strategically define
what would comprise the most essential reforms for the new government, postponing
conflictive issues such as the reform of the Constitution, the reform of the electoral
system, and several other deep institutional challenges to unconstrained electoral
democracy. Between 1990 and 1994 the government launched a special effort to pass a
relatively moderate bill on tax reform, municipal elections, and the reestablishment of
certain basic civil and political rights, which had been suspended under Pinochet’s 1980
Constitution. Rather than promote grand institutional reforms, new authorities opted
instead to establish cooperative agreements with the opposition, thereby advancing some
smaller reforms.
It is in this context of moderation that the new government formulated an
international relations agenda. The international arena provided democratic authorities
with an excellent vehicle for the advancement of specific policies, while also allowing
them to diplomatically circumnavigate political opposition from right-wing parties at
home. Foreign policy could significantly contribute to two major domestic goals: to
generate governability and a peaceful transition to democracy through the
reestablishment of civil and political rights; and to promote economic growth and social
development. For instance, on the economic front the government initiated an aggressive
strategy of opening international markets in order to move forward with specific social
and economic policies. At the political level, as we will see in the next pages of this
chapter, international organizations and governing bodies were used strategically by local
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actors as source of internal legitimacy and as a way of controlling the authoritarian
sectors of Chilean society.
Objectives and Priorities in Chilean Foreign Policy
As Chilean policymakers developed foreign policy objectives they simultaneously
assessed the opportunities and challenges of a new post Cold World War international
context and the domestic priorities of democratic consolidation and economic
development (Van Klaveren, 1998; Insulza, 1998). In this context, the government set
three core foreign policy goals, goals that remained very much unchanged until the
Coalition’s defeat in the 2010 election. First, the new authorities put a special emphasis in
the internationalization of the economy, which in Insulza’s words implied “strengthening
and widening our international presence in terms of commerce and investment abroad. A
country like Chile, which is open to the world, needs to link its economic and foreign
policy objectives” (Insulza 1998: 18). The international economic strategy was labeled
‘open regionalism’ and was meant to promote trade agreements between Chile and
countries both within and outside of Latin America. Consecutive administrations signed
economic as well as free-trade agreements with various countries in Asia, Europe and the
Americas. Among the most prominent arrangements were the complementary agreements
with Bolivia (1993), Venezuela (1993), Colombia (1993), MERCOSUR (1996), and
Cuba and Peru (1998). Free trade agreements were signed with Canada (1996), Central
America (1998), the European Union (2002), the United States (2003), South Korea
(2003), and China (2006). Moreover, this strategy also entailed the promotion of Chilean
private investment abroad. Between 1990 and 2004, Chile invested more than US $15
billion in Argentina, US $5 billion in Brazil, US $4 billion in Peru and US $2 billion in
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Colombia (Fuentes S. & Fuentes J. 2006). This strategy proved to be one of the most
successful foreign policy decisions that was made at that time. Today, Chile has a
network of signed free trade agreements with 56 countries, representing over 60 percent
of the world’s population. Seven out of every ten pesos of Chilean wealth come from
foreign trade. (Fuentes & Rojas 2010: 145).
A second objective established early on in the transition was a great strengthening
of Chile’s participation in international institutions (and international politics more
generally) with the aim of giving Chile the profile of a resolute contributor to the building
of a more “stable and more secure international order” (Insulza 1998: 35). According to
Insulza,
we have pointed out that Chile is an intermediate country within the international
system, and in a highly complex world it is essential to cooperate and to respond
to international responsibilities in order to promote peace and the well-being of
the people. This is a country that needs to not only take advantage of the
opportunities of the international system, but also to assume some responsibilities.
(Insulza 1998: 61)
This strategy represented Chile’s position as a small country, which wanted to promote
global rules within an international framework. As we will see, human rights promotion
became an integral part of this strategy.
The third foreign policy objective was proactive involvement within the Latin
American region. This implied the promotion of economic agreements with individual
countries (almost all the countries within the Pacific rim), economic agreements with
groups of countries (MERCOSUR, Central America, the Andean Community), and
political initiatives such as the resolution of all border conflicts with Argentina, the
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promotion of political initiatives within multilateral regional fora and the development of
other confidence-building measures with bordering countries.
Explaining Chile’s Foreign Policy Choices
As described in the previous section, Chile´s transition to democracy occurred in
a particular international and regional context that combined with the domestic constrains
of the time prompted the creation of a new foreign policy agenda that prolonged itself for
almost two decades. The remaining question is why human rights ideals have occupied
such a privileged position in the foreign-policy-making process during this period? The
following section explores a series of international and domestic forces driving Chile’s
commitment to the defense and promotion of international human rights.
International Dimension
As a relatively small country without geostrategic or economic prominence at the
international level, Chile’s foreign policy historically emphasized the promotion of
international law and multilateralism as a way of leveling the playing field among
nations. As the Chilean Foreign Policy Blue Book26 indicates, the goal is to
strengthen our involvement in international institutions and to participate within
the multilateral system with our own vision and capacities, making the principles
that inspire Chilean foreign policy a true reality through the effective promotion
of standards, norms, rules and international regimes, which facilitate the task of
‘global governance’ in order to confront new international challenges. (Ministerio
de Relaciones Exteriores de Chile, 2010)
Chile’s historical preference for building multilateral institutions, however, is not a
necessary or a sufficient condition for becoming an international human rights promoter.

26

The Chilean Foreign Policy Blue Book is a government initiative to provide a public report
stating core principles and objectives of the state on Chile’s international policy.
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In fact many small countries have active multilateral foreign policies in different issueareas but are less active than Chile on the realm of human rights.
The search for legitimacy and the need to recuperate what local policymakers
called “Chile’s lost international prestige” was at the forefront of the nation’s
international strategy in the early 1990s. All the policymakers interviewed for this project
concurred that the best way to recover full membership in the international society of
states was to portray an international image in tune with the democratic values and
human rights principles that were the prevalent pattern among democratic states in the
context of the Post Cold War. “Democracy and human rights promotion was central to
the country’s international insertion” (A. Van Klaveren, personal communication, July
2013), “human rights were at the time of the transition an international reality. Chile had
to be able to meet these new international challenges” (R. Garreton, personal
communication, July 2013), “Chile had to recover its traditional multilateral stand as a
defender of universal human rights” (E. Vargas, personal communication, July 2013) are
some of examples of the quotes used by government officials explaining human rights
promotion beyond its borders. In other words, the judgment of Chilean elites was that
their international policies were best served by following a liberal international order that
among other features set human rights promotion as an increasing international standard
of appropriate behaviour for states.
International human rights promotion was, therefore, used as a means for rapid
international insertion after years of isolation due to the notorious human rights violations
perpetrated by the military regime, notorious in part because Chile had previously
exemplified democratic governance in a Global South nation. Yet, it would be misleading
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to assume that the promotion of international human rights was purely instrumental. It
also responded to a moral commitment based on the historical experience of a nation and
in particular with new elected leaders that had experienced first-hand the horrors and
abuses of the Pinochet’s years. In fact, the new coalition of governing parties as we will
see later in the chapter, brought into the bureaucracy human rights ideas acquired in exile
and learned during the intensive struggle against the military regime. The Chilean
historian, Joaquin Fermandois, nicely illustrates this point:
The importance of being a ‘morally correct’ country was a first priority for the
Coalition of Democratic Parties when introducing themselves to the international
public. This was based upon a significant dose of passion due to sometime terrible
past experiences. (Fermandois 2004: 506)
At the time of Chile’s transition to democracy there was also significant evidence
of “peer pressures” from other states—especially European Union members— pushing
Chilean diplomats to be active human rights promoters. Roberto Garreton, who was in
charge of Chile’s newly created human rights unit at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from
1990 to 1994, recalls that there was an enormous interest in Chile’s transition to
democracy and an expectation that “Chile would become part of the international group
of countries that are well known human rights promoters” (R. Garreton, personal
communication, July 2013). He indicates that at the beginning of the 1990s Chilean
diplomats quickly learned that it was smart to team up with like-minded states that were
eager to form coalitions to promote human rights resolutions within the United Nations.
As an example of the international interest in getting Chile involved in the
promotion of human rights, Garreton remembers how the country became the sponsor of
the Resolution on “the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and
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Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and
Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”. All the work to present this
project was performed almost exclusively by the Netherlands including a leading study
by Theo van Boven concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation
for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms that is at the
core of the basic principles and guidelines that were agreed at the United Nations. Yet,
the Dutch government “offered us (Chilean delegation) the opportunity to sponsor this
initiative. Something that came as a gift since we did not have the capacity to
systematically work on presenting such projects” (R. Garreton, personal communication,
July 2013).
Unlike the “peer pressures” from European states, the influence of regional actors
on Chile’s decision to include human rights as parts of its foreign policy are difficult to
gauge at this point. Latin American states played a more significant role pressuring
counterparts with respect to democracy promotion rather than human rights protection.
Indeed, in 1991 Santiago was the site chosen for the OAS General Assembly at which
Hemispheric political leaders met to sign the democratic commitment to promote and
defend democracy throughout the hemisphere. This event symbolized a pledge from the
rest of the Inter-American countries to promote democracy throughout the region and in
Chile in particular. Domestically it also gave new political actors additional leverage in a
period when the recently elected government was still struggling to exert control over the
military, and simultaneously attempting to establish political mechanisms to seek truth 27,
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The Report of The National Truth and Reconciliation Commission was released in 1991.
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apply justice and provide reparations to the victims of human rights violations committed
by the military regime. Yet, regional effects towards international human rights
promotion—except for participation in the UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti in 2004—
were not mentioned by policymakers as an important driving force.
After the first democratic government of Patricio Aylwin came to and end in
1994, Chilean policymakers concluded that the main objectives of international
reinsertion were accomplished. Yet, the search for international legitimacy and prestige
through multilateralism and as member of the team of states that are recognized as human
rights and democracy activists remained at the forefront of Chile’s foreign policy aims.
General Augusto Pinochet’s detention in London in 1998 at the end of Eduardo
Frei’s administration illustrates this trend. The international arrest warrant issued by
judge Baltasar Garzón of Spain on charges of genocide and murder negatively affected
Chile’s international standing as it was evident that the country still suffered from
important institutional constraints precluding further democratic strengthen. It also made
evident the new political leaders were unable for two consecutive governments to
prosecute the perpetrators of past human rights violations. Under those circumstances,
Chilean diplomats promptly used the country’s newly recovered international credentials
in the human rights field as a way of deflecting international criticism about the
incapacity of the government to effectively pursue justice and as a platform to push for
the return of the General to Chilean soil (Rojas & Stefoni, 2001). As part of the
government’s strategy to block Pinochet’s extradition to Spain, the Minister of Foreign
Relations of the time, Jose Miguel Insulza, wrote a letter to UN Secretary General Kofi
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Annan highlighting Chile’s diplomatic action in favor of human rights protection and the
universalization of justice:
As the member states of the United Nations are aware of, since the reestablishment of the democracy in 1990, Chile has been advocating for the
international protection of human rights, and our diplomatic actions are very
consistent in this realm. My government had placed special interest in
contributing to the universalization of justice when comes to crimes against
humanity and the development of international norms when comes to individual
criminal responsibility when comes to human rights abuses. Chile was from the
beginning an active participant in the negotiations for the International Criminal
Court Statue that was signed in Rome on June 1998 and it was one of the first
states to subscribe to it on the past September 11. (Insulza in Aranda & Morande
2009: 102).
Chile’s international credentials continued to concern the government in the wake
of Pinochet’s return to Santiago. During his first year as President in 2000, Ricardo
Lagos, presenting the results of the Roundtable for Dialogue on Human Rights28
reiterated, as he had during his election campaign and earlier in his political career that
seeking truth and justice was an inescapable goal primarily for the people but also as a
way for the government to demonstrate to the international community that Chile is a
responsible nation. In his words:
We cannot fail, we owe this to the victims and the Chilean people and also to
international community that is looking at us… Today, after this agreement, we
are a better country. We have grown and learned from our own adversity, by
reaching this consensus we have been able to say to Chile and the rest of the
world that the country is capable of facing the challenges that our own history
asked us to face. (Ricardo Lagos in Aranda & Morande 2009: 106)

28

The Round Table for Dialogue on Human Rights was formed on the 21st of August 1999
during the government of President Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle. It was made up of a group of
people who included, among others, representatives from the Government, the Armed Forces and
the Police and religious and moral institutions. Its principal objective was to propose measures
that would contribute towards determining the fate or whereabouts of detainees that had
disappeared.
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The international recognition of Chile as responsible stakeholder was a key concern
throughout this period and indeed an important driver to include human rights as part of
the country’s foreign policy.
The final government of the Coalition of Democratic Parties headed by Michelle
Bachelet (2006-2010) was especially active in the human rights field. Chilean diplomats
participated on the discussion to reform the UN Human rights Commission and to make
the newly formed Human Rights Council a better vehicle than its predecessor for
carrying out its stated mission. They occupied the vice-presidency from 2008-2010. The
government was also finally able to ratify the Rome Statue establishing the International
Criminal Court. The normative ethical commitments as a motive for promoting
international human rights became more evident during Bachelet’s Presidency. During
her time in office, Bachelet was particularly sensitive to the topic, as she herself was a
victim of the Pinochet regime’s ruthless methods of torture and imprisonment. Explaining
the Chilean commitment to the UN Security Council, Bachelet stated:
You will be aware of my own personal experience with the abuse of human
rights. Those were painful times for me, for my family, and for my country. They
were certainly the darkest chapter in Chile’s history (...). But we are striving to
create a world in which such abuses are no longer possible. Nunca Más, never
again, as we said in Chile after our experience in the 1970s and 1980s. And that is
what we must also say in the United Nations, and act accordingly. Chile
subscribes fully to a broad concept of freedom and emancipation under which
respect for human rights—along with economic and social development, peace
and security—is one of the pillars of the mission of the United Nations in this new
century. As we would like to contribute our experience and commitment to the
new Human Security Council. (Bachelet, 2011).
In sum, the search to improve Chile’s international credentials in the context of
recovering the country’s international prestige was a triggering factor for the inclusion of
human rights into its foreign policy. Chile, however, continue pursuing a human rights
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foreign policy long after fully recovering its membership within the international
community at the beginning of the 1990s. The persistent inclusion of human rights into
Chile’s foreign policy can be interpreted, in part, as a search for legitimacy and prestige
through the projection of an international image of a “good international citizen”.
Domestic Factors
International factors generated the appropriate conditions for Chile to include
human rights into its foreign policy. Yet, Chile’s diplomatic commitment to human rights
is also a function of specific domestic conditions. In what follows, several possible
domestic drivers for foreign policy decision are assessed to establish the relative weight
of each one of them when it comes to human rights promotion. The main argument of
this section is that a key aspect for explaining Chile’s commitment to international human
rights can be found in the personal commitments and political influence of a small group
of experts on international politics. Together, these individuals formed a leadership
alliance that would have a profound impact on the nation’s foreign policy decisions for
more than twenty years (1990-2010). This group of experts understood how to use the
international community to their advantage in order to gain political influence
internationally and at home. The emergence of Chile’s foreign policy on human rights
during the 1990s can be understood as result of these actors’ choices and values, as well
as domestic political conditions during the democratization process and thereafter.
Transition to Democracy and the “Lock in” Effect
Democratic liberal theories predict that states commit to international human
rights instruments to protect unstable new democracies and to consolidate the credibility
of the new democratic authorities vis-a vis domestic political opponents (Moravcsik
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2000). In the case of Chile, there is evidence indicating that this assumption holds.
Chilean political leaders persistently emphasized that engaging with international human
rights was an effective way of exerting pressures on the non-democratic sectors of the
society and particularly the armed forces to preserve the democratic rules of the game. In
fact, during the first five years following the transition to democracy, any military
uprising—such as “Ejercicio de Enlace (1990) and “Boinazo” (1993)—was closely
scrutinized by the entire international community, putting additional informal pressures
on the armed forces to respect democratic rules (Fuentes 2006). From this point of view,
participation in international regimes in general and human rights in particular allowed
further scrutiny from the international community in times in which the main objective of
the political elites was to secure a peaceful transition to democracy.
After the transition to democracy and especially since the early 2000s, the country
started to contribute more significantly to the military dimension of UN peace operations.
This represents a significant foreign policy shift for a country that had limited
participation in these activities. Here the motives were to strengthening Chile´s
democratic process and institution building through the strengthening of civil-military
relations. Juan Emilio Cheyre, Commander in Chief of the Chilean Army from 2002 to
2006, indicated that the government was very effective in using foreign policy tools as a
way of reaching domestic objectives:
The orientation by President Lagos was to consolidate the transformation of the
military in order to ensure that its organization, equipment and doctrine were in
full harmony with Chilean foreign policy, its focus on peace and regional
integration, and on its desire to assume a role wherever international organizations
might require support from Chile and where Chile would agree to participate.
(Cheyre, 2008: 88)
76

Thus, military participation in international peacekeeping missions sponsored by the
United Nations was an additional tool used by civilian authorities to open new spaces for
dialogue with the armed forces.
The armed forces, which had consistently defended the prerogatives and
privileges they had acquired during the military regime, were surprisingly willing to
discuss their functions in the context of international peacekeeping missions. For the
military, participating in peacekeeping operations offered a window of opportunity for
the creation of a new military mission. After all, on the national stage the armed forces’
role was already being scrutinized and limited. Simultaneously, being part of the United
Nations in situations of humanitarian emergency gave the armed forces a unique chance
to atone for previous human rights abuses by supporting peace, security and human rights
abroad, and to cleanse themselves of the negative national and international image they
had acquired. Their participation in peacekeeping operations also helped the military to
obtain economic benefits in the form of payment for international missions, and provided
opportunities for international training and joint exercises with armed forces from around
the world (Aguero Felipe & Fuentes Claudio 2009).
It is important to note that this case illustrates that the reasons for new
democracies to pursue “lock in” strategies can vary. Chile’s high levels of uncertainty
and the constrained conditions in which the transition took place pushed the newly
elected political leaders to pursue this strategy as a way of preventing drawbacks and
ensuring the continuity of the democratic process as well as an alternative to
strengthening civil-military relations through peace-keeping. Unlike other new
democratic states, in the Chilean case there is little evidence indicating that they use the
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logic of subscribing international human rights treaties as a way of fulfilling domestic
goals in the realm of transitional justice that is characteristic of other states experiencing
transitions. Argentina is the case that comes most immediately to mind. In Argentina the
main human rights treaties have constitutional standing, making the country
exceptionally open to international human rights law (Engstrom 2011). Under President
Raul Alfonsin, the government instrumentally used international human rights treaties to
move forward his domestic agenda in particular the Trial of the Juntas (Sikkink 2008).
Chile under Aylwin’s policy of “justice under the limits of what is possible” was very
cautions not to open such possibility. In fact, the administration paid special attention to
the domestic effects of international human rights treaties especially when dealing with
the amnesty law in place since the military regime. The best example is the already
mentioned reservation that the Chilean delegation made when signing the American
Convention, namely that it would be inapplicable to previous events. Even when the
Inter-American Commission declared the Chilean Amnesty Law contrary to the
Convention, no action or responses were taken on the government side.
To summarize, the newly elected government of Patricio Aylwin deliberately
invoked international human rights treaties and employed international human rights
monitoring as a formula to exert additional pressure to the non-democratic sectors of the
Chilean society and to secure a peaceful transition to democracy. Later in the early 1990s,
participation in peacekeeping operations opened a new window of opportunity for both
the government and the armed forces to cooperate on an issue that was mutually
advantageous. While the military saw UN peacekeeping operations as a way of gaining
public recognition, increase resources and further access to training; the government
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detected an opportunity to further exert further civilian control over the military and
strengthening civil-military relations. Indeed, when dealing with peacekeeping missions
domestic actors (government officials and the military) astutely took strategic advantage
of international mechanisms to promote domestic objectives.
Political Leadership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
A key variable for explaining Chile’s commitment to international human rights
can be found in a small group of experts on international politics. Together, these
individuals formed a leadership alliance that would have a profound impact on the
nation’s foreign policy decisions for more than twenty years (1990-2010). This group of
experts understood how to use the international community to their advantage in order to
further pursue domestic goals. Simultaneously, they shared a set of common values
emphasizing democracy and human rights, due largely to their personal histories of
struggle against Pinochet’s regime. They took key positions within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs soon after the transition to democracy and remained in power for almost
two decades. This next section is dedicated to understanding this group’s ideals, values,
objectives, and impact on foreign policy decisions.
While the military regime was in power, several non-governmental organizations,
universities, and think tanks, both in Chile and abroad, worked extensively on issues
related to democracy and human rights in Latin America and global politics. Institutions
like FLACSO-Chile, PROSPEL, CERC, ILE, and academic networks like the Latin
American Network of International Relations (RIAL), developed a myriad of seminars,
workshops, publications, and policy initiatives facilitating the formation of what can be
understood as an international epistemic community (Hass, 1992). During the 1980s, a
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vibrant community of internationalists gathered in different parts of Latin America to
discuss ideas about democratic peace, confidence-building measures, Latin American
integration, U.S.-Latin American relations, and the prospects for democratization.29 This
group not only concentrated on academic work. They also worked extensively with
transnational human rights networks either when they were in exile and upon their return
in Chile as part of struggle against Pinochet’s dictatorship. Almost a decade later, the
Chileans that were part of this regional and international community of scholars and
human rights networks became government officials and used their international
connections to advance and coordinate action as well as to disseminate their ideas both
locally and throughout Latin America.
What stands out in the case of Chile is that, following the initial election, the same
center-left coalition maintained power for four consecutive terms. This unique situation
not only gave these new political leaders an opportunity to advance their careers within
the government but also allowed them to implement policies over a relatively long period
of time. In order to illustrate the main characteristics of this group and how its members’
common backgrounds affected the policymaking process, this section provides brief
profiles of five key political appointees within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs between
1990 and 2010: José Miguel Insulza, Heraldo Muñoz, Carlos Portales, Juan Gabriel
Valdés, and Alberto van Klaveren.

A good snapshot of this network is presented in the collection “Anuario de Política Exterior de
América Latina” produced by RIAL-Prospel as well as in the publications produced by the Area
of International Relations of FLACSO-Chile during the 1980s.
29
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These five political figures share important commonalities. All of them were
recognized professionals who developed their academic careers either in nongovernmental organizations or in universities in Chile and abroad. They all hold postgraduate degrees from prestigious U.S. universities. All of them were active members of
political parties in Chile and they each played an important role in the struggle to recover
democracy, and two of them (Valdés and Insulza) lived in exile. Finally, they each
occupied at least three key positions within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in different
periods, allowing for long-term continuity of the policies they promoted. Each of these
leaders had a striking political career in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Four of them
occupied at least one of the top five positions at the Ministry, and one of them (Muñoz)
was Minister of Communication and later the Chilean Representative to the United
Nations.
Jose Miguel Insulza began his career as an advisor in international affairs for the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1990, becoming Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs in
1994. During President Frei’s administration he was appointed Minister of Foreign
Affairs (1994-1999) and during the Ricardo Lagos’ presidency he became the Chief of
Cabinet as Minister of the Interior (2000-2004). In 2004, Insulza was supported by the
Chilean government in his successful campaign to head up the Organization of American
States (OAS).
Muñoz’ also fits our description of an expert in international relations because he
built extensive academic networks throughout the Americas during the 1980s, and, after
obtaining his PhD in the United States, he decided to return to Chile to confront the
military regime and reestablish democracy. Soon after the transition, he was appointed
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ambassador to the Organization of American States (1990-1994) and during the second
administration of the center-left coalition he became ambassador to Brazil (1994-1998).
Then the government appointed him Minister of Communication, offering him access to
top-level decision-making processes in the Presidential Palace. In 2003, President Lagos
appointed Muñoz the Chilean representative to the UN. During his time at the UN he was
a key actor in advancing R2P and establishing the Peacebuilding Commission. He
occupied key positions within the UN system, including chairing a special UN committee
on Al-Qaeda sanctions, President of the Security Council, and the head of the special
panel to investigate the death of Benazir Bhutto. Currently, Muñoz is the United Nations
Development Program’s Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean.
Table 7
Political Leadership and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Chile (1990-2010)

Institution
Studies

Abroad during
military
regime
Political party
Main
Positions in
Chile

Insulza

Muñoz

Portales

Valdés

CIDE
M.A.
University of
Michigan
Italy and
Mexico
(Exiled)
PS
-FA Minister
(1)
-FA Under
Sec (2)
-FA
Multilateral
Office
Director (5)
-Int’l.
Agency
Ministry
-Vice-Pres
AGC

Prospel
Ph.D.
University of
Denver
USA

FLACSO
M.A.
Stanford

CIDE
Ph.D.
Princeton

USA

PPD
-Comm
Minister

PS
-FM
Foreign
Policy
Director (3)
-FA
Planning
Director (6)
-FA
Diplomatic
Academy
Dir.

USA and
Mexico
(Exiled)
PS
-FA Minister
(1)
-FA
Economic
Director (4)
-Int’l
Division at
Finance
Ministry
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Van
Klaveren
U. Chile
M.A.
University of
Denver
USA

PPD
-FA Under
Sec (2)
-FA Planning
Director (6)

Table 7 (continued)

Main
Positions
Outside Chile

Insulza

Muñoz

Portales

Valdés

Van
Klaveren

-Amb. for
Int’l
Cooperation
-Secretary
General of
the OAS

-Amb. UN
-Amb. OAS
-Amb. Brazil

-Amb.
Mexico Amb.
Geneva Amb, OAS

-Amb. UN
-UN special
repres. in
Haiti
-Amb. Spain

-Amb.
Belgium
-Amb.
Luxem.
-Amb. To the
EU

Note: FA = Foreign Affairs Ministry; Under Sec = Undersecretary; AGCI = Chilean International
Agency for Cooperation; Amb. = Ambassador; Comm = Communication Minister; PS =
Socialist Party; PPD = Party for Democracy; UN = United Nations; EU = European Union.
For appointment information, see: http://www.minrel.cl.

A third case study is Juan Gabriel Valdés. After the transition he was appointed
Ambassador to Spain (1990-1994), during the second administration of the Concertación
of Political Parties, he was appointed Economic Director at the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (1996-1999), and in 1999 he became Minister of Foreign Affairs. From 2000 to
2003 he served as the Chilean Ambassador to the UN, and in June 2004 he was appointed
as Special Representative and Head of the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH). More recently, he was appointed the head of the governmental agency
“Chile-País,” whose mission is improving the nation’s image internationally (20082010).
Carlos Portales joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1994 as Ambassador to
Mexico (1994-1997) and later as Ambassador to the Organization of American States
(1997-2000). Then, he led the Diplomatic Academy (2000-2001) and the Planning
Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santiago (2001-2002). In 2002, as Director
of Foreign Policy, he became the third most important advisor in the ministry (2002-
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2008). He was appointed Ambassador to Geneva (2008-2010) where he focused on
developing an intensive human rights agenda.
Finally, Alberto van Klaveren is a lawyer and political scientist who specializes in
international relations (University of Denver and University of Leiden). Prior to the mid1990s he worked at the Institute of International Relations at the Universidad de Chile.
Then, in 1996 he was appointed Director of Planning at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
and subsequently was appointed Ambassador to Belgium, Luxemburg, and the European
Union (2001 through 2006), and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs (2006-2009). He is
the current coordinator of the Chilean team handling a territorial dispute with Peru before
the International Court of Justice.
The description of this group’s political careers and professional backgrounds
attempts to underscore the relevance of key agents within the foreign policy-making
process. Ambassadors Muñoz, Portales, van Klaveren, Insulza, and Valdés became
principal actors in the definition of programmatic goals as well as in the development of
specific policy initiatives within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Muñoz was a key actor
within the U.N. system as well as within the ministry. He promoted Chile’s involvement
in peacekeeping operations, the notion of the Responsibility to Protect, and preventative
peace building, among others. Ambassador Portales became a key actor in defining the
main guidelines for foreign policy during most of the Lagos and Bachelet presidencies,
including the approval of several international treaties by the National Congress (Treaty
of Rome, congressional guidelines for peacekeeping operations, and the ILO’s N° 169
agreement, among others). As Head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1994-1999), José
Miguel Insulza also took key foreign policy decisions to consolidate Chile’s
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internationalization policies. Finally, Ambassador Valdés also played a vital role at the
UN and became a key actor in promoting Chile’s proactive involvement in Haiti, as he
led the UN mission in that Caribbean country.
An additional dimension of their capacity to influence Chilean foreign policy
relates to the particular characteristics of Chile’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as
bureaucratic features played a role in allowing this group of leaders to effectively
implement their ideas. Unlike similar bureaucracies, the Chilean Foreign Ministry is
relatively small and therefore it was easier for the new leaders to take over during the
transitional period. Even though many diplomats and members of the Foreign Service
that worked during Pinochet’s year remained in their positions, the new group of
policymakers could be inserted above them either formally or de facto. Within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the key agencies in defining foreign policy decisions are: the
Policy Division, which is in charge of coordinating all programmatic agencies within the
ministry; the Multilateral Organizations Division, which is in charge of coordinating
policy actions at different multilateral levels; and the Planning Division, which is in
charge of establishing guidelines within different divisions. Other offices relevant to
policy decisions are the Chilean Embassies at the UN in New York and Geneva, due to
their role in dealing with multilateral topics. All of these divisions and units were
effectively taken over by this new group of foreign-policy makers.
In sum, each of these individuals held positions of power within the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs for almost twenty years, gaining important expertise in the field and
access to multilateral organizations. What all of them have in common is not only a
similar professional background but also a shared commitment to the promotion of
85

democracy at home and abroad and of human rights more generally. This commonality of
interests and values was clearly reflected in a set of foreign policy priorities that for more
than twenty years supported international initiatives for the promotion and protection of
international human rights and democracy.
Civil Society and Foreign Policy
While the last section highlighted the relevance of certain key individual actors
who have made key decisions within the state apparatus, this section will focus primarily
on the role of non-state actors, in particular NGOs in the policymaking process. In
particular it assess the idea the role of what has been called advocacy networks (local or
transnational) in affecting foreign policies on human rights (Keck & Sikkink 1998).
The democratization process during the 1990s did not increase civil society
participation in Chile. On the contrary, many of highly organized human rights
organizations during the military regime decided to terminate their advocacy activities
when the democratic system was restored. Indeed, as several scholars have mentioned,
civil society organizations had played a pivotal role during the cruelest period of the
Pinochet regime. They were critical in documenting violations of human rights,
articulating social disapproval of the regime, and providing important transnational
networks to advance the democratic agenda of freedom, human rights, social rights, and
gender equality.
After the military coup and the subsequent banning of political parties, various
NGOs were created with the aim of defending and advancing human rights. Many NGOs
emerged during the 1970s and 1980s as the result of conscious efforts by activists with
strong links to political parties. An extensive network of non-governmental organizations
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was developed at the local as well as national level. These organizations devoted their
attention to diverse issues, including, among other topics, women’s rights, the media and
freedom of expression, rural studies, the environment, housing, education, and
decentralization (Piña 1989; Oxhorn 1995).
The transition to democracy proved a turning point for many individuals working
in NGOs, with one of the immediate impacts being that many of these professionals went
to work for the government. The newly-elected officials represented a broad coalition of
Christian Democrats and Socialists, who had previously been part of the opposition to the
military regime. This political climate presented social actors with a golden opportunity
to influence public policy. The personal backgrounds of many of the newly-elected
politicians made them sensitive to the demands of civil society. The story of activists
within human rights organizations is particularly illustrative. The organizations that had
close ties with the governing Concertación coalition saw their leaders assume
government positions in the new administration. They entered those posts with the
explicit intention of lobbying authorities from within. Activists from the Vicariate of
Solidarity and the Chilean Committee for Human Rights (CHCHR) were politically
connected to the Partido Demócrata Cristiano and the Partido Socialista. Several of
them actively participated in the formation of government strategies, first in developing
the new government’s electoral platform, then in implementing the platform once the
transition to democracy took place.30 Particularly relevant was the Catholic Church’s
30

To mention some of them, Alejandro González, Jorge Domínguez, Roberto Garretón, Carlos
López, Felipe Portales, and José Zalaquett used to work in the Vicariate of Solidarity and in the
CHCHR, and assumed new government positions related to human rights issues soon after the
transition.
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decision to dissolve the Vicariate of Solidarity, and the CHCHR’s decision to dissolve a
network of more than five thousand volunteers nationwide.
As the principal leaders of both organizations were assuming new positions
within the state bureaucracy, it was impossible for them to maintain the same level of
grassroots activity as before. The CHCHR transformed itself from a dense network of
grassroots organizations into a bureaucratic entity with few staff members, fewer
resources, and a lower level of interaction with social organizations. Another major shift
in the non-governmental sector after the democratic transition was the significant decline
of funding and sponsorship from international agencies. Thus, many of the NGOs
working on issues concerning human and social rights disappeared after the transition.
The reasons commonly provided by the literature include the dominance of political
parties in the transitional political process, and the transition of leadership talent from
NGOs to the new democratic government (Delamaza 2005; Fuentes 2005). Several
organizations managed to maintain some of their influence, effectively monitoring the
instatement of human rights clauses by the new Chilean government. However, such
pressures were almost exclusively related to past human rights violations and specific
human rights issues in the current agenda. Indeed, organizations linked to the indigenous
movement, children’s rights, and the monitoring of violations of human rights committed
during the military regime organized alternative reports to be submitted before the UN
human rights system (Fuentes 2010).
The Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs was not an exception. As said before,
many of the key new foreign policy authorities had created important ties with human
rights networks as part of the struggle against the military regime allowing them to bring
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human rights ideas and values into their work. On the other hand, local NGO activists
were also designated to occupy bureaucratic positions at different levels of the state
apparatus and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This was particularly evident in the case of
the newly formed Human Rights Unit at the Ministry. The designated Director from
1990-1994 was Roberto Garreton—a human rights defender with an outstanding public
trajectory as a human rights lawyer at the Vicariate of Solidarity. President Patricio
Aylwin personally appointed Garreton to this position and they had a close relationship
while in office. Indeed, Roberto Garreton previously worked at the Vicariate with Andres
Aylwin—the president’s brother and also a prominent human rights lawyer— which
made the human rights movement and its people even closer to the Presidency. During
1990 an early 2000s, the directors and sub-directors of the Human Rights Unit had a clear
human rights background31: Carmen Hertz, an active human rights lawyer for the
Vicariate that lost his husband in the hands of the Caravan of the Death; Felipe Portales,
sociologist, scholar and human rights activist; Alejandro Salinas, human rights lawyer
trained in the United States who participated in the team of experts that was part of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 1990 and consultant for international NGOS
(Amnesty, Human Rights Watch).
What is remarkable about this case is that the newly created unit at the Foreign
Ministry was occupied not by the diplomatic service and its bureaucracy but by a small
group of selected experts with a personal commitment with the human rights cause. The
inclusion of human rights activists within this unit was pivotal for Chile’s international
31

For this research it was possible to interview three of them: Roberto Garreton, Alejandro
Salinas, and Felipe Portales.
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human rights commitment. This group brought specific knowledge within the Foreign
Ministry in an area where there was no previous expertise and where the predominant
view was that human rights were not inherently part of the national interests.
Paradoxically, the only previous training on this subject within the Ministry was how to
respond to the criticism of international community in light of the abuses committed by
the military regime. Garreton and the directors thereafter were able to bring human rights
within the foreign policy decision-making procedures, a process that was reinforced by
their ties with other recently appointed high-ranked governmental officials and in some
circumstances with their close ties with the President itself.
The newly created human rights unit was also critical to help training diplomats
on human rights issues. Roberto Garreton and Alejandro Salinas recall that part of their
work was to interact with the Chilean delegation in Geneva (base of UN Human Rights
Commission/Council) and sometimes Washington (Inter-American Human Rights
Commission) a process that prompted a common learning: Chilean diplomats learned
about the human rights world through the expertise of these group and the human rights
experts relied on the delegation specific knowledge regarding diplomatic procedures. The
inclusion of human rights experts within the Ministry was also beneficial for enhancing
the links between Chile’s diplomacy and international human rights groups. The expertise
of the Directors of the Unit and their prestige as human rights lawyers made them closer
to international NGOS and helped them to establish a working relationship during
international meetings and United Nations settings. Garreton, for example indicates: “I
felt part of the NGOs. Due to my background as a human rights defender I was much
closer to the international advocacy groups rather than the diplomatic world” (R.
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Garreton, personal communication, July 2013). The interaction between diplomats and
international NGOS continued over time and is something that was very much set in
motion due to the experience of the appointed directors of the human rights unit.
In sum, NGOs did have a role in the way in which Chile responded to
international human rights. However, its role has been slightly different than the one that
is traditionally highlighted by the literature on the subject that portrays a group of
transnational groups (domestic and international) pushing from the outside for
governmental changes (Keck & Sikkink 1998). In Chile’s case the very same people that
advocate for the overthrown of Pinochet was able to enter the government during the
transition to democracy and from that position pushed for changes from within.
What is worrisome for the future is that since the transition to democracy the field
of foreign policy has been characterized by top-down action, with policymakers trying to
address international human rights domestically but facing weak civic engagement on
this matter. When dealing with civil society it is possible to observe a lack of human
rights non-governmental organizations pushing for the implementation of foreign policy
initiatives. This is an important weakness considering that these types of organizations
are fundamental to ensuring that states abide by international norms, especially in the
area of human rights.
Of course, the involvement of civil society activism has varied greatly according
to theme. Civil society activism is most likely found in issues concerning international
commerce, international environmental standards, and the adoption of international
standards concerning indigenous rights. But in issues concerning the protection of human
rights abroad, civil society actors have not played a relevant role at all. Put in another
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way, the protection of human rights internationally, humanitarian catastrophes or issues
such as emergent debate on norm of the Responsibility to Protect have not been part of
the agenda developed by Chile’s local civil society’s most influential actors.32
Conclusions
This chapter explains Chile’s foreign policy (1990-2010) as the product of the
interplay between international and domestic conditions and pressures, actors’
preferences and values, and a set of institutional determinants that resulted in a strong
commitment to human rights policies during the 1990s and in the following decade. The
inclusion of human rights into Chile’s foreign policy can be interpreted as an expression
of principled commitment to human rights values combined with and strategic use of
foreign policy as a means for managing the transition to, and consolidation of,
democracy. A key explanatory factor can be found in a small group of experts on
international politics with extensive ties with human rights networks that took over the
Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs since the return of democracy. Together, these
individuals formed a leadership alliance that would have a profound impact on the
nation’s foreign policy decisions for more than twenty years. Their influence in the
promotion and implementation of foreign policy based on human rights and democratic
principles has been characterized by remarkable longevity.
This case also highlights the limits of international relations approaches to
understand human rights foreign policy. Chile’s diplomacy illustrates that a country does

32

Few nongovernmental organizations have addressed the topic. Among the exceptions are
Amnesty International (Chilean Section), FLACSO-Chile, and Ignire.cl. The topic has not
garnered media attention either.
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not need to be coerced by a great power to adopt human rights policies. If anything,
Chile’s human rights performance has been consistent with human rights values beyond
economic or political pressures. The country has voted in favor of examining human
rights situations in almost all the instances at the UN Human Rights Commission and
later in the newly created Human Rights council. Chile’s decision at the Security Council
in 2003 of not supporting the United States invasion of Iraq despite the pending signature
of a Free Trade Agreement with the US reinforces this argument.
The liberal explanations predicting that transitional democracies will ascribe to
international human rights to protect unstable regimes played a role here. Government
officials used the international community and international human rights groups as a
source of power, thereby, counteracting the institutional legacy of the military regime and
keeping the authoritarian sectors (particularly the armed forces) of the Chilean Society
under control. Yet, the persistence of Chile’s active human rights diplomacy once
democratic consolidation took place and once there were no clear motives for effective
“lock in” policies cannot be explained by this approach. The evidence suggests that
human rights were incorporated into foreign policy driven by a group of political leaders
that has been exposed to human values and ideas and advocacy groups during the
struggle against Pinochet and effectively introduced them not only for instrumental
reasons but also as a matter of principle. They also created a specific human rights unit
within the Ministry as a way of further institutionalizing these policies.
Chile’s policy also illustrates that constructivism is right in highlighting the role
of ideas and values in foreign policy. It demonstrates that a state democratic identity does
make them immediately a human rights promoter and that those international ideas are
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not easily diffused into domestic politics. The case shows that political elites are key
drivers of the human rights values, that beliefs are also combined with strategic interests,
and that favorable institutional settings especially at the Foreign Ministry are key.
The final conclusions are dedicated to highlight some of the most recent trends in
the government’s foreign policy decisions and their implications for Chile’s commitment
to international human rights in the future. Domestically there were already significant
changes as a new coalition came into office. At the beginning of 2010 the Coalition of
Parties for Change, lead by Sebastian Piñera, won Chile’s presidential election. This was
the first democratic election of a right-wing leader in fifty-two years, and serves as the
perfect test for evaluating the endurance of foreign policy priorities established by
previous governments. The question is, to what extent President Piñera’s administration
will maintain the previous human rights approach to foreign policy and whether a policy
shift is likely to occur. If Piñera is unsympathetic to the policies adopted by the previous
coalition, then the degree of institutionalization of human rights ideals within the state
apparatus will be crucial to their future sustenance.
So far Piñera´s administration has maintained a similar foreign policy approach
toward human rights. Chile was selected as a member of the Human Rights Council in
2011 showing an active participation within this institution; the country has also
increased its financial contributions to Inter-American Human Rights System indicating
that is crucial to enhance and strengthened regional human rights mechanisms; and
finally the government with congressional approval decided to keep Chilean troops from
the continued UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH). Despite strong
discussions between the Ministry of Defense, the armed forces, and the Ministry of
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Foreign Affairs, and the disapproval of some of its political supporters, the government
kept Chilean troops and civilian personnel in the Caribbean country. This decision speaks
of the persistence of Chile’s policies on this subject and says much about the future of
Chile’s performance on international human rights and humanitarian aid.
On a less positive note, the Chilean foreign ministry´s showed lukewarm support
of recent protests for democracy and the protection of human rights in the Arab World. In
the case of the Egyptian protests for example, the Chilean government failed to release
any sort of declaration calling for democratic elections or for the peaceful resolution of
the conflict. Despite Chile’s experience with similar democratic struggles, the country
opted to remain silent. Regarding Libya, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a timidlyworded declaration, calling for the prevention of further civilian casualties caused by the
Gaddafi-led government’s repressive action. The language of R2P was not used by the
government, despite international evidence indicating the need to protect the Libyan
population from the risk of mass atrocities. More recently, Chile condemned violence
against civilians in Syria but, again, it did not use R2P language. These three crises reveal
the new government’s timidity in addressing ongoing human rights struggles.
Nevertheless, it is still too soon to evaluate the administration’s long-term approach to
this matter.
Despite Chile’s commitments, there is still much room for improvement when
comes to international human rights promotion. Past experiences can illuminate some of
the future challenges. Two topics are particularly relevant for the task of strengthening
international human rights policies of the current government of Sebastian Piñera and the
incoming administration in 2014.
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First, this study shows the importance of political leadership to introduce
important policy changes. Yet it also highlights that in many cases the prevalence of
individuals over the construction of institutional capacities has prevented the
consolidation of institutional rules and structures with the capacity to more permanently
shape future foreign policy decisions. It is true that specific units were created within the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs for human rights and humanitarian affairs. However, when
relevant decisions regarding human rights and international security are made, these units
show very little capacity for generating responses. Rather than elaborating on the state’s
human rights policies internationally, the main task of the human rights division is
basically to respond to Chile’s monitoring requirements for international treaties.
Responses to R2P is another good example of an international human rights norm, which
has been strongly supported by Chilean representatives at the UN but has remained
relatively absent from debates at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Santiago. There is no
single official in charge of this topic within the Ministry. This situation poses the
immediate question of whether there is enough institutional strength to sustain human
rights policies when leaders that might be less sympathetic to the ideas and values of
human rights come into power. Effective human rights promotion requires enhanced
institutional capacities, a medium to long term agenda of action and strategies along with
better diplomatic training (Fuentes, 2013).
Second, non-governmental organizations remain weak, and their access to the
decision-making process in foreign policy is limited. There is no evidence that the
political opposition or other relevant groups are currently engaged in monitoring Chile’s
international action. Furthermore, unlike in the late-1980s, there are very few national
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academic institutions dedicated to the systematic study of Chile’s international policies
and even less so specifically following up the government’s efforts to uphold human
rights and democratic principles abroad. Thus, there is relatively little pressure on the
government to keep its previous commitments to international human rights. The
experience shows that adequate channels for NGOS engagement with the policy world
enhance foreign policy activity.
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CHAPTER 4: BRAZIL’S HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY
Brazil’s Human Rights Policy-Shift: From Defense to Acceptance
The return to civilian rule in 1985 opened the space for a gradual opening up of
Brazilian diplomacy to the institutional and normative framework of the international
human rights regime. In fact, scholars and local policymakers have compellingly argued
that since the transition to democracy Brazil’s foreign policy has shifted from a defensive
and almost exclusive focus on state sovereignty to broadly accepting and legitimating the
role of human rights in international politics (Engstrom, 2010; Macaulay, 2010; Pinheiro,
1999). Paulo Sérgio Pinheiro, a Brazilian scholar and human rights expert, indicates that
since the military dictatorship there has been a “sea of change when comes to Brazilian
human rights policy … Democracy provoked decisive changes in Brazil’s foreign policy
vis-à-vis human rights” (P. Pinheiro, personal communication, August 2013).
Brazil’s position during the military regime (1964-1985) in relation to multilateral
organizations and human rights institutions was “contradictory at the beginning and
eventually it turned out to be increasingly defensive and isolationist, particularly during
1976 to 1981” (Martin Solon, Clara 2011: 15). Brazilian delegations were part of the
human rights system but they participated as a way of defending themselves from the
increasing international criticism towards domestic abuses especially during the 1970s. In
1977, Brazil was selected for the first time as a member of the UN Human Rights
Commission, its main objective being to strengthen the position in which human rights
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are seen as an exclusive responsibility of the state and, therefore, denying any legitimacy
to international actions intended to promote and protect human rights beyond national
borders (Lindgren Alves, 2009). Chancellor Azeredo da Silvera in his opening speech at
the XXXII UN General Assembly, most clearly represents the Brazilian vision of the
time:
In the end, the solutions to issues pertaining the Rights of Man are responsibility
of national governments. In a world that is unfortunately characterized by
interventionist attitudes, either open or concealed, and by the distortion of certain
issues, no state or group of states, can be attributed with the capacity to judge
other countries in issues that are that serious and pertaining only to the intimacy
of the national life of a state. (Azeredo da Silvera in Martin Solon, Clara 2011:
15)
Brazil’s human rights violations were analyzed and discussed between 1974 and
1976 through a confidential procedure within the UN Human Rights Commission, a
procedural alternative illustrating the skill of Brazilian diplomats in avoiding any
possibility of public condemnation. During the military dictatorship, Itamaraty (the
idiomatic short hand for Brazilian diplomatic service) was particularly careful in avoiding
expressing any opinion regarding human rights situations abroad. When resolutions on
country situations were voted, Brazil voted against them in a majority of the cases and
abstained on the rest. (Martin Solon, 2011: 15).33
The return to civilian rule had important effects on Brazil’s response to violations
of human rights in other countries. The Sarney government (1985-1989) has been
characterized by scholars and policy-makers as an “intermediate stage” between the
defensive isolationism of the military regime and the more active multilateralism of its
33

Exceptions were South Africa (Apartheid), Namibia, and Palestine and the Occupied
Territories.
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successors (Macaulay, 2010: 137). As Paulo Sergio Pinheiro has said, “we can note yet
speak of a genuine new course because the legacy of continuity would prevail during the
Sarney government, limiting bold initiatives” (Pinheiro,1999: 9). Sarney during his
speech at the United Nations General Assembly, praised the International Declaration of
Human Rights as the “most important document written by man in contemporary
history”. This is not a minor change considering that between 1977 and 1984, Brazilian
speeches, which traditionally open the UN General Assembly, “had never even
mentioned human rights” (Pinheiro, 1999: 9).
During this period the executive submitted to congress several human rights
instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
the Covenant on Economic and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the American Convention
on Human Rights. Despite the hovering presence of the military institution, only recently
returned to its barracks, Sarney’s government was also able to insert a number of very
important human rights guarantees into the 1988 Constitution (Macaulay, 2010: 137).
Yet, the transitional government remained abstentionist within the UN system, “only
faintly acknowledging the legitimacy of multilateral initiatives to enforce human rights
norms” (Pinheiro, 1999: 10). At the same time, some governmental officials used
dismissive language when referring to human rights issues, in particular international
assessment of national human rights practices and associated international assessment
with “imperialist” attitudes.34

34

Former Minister of justice and Senator, Paulo Brossard, attacked Amnesty on national
television accusing it of being a subversive organization.
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The Sarney Administration’s successor, the Collor de Mello (1990-1992)
government, more broadly accepted the legitimacy of international human rights and
actively pursued initiatives to open Brazil’s doors to international scrutiny. It hastened to
ratify international human rights instruments--the ICCPR and the ICESCR in 1992--with
the significant help of more progressive senators.35 In a psychologically-related move, the
government also hosted important international conferences dealing with issues that had
resonance in the human rights domain including the UN Conference on Environment and
Development, held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. Most notably, the government explicitly
recognized that the UN Human Rights Commission “has the right to comment on the
status of human rights on any part of the world” (Pinheiro, 1999: 10). Brazilian
delegations abroad opened their doors to NGOS and external enquiries. In fact, the
government issued a recommendation that missions should respond without resistance to
complaints about the human rights situation and maintain contacts with NGOs. Collor the
Mello was the first Brazilian President to receive representatives from Amnesty
International investigating torture and the condition of street children. In meetings
dealing with these issues, President Collor de Mello famously stated that “national
sovereignty cannot be a protection against human rights violations” and in his speech at
the XLIV UN General assembly he stressed that the world is marching “towards an
advanced stage of democratic construction and of respects for human rights” (Pinheiro,
1999: 13).

35

The then Senator Fernando Henrique Cardoso was particularly supportive of human rights
initiatives.
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After Collor’s resignation from the presidency due to an impeachment trial on
charges of corruption, Itamar Franco (1992-1994) took over as an interim President. The
highlight of this period was Brazil’s active participation at the UN Conference on Human
Rights in Vienna where Ambassador Gilberto Saboia acted as the Chair of the drafting
Committee. Brazil played an important role defending the universality principle in the
face of other delegations from Asia and Africa that were strenuously insisting on the
affirmation of culturally distinct approaches to human rights, that is cultural relativism
(Lindgren & Alves, 2001; Belli, 2000). The Brazilian delegation strongly promoted the
notion that “democracy, development and human rights” are intrinsically linked and
interdependent. The Vienna Conference had important effects at the domestic level,
fostering a series of meetings between governmental officials and local civil society
groups, NGOS, and scholars to generate a common diagnosis about the most pressing
human rights issues in Brazil. One of the indirect results of the Conference was that
“Brazil started to be more aware of the demands and compromises required as a result of
being part of the international human rights regimes, including presenting periodic
reports to UN Treaty bodies on the subject” (Martin Solon 2011: 23).
Foreign Relation Minister, Celso Amorim, clearly reflects the spirit of the time in
his speech to the UN Assembly in 1993:
Transparency in the decisions and actions of the government constitutes an
important aspect of Brazilian policy. This transparency is also manifested in the
fluid and constructive dialogue with the segmentary organizations of society
dedicated to the fight for the observance of human rights in the country. (Amorim
in Pinheiro, 1999: 18)
Brazil took several steps under the presidency of Fernando Henrique Cardoso
(1995-2002) to display its commitment to international human rights. As Fiona Macaulay
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points out, it is during this government that “Brazil’s alignment with international human
rights standards and active multilateralism intensified and became key foreign policy
tenants” (Macaulay, Fiona 2010: 138). Eminent Brazilians diplomats, for instance
Ambassador Lindgren Alves, signal the first year of Cardoso’s mandate as the time in
which the country started a new phase of its human rights diplomacy, finally accepting
the legitimacy of these principles as part of its foreign policy.36 Among Cardoso’s most
notable achievements was to finally recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (Brazil was the last Latin American to accept its jurisdiction). In
addition it accepted international oversight carried out by UN bodies in execution of their
mandates under the six human rights Conventions ratified by Brazil (Macaulay, 2010:
140). In 2001, Brazil offered a standing invitation to all the mandate holders of Special
Procedures of the Human Rights Council. As a result, Brazil became in the words of
Macaulay, “the most inspected country in the hemisphere” (2010:40). Brazil has received
visits by 17 such mandate holders since 1998 (Brazilian Mission at the UN, 2012). Along
with the Special Rapporteurs37, the country has received the visits of three High
Commissioner for Human Rights: Mary Robinson (2000), Louise Arbour (2007) and
36

Lingren Alves (1994) describes these phases as follows: 1978-1984: a conservative period,
defensive positions; 1985-1989, Sarney’s transition government, characterized by the still
relatively timid recognition of the legitimacy of the multilateral system when comes to human
rights; 1990-1994, brazil experience a period of adhering, recognizing, and ratification of
international human rights treaties. Finally, since 1995 the country entered a period in which the
system is legitimized and therefore, they decided to play within the system and a more
constructive role.
37

These include, for example, Special Rapporteurs on: Torture (2000), Right to Food (2002,
2009), On the Sale of Children, Prostitution, and Pornography (2003), Extra-judiciary Executions
(2003, 2007), Adequate Housing (2004), Independence of the Judiciary (2004), Racism (2005),
Indigenous Peoples (2008), New Forms of Slavery (2010). See: abstained (Martin Solon, Clara
2011: 26)
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Navanethen Pillay (2009). At the domestic level, and following the guiding of the Vienna
Convention, the government launched in 1996 the National Human Rights Plan
(PNDH)38 that included a national plan of action on the subject along with some
guidelines referring to Brazil’s international policies on human rights (Brazilian Mission
at the UN, 2012). The Foreign Ministry created a new Department for Human Rights and
Social Issues to further institutionalize the inclusion of human rights as part of Brazil’s
foreign policy and to be able to better fulfill treaty obligations including the
implementation of reports.
Under Lula da Silva administration (2003-2010) the country continued to
manifest a conspicuous commitment to compliance with international human rights
behavioral norms and procedures. Yet, unlike previous administrations and primarily due
to the perception of Brazil as a rising power, Lula’s foreign policy was more closely
monitored locally and internationally. While there was much positive continuity, there
was, as well, what one could describe as “negative continuity”: Brazil continued
abstaining when confronted with UN resolutions denouncing states for gross abuse of
human rights. Even though abstentions at the United Nations was also a common feature
of previous governments, during Lula’s government this situation led more than in the
past to strong criticism by international NGOS as well as by newly created local
organizations39 that were for the first time since the transition to democracy set up to
follow up on Brazil’s foreign policy decisions. Indeed, one of the most important features
38

PNDH is the acronym in Portuguese.

39

Conectas, is a Brazilian NGO founded in 2001 with the mission of promoting human rights in
the Global South. They have an specific program monitoring Brazilian foreign policy on human
rights.
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of this period is the strengthening of local NGOs and think tanks monitoring Brazil’s
international actions.
On the other hand, Brazil during this period acted as a global defender of
economic, social and cultural rights. Lula’s government actively promoted international
initiatives to elevate the issues of poverty and hunger on the international agenda and, in
particular, initiated important diplomatic actions on the right to health and access to
medicine. At the same time, Brazilian diplomacy was active on issues such as the
protection of the rights of sexual minorities, the defense of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), and curbing the trade in small arms. Brazilian diplomats were also engaged
on the reform of the UN Human Rights Commission and the creation of a new UN
Human rights Council.
Assessment: Is Brazil a Human Rights Promoter?
Even though Brazilian diplomacy towards human rights has changed in important
ways since the return to democracy, its performance in the arena of international human
rights defense is less impressive than that of certain other Latin American countries in
which democracy was restored after a period of harsh military rule. The country’s
acceptance of international human rights as a legitimate issue in international politics did
not go so far as make human rights a trump in relation to other foreign policy interests.
On balance, I will propose, Brazil cannot reasonably be seen as a global human rights
promoter or even a regional one. This conclusion reflects four dimensions of Brazilian
behavior which I will sketch now and then develop in the following section.
First, even though Brazil has ratified the most important human rights treaties, the
country in comparison with other Latin American peers was relatively slow to accept
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intrusive international scrutiny – reflected in longstanding refusal to sign up to UN treaty
bodies – and individual complaint procedures. This was also at the Inter-American
Human Rights system. For example, Brazil was one of the last OAS member states in
Latin America to recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(See table 10). Second, an unwillingness to openly criticize human-rights-abusivecountries as has been evidenced by Brazil’s abstentionist record at the UN Human Rights
Commission and later at the Council. At the same time, Brazil has very reluctantly
entered the discussion on Responsibility to Protect and it has clearly pointed out its
adherence to a softer concept “non-indifference”. Third, Brazil’s financial contribution to
the international human rights system (UN and OAS) is comparatively lower than many
western states or Latin American states in relation to their wealth and population. Fourth,
despite enormous progress since the transition to democracy, Brazil still suffers from a
poor domestic human rights record. It is true that different administrations have
implemented successful social programs some of which have been exported to other
developing countries (“Hunger Zero”, for example) but the government’s incapacity to
ameliorate pressing human rights abuses—including unlawful police killings, the use of
torture, prison overcrowding, and ongoing impunity for abuses committed during the
country’s military rule—40 leaves Brazil in a difficult position to promote human rights
internationally.
As Brazil’s international profile has heightened, the country has been the target of
more criticism of its behavior and calls to play a greater role in the promotion of
40

For a description of the human rights situation in Brazil see the Country reports from HRW that
are issued yearly. See also CONECTAS and the NGOS associated to it.
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international human rights have augmented. The following section looks at Brazil’s
human rights diplomatic performance in the same areas that were previously discussed in
the Chilean case: a) Legal (ratification of International human rights treaties); b)
International Human Rights Regimes (Participation in multilateral human rights
institutions); c) Peace promotion and humanitarian protection (relevant UN peace
keeping initiatives and responses to humanitarian crisis especially massive human rights
violations); d) Financial assistance for human rights. In order to provide a better
comparison, in each one of these four areas Brazil’s performance is contrasted with other
countries in Latin America and middle powers such as India, Turkey or South Africa.
Legal: International Human Rights Treaties
Brazil has no ratified all the major international human rights treaties, including
the regional ones such as the American Convention on Human Rights in 1992 (See table
9). The process of entering the major conventions started during the transitional
government of Sarney and the majority of the treaties were signed in the following
governments, especially during Collor de Mello’s administration. President Sarney’ first
speech at the UN, explains why his government decided to become part of these treaties:
With Pride and trust, I bring to this Assembly the decision to be part of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the Convention against Torture and
other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading Treatment. With this decision, the Brazilian
people give a step towards the democratic reaffirmation of its state, in front of
themselves and the international community, a solemn commitment with the
principles embodied in the UN Charter and with the promotion of human dignity.
(Sarney at Martin Solon, Clara 2011: 18)
It is also worth mentioning Brazilian efforts to maintain the integrity of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The Court became operational in 2002, with a
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distinguished Brazilian jurist as one of its eighteen judges. In the face of this
development the U.S. government engaged in a wide-ranging campaign to undermine the
ICC, including an effort to bully states into signing “Bilateral Impunity Agreements”
exempting U.S. nationals from the ICC’s jurisdiction. Brazil took a welcome stance at the
time by not only refusing to sign such an agreement, but also by publicly stating that such
an accord would “run counter to the letter and the spirit of the Rome Statute and
constitutes a threat to the judicial equality of States” (HRW, 2004).
On the downside, although major conventions were ratified it took more than a
decade for Brazil to recognize the jurisdiction of the oversight bodies associated with
these treaties (Macaulay, 2010: 138). At the international level, Brazil was reluctant to
accept international scrutiny and no jurisdiction of the oversight bodies created by the
UN treaties were recognized until years after ratification. Following the democratic
transition Brazil was also initially hesitant to issue invitations to UN Special Rapporteurs.
At a regional level, Brazil has been characterized a human rights “laggard”
(Engstrom 2010). In fact, the country was one of the last Latin American states to
recognize the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 1998 (See
table 10). Furthermore, when Brazil ratified the American convention of Human Rights,
it became the only country in the region to make a reservation on Articles 43 and 48,
claiming that the Inter-American Commission had no automatic right to conduct “in
loco” visits, which could only occur with the express permission of the host country
(Macaulay, 2010: 139). This was a striking redundancy in that the Commission had never
claimed that it could undertake an on-site inquiry without permission from the target
state.
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Following the democratic transition, Brazil has had comparatively few dealings
with the Inter-American system (IAHRS). By 1994 only two of the hundreds of cases
pending before the IACHR concerned Brazil (Macaulay 2010: 139). This is an anomaly
in that NGOs have documented an abundance of human rights abuses in Brazil. The
anomaly stems from a number of factors. One is the success of successive Brazilian
governments in persuading the Commission not to process the complains received. A
second is the lack of awareness within Brazil of the resources and opportunities provided
by the Inter-America system and the international human rights system more broadly
(Engstrom, 2010, 2013). That lack of awareness in in part a function of the concentration
of abuses among the poor and poorly educated, in part a function of a certain
introversion, a widespread sense that Brazil is today a global rather than a regional actor,
that regionally it is almost a system unto itself.
Recent studies indicate that when comes to Brazil this pattern of recourse to the
Inter-American Human Rights System has continued throughout the 2000s. In terms of
concrete engagement with the IAHRS on specific cases, “Brazilian state institutions have
tended either to ignore judgments by the regional system or choose not to implement
substantial measures” (Ensgtrom 2010). At the same time, unlike the case of Chile,
Brazilian representatives acting as judges in the Court or as Commissioners at the
IACHR41 have been relatively few in comparison to other countries in the region.

41

Only Few Brazilians have been elected to the IACHR: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, 19641983: Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991 and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2004-2011.
Cançado. Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American Court.
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During Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s term, however, there was an increasing
engagement with the Inter-American human rights system and the Brazilian government
reached a number of “friendly agreements” with the Commission most notably an
agreement to demolish the infamous Carandiru prison. Years later in 2001, and in a in a
landmark ruling, the Court of Human Rights criticized the Brazilian government for not
taking effective measures to prosecute and convict perpetrators of domestic violence.
This time the Brazilian government responded in 2006 enacting a law under the symbolic
name “Maria da Penha Law on Domestic and Family Violence.” Despite these notable
exceptions, the general picture of Brazil’s engagement with the Inter-American system
has been more of neglect rather than active engagement.
Table 8
Brazil: Selected International Treaties
Treaty
Year of Ratification
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1992
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
1992
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
1984
against Women
Convention on the Rights of the Child
1990
Ottawa Convention
1999
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
2008
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
2010
Enforced Disappearance
International Criminal Court/ Rome Statue
2002
Source: Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=country&iduct=35; Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights. http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en
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Table 9
Countries that Ratified the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) and
Accepted the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
Country
Argentina
Barbados
Bolivia
Brazil
Chile
Colombia
Costa Rica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
El Salvador
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Mexico
Nicaragua
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Surinam
Trinidad y Tobago
Uruguay
Venezuela
Source: Sikkink (2004: 84)

Acceptance of the Court
1984
2000
1993
1998
1991
1985
1980
1990
1984
1995
1987
1998
1981
1998
1991
1990
1993
1981
1987
1991
1985
1981

International Human Rights Regimes
This section examines Brazil’s role in the UN human rights system by looking at
its performance at the Human Rights Commission and the Human Rights Council
(established in 2006) and when necessary it also highlights important landmarks at the
United Nations General Assembly. It systematizes Brazil’s position (voting behavior)
regarding resolutions condemning human rights abuses internationally and describes
major initiatives and proposals submitted to the UN human rights system.
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UN Human Rights Commission
When it comes to initiatives within the Commission, Brazil has played a
considerable role. Most notably, it took the lead in proposing a series of resolutions in the
areas of development, health, and democracy. The Brazilian delegation in 2000 presented
a proposal in the Commission that led to a resolution on “The Incompatibility between
Democracy and Racism”. Later in 2005, Brazil presented a resolution at the Commission
expressing concern at abuses against persons on the grounds of their sexual orientation
and calling on states to “promote and protect the human rights of all persons regardless of
their sexual orientation.” This was the first time that a resolution specifically focusing on
sexual orientation had been brought before the Commission.42
In the area of health, Brazil has shown important leadership starting during
Cardoso’s administration and later on reinforced by Lula’s government. In relation to
HIV/AIDS, it has been one of the principal players in the global struggle for access to
affordable antiretroviral medicines and in promoting flexibility in the patent rules of
international trade agreements. In 2001 the Brazilian National AIDS Program won the
UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s Human Rights and
Culture of Peace Award. Later in 2003, Brazil contributed to the appointment of a UN
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Health as well as to the Commission on Human
Rights adopting resolutions recognizing that access to medication in the context of
pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, is a fundamental right
(Dauvergne, P. & Farias, D. 2012: 910-912).
42

Unfortunately, although it was co-sponsored by twenty other countries, the resolution was
shelved at the last moment.
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In regard to voting behavior, records show that out of 59 resolutions that were
considered by the Commission on Human Rights, 24 were adopted by consensus among
the country members. Out of the ones that were voted (35 in total), Brazil voted in favor
18 times, abstained 15, and voted against on two occasions (Martin Solon, 2011: 28).
Table 10 summarizes Brazil’s voting pattern at the UN Human Rights
Commission from 2001-2005. During this period, Brazil voted in favor of resolutions
addressing abuses in North Korea, Iraq, the Israeli-Occupied Territories, and Sudan. Yet,
Brazil’s delegation to the Commission in Geneva voted against or abstained in critical
human rights situations such as the following (Martin & Solon, 2011).
Voted against (twice) and abstained (twice) on resolutions criticizing abuses in
Chechnya despite ongoing serious violations of human rights and international
humanitarian law by both parties to the conflict. In 2004 the members of the Commission
rejected a resolution introduced by the European Union condemning human rights abuses
in Chechnya. In that opportunity, Brazil joined the majority of countries voting against
the resolution with nations such as China, Congo, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Nigeria, Russia, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and
Zimbabwe.43


Abstained on each one of the resolutions regarding Cuba (2001 to 2005),
despite this country’s longstanding restrictions against political dissidents. In
contrast, since 2001 Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador
voted in favor of such resolutions. Mexico has voted in favor since 2002.

43

18 countries abstained from voting including: the following Latin American countries:
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Paraguay, and Peru.
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Argentina voted in favor in 2001/2002/2003 but abstained in 2004 and 2005.


Abstained twice (2001 and 2002) on resolutions on the human rights situation
in Iran. Brazil maintained this pattern of avoiding condemnation of the Iranian
regime in the following years but at the UN General Assembly.



Abstained three times on resolutions on Zimbabwe (2002/2003/2004). In the
voting in 2004, among the countries blocking the resolution on Zimbabwe
were India, South Africa, and Russia. The supporters included: Argentina,
Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Guatemala, Honduras, and several European
countries.44



Abstained on a resolution criticizing abuses in Turkmenistan (2003), a country
characterized by Human Rights Watch as “one of the most repressive states in
the world.” At the time of voting, no independent human rights organizations
could operate in Turkmenistan, and the media was subjected to strict prepublication censorship. However, a year later in 2004 Brazil voted in favor of
the resolution on Turkmenistan.



Abstained in 2005 on a resolution criticizing abuses in Belarus, a regime that
since 1994 continues to severely curtail freedoms of association, assembly,
and expression, and the right to fair trial. In this opportunity among the list of
countries that voted in favor were Australia, Canada, Costa Rica, France,
Germany, Mexico, Paraguay, and UK. China, India, South Africa and Russia
were among the countries opposing the resolution. In previous resolutions

44

Mexico also abstained in this opportunity.
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(2003/2004) Brazil had voted in favor.
UN Human Rights Council
Brazilian diplomats were actively engaged in the creation of the UN Human
Rights Council (2006) and took on a leadership role in the creation of a new mechanism,
the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) (Belli, 2008). In Brazil’s view, the UPR
mechanism represents one of the pillars of the HRC, as it embodies the principles of
universality, impartiality, and non-selectivity, essential to ensuring balanced and
constructive treatment of countries under examination. Brazil played a constructive role
in the interactive dialogue promoted with countries participating in the UPR First Cycle,
contributing with questions and recommendations to the process. Brazil also supported
capacity-building activities in countries undergoing evaluation under the mechanism,
such as the exchange of experiences provided to foster the participation of Angola, Haiti,
Panama, and São Tomé and Príncipe.
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Table 10
Brazilian Position and Status of the Resolution (UN Human Rights Commission)
Country
Lebanese prisoners
in Israel
China (No action
motion)
Afghanistan
Iraq
Myanmar
Cuba
Iran
Russia
Sudan
DRC
Sierra Leone
Burundi
Equatorial Guinea
Rwanda

2001
In favor
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
Consensus
In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus

2002
In favor
(Adopted)
-

2003
In favor
(Adopted)
-

2004
No voting
(Adjourned)
In favor
(Adopted)
-

2005
-

Consensus
In favor
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus
Consensus
Consensus
In favor
(Adopted)
-

In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
-

Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
-

Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
-

Against
(Rejected)
In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus
Consensus
-

Against
(Rejected)
Removed
Project
-

-

-

-

-

Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)
-

Consensus
-

-

Removed
Project
-

Cyprus
Zimbabwe

Abstention
(Adopted)
Consensus
-

East Timor
Turkmenistan

-

Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
Consensus
-

Belarus

-

-

Chad
(1503 Procedure)
Liberia
(1503 Procedure)
Democratic
Republic of Korea

-

-

Consensus
Abstention
(Adopted)
Abstention
(Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus

-

-

Consensus

-

-

-

-

In favor
(Adopted)

In favor
(Adopted)

In favor
(Adopted)
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Abstention
(Adopted)
-

Table 11
Brazilian Position and Status of the Resolution UN Human Rights Council
Item
Item
7

Item

Country
2007

2008

Year
2009

2010

2011

Palestine
and the
Occupied
Territories
Belarus

In favor
(2
resolutions
Adopted)
-

In favor
(4
resolutions
Adopted)
-

In favor
(4
resolutions
Adopted)
-

In favor
(26
resolutions
Adopted)
-

Ivory
Coast
Myanmar

-

-

-

-

In favor
(5
resolutions
Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)
Consensus

Consensus

Consensus

Consensus

Consensus

Consensus

Libya
Honduras
Iran

-

-

-

-

Consensus
-

-

Consensus
In favor
(Adopted)
In favor
(Adopted)

Democrati In favor
Abstention
In favor
c Republic
(Adopted)
(Adopted)
(Adopted)
of Korea
Sudan/
Consensus Consensus
In favor
In favor
Darfur
(Adopted)
(Adopted)
Source: Based on (Martin Solon, Clara 2011) and Conectas yearbook (2008-2009, 2009-2010,
2010-2011 http://www.conectas.org/en/. Note that these tables only include resolutions,
and not amendments. Brazil has also abstained in certain amendments in some
occasions, including the one regarding the DRC in 2008.

In its first two terms at the HRC, Brazil led or co-sponsored a number of
initiatives concentrated on economic and social rights and non-discrimination issues
(Brazilian Mission at the UN, 2012). These initiatives included convening the 10th
Special Session of the HRC in 2009 to discuss the impact of the global economic and
financial crisis on human rights. In Brazil’s view, the emerging effects of the crisis,
which were then expected to manifest themselves through growing poverty and
inequality, increasingly unstable and less secure working conditions, reduced social
rights, and heightened discrimination and xenophobia, fully justified the organization of
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the session and updated discussions on the issue. The Brazilian delegation decided to call
the 13th Special Session of the HRC in 2010 to discuss strategies for incorporating the
human rights perspective in Haiti’s rebuilding efforts.
Brazil also sponsored important resolutions tackling racism and racial
discrimination. They supported the follow-up mechanisms of the Durban Declaration and
Plan of Action. In 2008, Brazil hosted the Regional Preparatory Conference to the
Durban Review Conference. Brazil has also proposed a series of resolutions that reflect
its commitment to overcoming racism and racial discrimination from a variety of
perspectives. Brazil and South Africa, in their capacity as host countries of the 2010 and
2014 FIFA World Cups, proposed, in March 2010, the Resolution entitled “A world of
sports free from racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia, and related intolerance”
(A/HRC/RES/13/27). Aware of the challenge posed to peaceful and democratic
coexistence by political platforms with racist and xenophobic overtones, Brazil
reintroduced in 2011 a resolution in the HRC reaffirming the “Incompatibility between
democracy and racism” (A/HRC/RES/18/15).
Brazil also strove to advance the promotion of children’s rights through fostering
the presentation of a resolution on adopting the “Guidelines for the Alternative Care of
Children” (A/HRC/RES/9/13 and A/HRC/RES/11/7), an essential measure to protect
children deprived of proper parental care. Aware of the mobilizing potential of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Brazil secured, in September 2007, the approval
of a resolution on the “Elaboration of human rights voluntary goals to be launched on the
occasion of the celebration of the sixtieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights” (A/HRC/RES/6/26). The effort provided the bases for approval, the
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following year, of the resolution “Human rights voluntary goals” (A/HRC/RES/9/12),
which establishes a set of ten commitments capable of positively impacting the ability of
countries to promote and protect the rights provided for in the Universal Declaration.
In terms of voting behavior regarding country situations, Brazil’s performance at
the HRC has tended to accompany the consensus at the Council. When resolutions have
been voted, the majority of Brazilian votes have been in favor of addressing violation of
human rights including Sudan, North Korea, Belarus and Iran (see Table 12). Yet, in
2009, Brazil abstained on whether to continue human rights monitoring of North Korea
where UN monitors were looking into reports of executions and detention camps. Brazil
abstained along with South Africa, Angola, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Bolivia, Qatar,
Philippines, Gabon, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Nicaragua, and Senegal.45 By comparison,
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay joined most European countries in supporting
continuation of the UN monitoring mission. Brazil also abstained on an amendment to a
resolution regarding Congo.
When dealing with Special Sessions at the Human Rights Council46, the country
has voted in favor of the majority of resolutions regarding urgent human rights concerns
(2006-2011). This covers the following situations: Palestine occupied territories, Darfur,
Myanmar, DRC, Ivory Coast, Libya and Syria. However, in 2009 Brazil abstained in a
resolution aimed at stopping the council from monitoring human rights in Sri Lanka,
where the UN High commissioner for Human Rights had denounced widespread war
45

Voted against the resolution: China, Cuba, Egypt, Indonesia, Russia, and Nigeria.

46

Between 2006 and December 2011, the HRC held eighteen special sessions and six of them
related to the Arab-Israeli conflict.
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crimes. By comparison, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico voted for the continuation of the
inquiry (Asano, Nader, & Vilhena, 2009).
UN General Assembly (UNGA)
The case of Iran is probably the most commented at international circles when
comes to Brazil’s votes at the UNGA. Since 2001, with the exception of 2003, Brazil has
abstained on all resolutions addressing Iran’s human rights situation at the UN General
Assembly in New York (Asano, Nader, & Vilhena, 2009). The voting of the UN in 2008
(document A/63/430/Add.3) is a good example of the general pattern of voting behavior
of UN country members when comes to condemning human rights abuses in Iran. The
majority of Latin American countries votes in favor of the resolution including :
Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Netherlands, New Panama, Peru,
Among the countries voting against were India, China, Russia, and South Africa.47
President Lula da Silva expressed his support of the Iranian regime in other instances. For
instance, Lula welcomed Iranian President Ahmadinejad to Brazil only a few months
after the allegedly fraudulent June 2009 elections in Iran, and he refused to condemn
Iran’s nuclear program or support a move toward UN sanctions (Brands, 2010). Between
2007-2011, Brazil abstained on a number of other resolutions condemning human rights
violations in country specific situations at the UNGA. As table 13 illustrates, apart from
Iran, the abstentions included North Korea and Myanmar.

47

Some the countries against the resolution were: Afghanistan, Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cuba, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Ecuador, Egypt,
Eritrea, India, Indonesia, Myanmar, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Qatar, Russian Federation, Saudi
Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Somalia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Venezuela, Zimbabwe.
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Table 12
Brazilian Abstentions to Country Human Rights Resolutions (UN General Assembly)
Years
2008-2009

Country Human Rights Situation- Abstentions
Iran
North Korea

2009-2010

Iran
North Korea
Myanmar
2010-2011
Iran
Myanmar
Source: Based on Conectas yearbook (2008-2009, 2009-2010, 2010-2011), at
http://www.conectas.org/en.

Brazil’s human rights diplomacy—especially since President Lula took office in
2003—has been criticized by media, international and domestic NGOS monitoring the
country’s foreign policy at the UN human rights system. Already in 2004 Human Rights
Watch wrote to President Lula indicating that they “were disappointed by Brazil’s failure
to condemn certain abusive governments at the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, and
by your unwillingness to speak about abuses in countries that you visited, such as Egypt,
Libya, Syria, and Cuba” (HRW, 2004). These organizations strategically used President
Lula da Silva visit to the Council in June 2009 to explicitly condemn Brazil’s
international policies on the subject. In a press release, titled “Brazil: Support Victims,
not Abusers”, Julie de Rivero, Geneva Advocacy Director at Human Rights Watch, stated
that:
Brazil's support for abusive governments is undermining the Human Rights
Council's performance. Rather than speaking up for victims, Brazil often argues
that governments need to be given a chance and that the sovereignty of nations is
more important than human rights. (HRW, 2009)
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She concluded saying that "Brazil seems more concerned about not offending abusers
than it is about implementing the council's mandate to address human rights violations.”
Most notably, local NGOS such as Conectas and the Brazilian Human Rights and
Foreign Policy Committee have criticized the country’s international human rights stands
at the UNHRC. Since 2007, the Brazilian NGO Conectas issues a yearbook that monitors
Brazil’s initiatives and voting behavior at the UN human rights system. In 2009,
Conectas researchers published at “Politica Externa”— one of Brazil’s most influential
international politics journal— an article reviewing Brazil’s human rights diplomacy. In
the article they state the following:
Brazil has been performing an increasingly relevant role in the international
scene, including in forums that deal with human rights, such as UN Human Rights
Council. Nevertheless, despite having become a strategic actor within the
Council, Brazil has taken questionable positions in cases of rights violations in
specific countries such as North Korea and Sri Lanka. Its stances in these cases
distance themselves both from the international tradition in this field and the
constitutional principles that rule our international relationships. In these cases, by
resenting harsher resolutions by the Council against human rights violations,
Brazil seems to act in a fashion that is ambiguous selective and non consistent and
therefore does not contributes to the Council’s success. (Asano & Nader &
Vilhena 2009: 77)
When asked about the growing criticism of Brazil’s foreign policy on human
rights, Lula’s Presidential advisor, Marco Aurelio Garcia, was quoted by Estado de Sao
Paulo in June 2009 as saying: “Brazil doesn’t have to be handing out certificates of good
conduct or bad conduct around the world”. And he added, “We think it is much more
important to take positive actions that can move a country to improve its internal situation
than actions of a restrictive nature” (Oppenheimer, 2009). In an article explaining
Brazil’s foreign policy, Lula’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Celso Amorim, further asserts
their position on this subject:
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As I had the chance to observe during the 65Th UN General Assembly, more often
than not the exercise of human rights is more effectively ensured by dialogue and
cooperation than by arrogant attitudes derived from self-declared moral
superiority. A harsh condemnation of this or that country in Geneva or New York,
based on self-ascribed position of higher moral ground does little to ameliorate
the situation of those perishing in the field. (Amorim, 2010: 238)
Peace Promotion and Humanitarian Protection
Brazil’s participation in peacekeeping can be clearly divided into two stages:
before and after the MINUSTAH operation in Haiti. Prior to MINUSTAH, Brazil
adopted a strict policy of participation only in Chapter VI observation and monitoring
missions (often not participating in more robust follow-on missions) in the Western
Hemisphere and Portuguese-speaking nations. Overall, Brazil participated in 23
peacekeeping operations from 1957 to 1999, as well as several Organization of American
States (OAS) missions and operations under the auspices of the UN Department of
Political Affairs (DPA). Throughout the 1990s, Brazil maintained a peacekeeping
doctrine that was limited in scope and conditioned only to the pacific settlement of
disputes (Kenkel, 2013).
In 2004, Brazil took on its most important and sizeable peacekeeping commitment
to date: providing MINUSTAH’s largest contingent (up to 2,200 troops) as well as an
unbroken succession of generals serving as its Force Commander. Today Brazil is the
largest contributor of peacekeepers in the Americas (Kenkel, 2013). Since Haiti,
Brazilian troops have participated in the full range of activities under MINUSTAH’s
Chapter VII mandate.48 This is an important change in Brazil’s peacekeeping doctrine

48

Yet, Brazilian policymakers continue to be very skeptical of the possibility of use of force as
stated on UN Charter under Chapter VII.
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considering that local decision-makers traditionally refused to send troops to UN peace
enforcement operations other than those conducted under Chapter VI of the United
Nations Charter, which require the consent of the ruling authorities in the country
concerned. In fact, with the exception of Rwanda, Brazil had always abstained from
Security Council Chapter VII decisions about interventions. For example, when the
debate on humanitarian crisis in Darfur took place and Brazil was an elected member of
the council, the government chose to adhere to a non-interventionist posture and
abstained from the instigation of a trial for the men listed by the International
Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (Hertz, 2014).
The decision to go to Haiti was unprecedented and Brazilian leaders were
cautious in explaining the reasons for its involvement. As Brazilian scholar, Matias
Spektor, explains: “Lula was careful not to couch this major transformation in terms of a
new doctrine. Instead, his discourse emphasized continuity with Brazil’s traditional
attachment to national sovereignty” (Spektor, 2012). Lula explained the country’s
presence in Haiti due to a “growing approximation and consolidation of Brazil’s relations
with its region” while insisting that it is “require that the situations of instability in these
countries deserve a more attentive follow-up on the part of the Brazilian government,
which is oriented by the principle of non-intervention, but also by an attitude of ‘nonindifference’’ (Lula da Silva quoted by Spektor).
Lula’s emphasis on “non-indifference” evidence and increasing acknowledgment
within Brazil’s political elites that human rights abuses cannot be discarded as nonconsequential for international affairs. Starting in late 1990s and especially since the UN
mission in Haiti, Brazilian diplomats ameliorated their anti-interventionist rhetoric and
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started to contribute more consistently to UN peacekeeping missions. Yet, they remained
very much skeptic to the idea of humanitarian intervention. Spektor (2012) explains,
For Brazilian leaders the notion that the international community had an
obligation to act in the face of mass atrocities in places like Rwanda, Somalia and
Kosovo was deeply problematic. They feared that within this emerging consensus
major powers would find a permissive environment to impose their will on far
weaker countries.
Indeed, Brazil’s position towards the notion of Responsibility to Protect introduced in the
UN Summit in 2005 has been ambiguous. “Officially the government welcomed the
initiative, but in practice it denounced R2P as a ploy of the strong to secure the legal right
to intervene at will across the developing world. Under Lula, Foreign Minister Celso
Amorim had spoken of R2P as “droit d’ingerénce [. . .] in new clothes.” (Spektor, 2012).
In a lecture given at the London School of Economics in 2009, Amorim voiced Brazil’s
position on the use of military force for humanitarian purposes even more clearly: “We
reject the view of an international order which favors the use of force and regards
multilateralism as just one among many options on the menu, to be selected when it suits
the objectives of the powerful” (Amorim in Brands, 2010: 19).
It is not until the crisis in Libya in early 2011 that Brazil was compelled as nonpermanent member of the UNSC to address a Chapter VII resolution calling for a
coercive response to a humanitarian emergency. Brazil voted in favor of imposing
sanctions on Libya (Resolution 1970) but joined China, India, Russia and Germany in
abstaining from the vote authorizing “all necessary measures” against Libya (Resolution
1973). However, after NATO’s intervention in Libya, Brazil’s criticism to the military
action hardened with Itamarity issuing statements condemning the loss of civilian lives
and calling for a ceasefire.
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Brazilian concerns regarding the potential abuse of R2P by western powers and
what was considered the misuse of the principle during the NATO intervention in Libya
crystallized in a new proposal “Responsibility while protecting” (RwP) that was
presented by Brazil’s UN representative in late 2011. This proposal includes a set of
criteria (including last resort, proportionality, and balance of consequences) to be taken
into account before the Security Council mandates any use of military force, and a review
mechanism to ensure that such mandates’ implementation is closely monitored. It also
emphasizes that prevention is the “best policy” and that the use of force in particular must
be monitored and assessed.49 Brazil’s position in this proposal highlighted prevention and
monitoring but remains very cautious about the prospects of the use of force for
humanitarian purposes.
Financial Assistance
Financial contribution to important UN or regional bodies provides an additional
indicator of the degree of nation’s support for international human rights. Since 2006 the
contribution of Brazil to the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
(OHCHR) has been very limited. According to the annual OHCHR reports, only in 2010
and after not contributing for several years, Brazil gave US $1 million. In 2011 Brazil
contributed only US $ 5,665, which leaves them according to OHCHR´s donor ranking
per capita in place 69 out of 71 countries. In contrast, India contributes more than
US$50,000 annually and Turkey around US$100,000 (OHCHR, 2011).
This dissertation covers up to 2010 (Lulas’s Government). However, Brazil’s reaction to the
crisis in Libya and its RwP proposal is critical to understand the country’s most current position
when comes to respond massive human rights abuses. Yet, the discussion of RwP and its impact
on Brazil’s foreign policy and international politics more broadly is still ongoing and its impact
should be assessed in future research.
49
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The United Nations Democratic FUND (UNDEF) that was created in 2005 is a
UN institution providing grants to civil society groups for democracy promotion. It has
received important contributions from countries such as India and United States as well
less sizable but not insignificant contributions from Latin American countries including
Mexico, Chile, and Peru. Brazil, by contrast, has never contributed funds for UNDEF.
Brazil´s financial assistance to the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has
been very limited in comparison with its regional peers, with no contributions in 2007,
2010, 2011 and 2012 (IACHR, 2012).
Humanitarian assistance is one area in which the Brazilian government decided to
participate more actively since Lula’s administration and the government defines50 it
expressly as actions directly targeting the promotion and protection of international
human rights.51 The humanitarian assistance provided by Brazil during the Lula
administration consisted of donations in kind (food, medicine and general items), sending
in Brazilian professionals to help, cash donations and participation in multilateral
dialogues on humanitarian assistance. In 2010, the international humanitarian assistance
budget was US$21million (Pimenta de Faria & Goulart Paradis 2013).
The initiative that granted Brazil a worldwide reputation as a provider of technical
assistance has been the internationalization of its national strategy to combat hunger
50

The Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MRE) defines international humanitarian assistance:
“Any action that contributes, in an immediate and effective way, to prevent, protect from, prepare
for, reduce or alleviate suffering and to provide assistance to other countries or regions that are –
temporarily or otherwise – in situations of emergency, public calamity, imminent or serious threat
to life, to health, to the protection of human rights or the humanitarian rights of its population”
(MRE at Pimenta de Faria & Goulart Paradis 2013).
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Technical cooperation is a second area but it has not been defined as compromising human
rights initiatives and therefore it has not been included in this section.
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“Zero Hunger”. President Lula invested important diplomatic efforts on the “Action
against Hunger and Poverty” that was launched by Brazil at the United Nations in 2004
with the objective of identifying “innovative financing mechanisms” capable of scaling
up resources for financing development in the poorest countries. Since the launch of this
initiative, Brazil’s policies to combat hunger and poverty have become an international
reference point and the focus of important international partnerships. During the last
decade, the Ministry of Social Development and Fight Against Hunger (MSD) alone has
had visits by delegations from 63 countries, 25 of them African, interested in learning
more about the “Bolsa Família” Program. The demand for Brazil’s social technology has
led the United Nations to open its only Center for Excellence against Hunger of the
World Food Program (WFP) in Brazil (Instituto Lula, 2014)
Conclusions
Brazil´s diplomatic performance on human rights promotion. The country has
indeed moved from a defensive position at the beginning of the transition to democracy
in the late 1980s towards embracing human rights promotion and finally to accepting
international scrutiny in the mid-1990s. Brazil is today signature of all major human
rights treaties in sharp contrast to the United States, China, or India. The country was also
an active participant in the process of reform creating the new UN Human Rights Council
and has been at the forefront of important international initiatives at the United Nations
on the right to health, development and non-discrimination.
On the downside, Brazil took more than a decade (after treaties were ratified) to
recognize the jurisdiction of its associated bodies. The country shows ambivalent support
to resolutions addressing human rights abuses in foreign countries and presents and
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important record of abstention votes at the UN system in the past two decades. This was
particularly the case at UN Human Rights Commission but the country still abstained in
important resolutions at the newly created UN Human Rights Council and continued to
do so at the UN General Assembly. Discussions related the use of force for human
protection and the principle of Responsibility to Protect remain highly contested among
Brazilian elites and Itamaraty. The financial assistance for human rights has been limited.
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CHAPTER 5: UNDERSTANDING BRAZIL’S HUMAN RIGHTS FOREIGN POLICY
Contextualizing Brazil’s Foreign Policy
Despite being a continental sized country and having borders with almost every
country in South America, Brazil since the first decade of the last century has not dealt
with external security threats nor it is dependent on any militarily stronger nation. Indeed,
the configuration of Brazil’s national space and territorial demarcation followed a process
led by the Brazilian diplomat Baron Rio Branco characterized mainly by international
negotiations and arbitrations, rather than interstate conflict (Lafer, 2001) The early and
peaceful establishment of borders had major consequences for the formation of the
nation, its diplomatic practice and the future pattern of Brazilian foreign policy. It
impacted at least in three ways. First, without military threats the country developed its
international policies relatively independent of external forces. This sense of
independence is captured more clearly on Brazil’s traditional foreign policy quest for
“autonomy”, that is, “the condition allowing states to formulate and implement foreign
policies independently of constrains imposed by powerful states”52 (Vigenani and
Cepuluni 2009:6). Second, economic interests rather than security became central in
shaping its international policies and, as a consequence, Brazil’s foreign policy has
always had a strongly developmentalist component. Foreign policy is perceived as a
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Note that autonomy is understood as a continuum whose extremities are alignment and full
autonomy. Between these extreme there is a full gradation of foreign policies.
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critical tool for national development. Third, the stellar performance of Rio Branco53 as a
conflict mediator gave Brazilian diplomacy a special statue within the state apparatus.
From the moment of its inception, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) enjoyed a
great deal of legitimacy among Brazilian elites and important levels of autonomy vis-àvis other state institutions (Lima 2000 and 2005; Lima and Hirst 2006).
The centrality and the persistence to Brazil’s foreign policy of the factors
mentioned above generated an uncommon degree of stability to the international policies
of this colossus of the South. Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst (2006), for
example, highlight that in the past century Brazilian foreign policy had only two major
policy shifts: the first in the 1930s, with the crisis of the agro-exporting model and its
replacement by an import substitution model (ISI); and the second in the 1990s, with the
exhaustion of the “protected industrialization” regime and its replacement by a model of
competitive integration into the global economy. Arguably, since early 2000s President
Lula da Silva initiated a new foreign policy shift intended to develop a more assertive
foreign policy to enhance Brazil’s role in the world.
The first shift was driven by the rapid industrialization of Brazil in the fist half of
the 20th century. The country became one of the most successful examples of the ISI
model. The major characteristic of this development model were a central role for the
state in the provision of incentives and in production itself; discrimination against
imports; and large-scale participation by the state in foreign direct investments on a wide
range of industrial sectors (Lima and Hirst 2006: 23).

53

Rio Branco was Minister of Foreign Relations from 1902-1912.
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Foreign Policy was a key part of the ISI model and Itamaraty was instrumental “to
the model’s domestic consolidation and international recognition”. Furthermore, “a close
and virtuous link was seen to be established between the goal of ISI and the objective of
developing an autonomous foreign policy” (Lima and Hirst 2006: 24). Vigevani and
Cepaluni describe the foreign policy of the time54 as having a series of characteristics
including: a policy of contesting the norms and principles of important international
institutions; the belief in autarchic development, guided by the expansion of the domestic
market and by economic protectionism, and resistance to international regimes
interpreting as freezing world power, in favor of the status quo (Vigenani and Cepuluni
2009:7). Lima and Hisrt (2006) add Brazil’s international role as a leader for differential
treatment for development countries in the trade regime and the high value that the
policymakers assigned to the expansion of economic cooperation with southern countries.
The next policy foreign policy shift took place in the 1990s as a “result of both
severe economic conditions and the systemic constraints produced by the fiscal crisis of
the state” (Lima and Hirst 2006: 24). Brazil was experiencing a deep economic crisis
originated in the exhaustion of a relatively autarchic economic model founded in the
1930s based on import substitution. This process took place in the context of the
transition to democracy in the mid-1980s that put to an end over two decades of military
regimes that first took power as a result of the 1964 military coup. Jose Sarney assumed
the Presidency in the midst of the collapse of the ISI model, an enormous foreign debt,
rampant inflation, and the pressures of an incomplete transition. At the international
These authors characterize Brazilian foreign policy during this period as “autonomy through
distance.”
54

132

level, the world was witnessing the meltdown of Soviet power that led to the end of the
Cold War and the emergence of new world order.
An important consequence of these changes was the developing of a new foreign
policy concept “autonomy through participation”, an idea that was incipient during
Sarney government, gained more prominence during Collor de Mello, and was fully
implementation during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s Presidential term. In his brief
period as Minister of Foreign Relations (1992-1993), Cardoso set the parameters of what
he called a new foreign policy:
Why a new foreign policy? Firstly, because Brazil has changed. In the political
arena, we have made the transition from authoritarianism to democracy. In the
economic arena, after a period of accelerated development, we entered a period of
crisis that could lead to stagnation of growth. On the ideological side we have
gone beyond authoritarian nationalism and autochthonous development to seek a
competitive insertion in the world. Secondly, because the world has changed. In
the political arena the end of the Cold War redrew the power structure. In the
economic arena, globalization looks like becoming the dominant trend. In the
ideological arena, democracy and the market economy are the general rules.
(Cardoso in Vigenani and Cepuluni 2009:47)
Cardoso puts it even more explicitly during his Presidency, “autonomy through distance
pursued by the military dictatorships must be replaced by one of autonomy through
participation, within a changing international reality” (FHC at Brands, Hal
2012:8).According to Vigenani and Cepuluni (2009) the idea of “autonomy through
participation” that was set forth during this period translates to a set of foreign policy
priorities that include:
the adherence to international regime, including those of liberal slant without
losing the capacity to manage foreign policy. In this case the objective would be
to influence the very formulation of the objectives and rules governing the
international system. It is felt that national objectives would be more effectively
achieved along these paths. (Lima and Hirst 2006: 24)
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In sum, these new foreign policy priorities were crafted with the objective of retaining
“the desire for autonomy” but at the same time, “sought to remove the legacy of
authoritarianism and to respond to the international power of global liberalism” (Lima
and Hirst 2006: 24).
In the end of Cardoso’s term the pendulum leaned once again toward emphasizing
the autonomous aspects of its foreign policy, a priority that was deepened during Lula’s
government. The main reasons behind this emphasis were an increasing concern about
the international consequences of increasing U.S. unilateralism during the first term of
George W. Bush’s Presidency and, most importantly, Brazil’s stunning economic success
at the beginning of the new century. Fueled by a commodity boom and a growing
domestic market, economic growth picked up, averaging 4.5% between 2004 and 2010
with relatively low inflation. The social implication of this new economic growth also
became more evident by the middle of the decade when observers began to notice that
Brazil was enjoying falling poverty rates and improving measures of income inequality
(Montero, Alfred 2014: 2-3). Brazil was on the rise and President Lula was convinced
that progress at home required more ambitious policies abroad. In his words, “This
country has greatness… this country has everything to be the equal of any other country
in the world. And we will not give up on this goal” (Lula at Hurrell, 2010:1).
Although Lula’s government adopted macro-economic policies at home that were
similar to his predecessor, during this period Brazilian elites were aiming for a more
ambitious goal “a certain reconfiguration of the world’s commercial and diplomatic
geography”—that is, according to Celso Amorim, to hasten the transition to a multipolar
order in which international norms and institutions no longer favor the developed world
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at Brazil’s expense (Amorim at Brands, 2012:8). The speech by President Lula to
diplomats in 2003 captures the tenor of his foreign policy:
We no longer accept participation in international politics as if we were Latin
American wretches; a Third World country of no count; a worthless country with
homeless children; a minor country whose people only know how to play soccer
and dance the samba… There is no interlocutor anywhere in the world who
respects another who bows his head and acts as an inferior. (Lula da Silva 2003)
These foreign policy goals translated into an active diplomacy that included the opening
of 33 new embassies, 5 new permanent missions to international organizations (including
the IAEA and the Human Rights Council) and 19 new consulates (Hurrell 2010:1).
Itamarity has played and important role promoting these new policies. Despite increasing
pluralism of Brazil’s foreign policy and the rising importance of the Presidency in
international affairs during Cardoso and Lula (Pinheiro, 2009; Faria, 2012; Cason &
Power, 2009), the Ministry of Foreign Relations remained the most important institution
in the designing and implementation of the country’s foreign policy, especially when
comes to political decisions involving traditionally respected notions of sovereignty and
non-intervention. The appointment of Celso Amorim55, a career diplomat rather than an
eminent figure from outside the ranks of professional diplomacy as the head of the
Ministry of foreign Affairs during Itamar Franco’s and in both of Lula’s terms further
strengthened the power of the Ministry.
In terms of concrete foreign policy strategy, Brazil’s international insertion during
Lula has involved a strong focus on South America as key region for projecting Brazil’s
global ambitions (Malamud & Andres, 2011); a heavy focus on building economic and
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Celso Amorim was Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1993-1995 and then from 2003 to January
2011. Amorim is recognized as the artifice of Lula’s foreign policy.
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political ties with other emerging countries especially China, India and South Africa; and
an increasing interest in partnerships with other regions such as Africa and the Middle
East in search of areas to cooperate; and while Lula has maintained a good relationship
with Washington this foreign policy strategy has inevitably resulted in “a relative
distancing from the United States and the decline of traditional partners in Europe”
(Hurrell, 2010:1). When comes to international institutions, Brazil has always relied on
multilateralism as a source of power and during Lula’s term Brazilian diplomacy pushed
much harder than previous administrations for a UN Security Council that better reflects
the current distribution of world power, including a permanent seat for Brazil.
Overall, Lula’s foreign policy has been characterized by a search for “autonomy
through diversification” (Vigenani & Cepuluni 2009) and the core of its strategy was
based on a renewed emphasis on development goals and the centrality of South-South
cooperation (Dauvergne & Farias, 2012). Brazil’s ultimate goal is the reconfiguration of a
new global order in which developing countries are at the center of the stage. As Celso
Amorim (2010) puts it:
The rise of developing countries is a structural transformation that is knocking
down another wall: the North-South wall, albeit an invisible one. It is falling apart
much more slowly than the Berlin Wall, but falling it is. In this more multipolar,
more complex world in which developing countries are no longer passive
bystanders, Brazil is willing to play a greater role.
In sum, during the first decade of the 21st century and following a pattern that can be
traced back to Brazil’s state formation, the major determinants of Brazil’s foreign policy
have been given by the pursuit of international autonomy and the primacy of domestic
development. Itamaraty has been a key actor reinforcing the legitimacy of these ideas and
has exerted great influence on the worldview of Brazilian decision-makers. What is
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remarkable in the Brazilian case is that these foreign policy priorities have remained in
place despite important domestic changes such as the installation of the military regime
in 1964, the restoration of democracy in the late 1980s, and the liberation of the
economy. After two successive and stable democratic administrations, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso (1995- 2002) and Lula Da Silva (2002-2010), autonomy and
development have remained, despite different degrees of emphasis, at the core of Brazil’s
international strategies.
The prevalence of these two principles (autonomy and development) and the
traditional influence of the Foreign Ministry had an important impact on the ways in
which human rights ideas are perceived and potentially incorporated into the foreign
policy decision-process in Brazil. The next section analyses these issues further
considering the international and domestic determinants of international human rights
promotion.
Human Rights Promotion: International Influence and Domestic Determinants
The literature on human rights and international politics offers some insights on
how human rights principles are included as part of a nation’s foreign policy. One
perspective highlights the influence of international factors and especially the role of
ideas and norms as standards for the appropriate behavior of states. This view predicts
that countries will adopt new ideas such as human rights through a process of
international socialization that is driven by a need to enhance international legitimation
and credibility. It highlights the role of transnational advocacy networks as key actors
enhancing the transmission of international norms (Finnmore & Sikkink1998; Barnett &
Finnemore 1997; Clark, Ian 2007; Keck & Sikkink 1998). Other explanations emphasize
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how domestic determinants are critical for the acceptance and inclusion of human rights
into policy. For liberals, the inclusion of these principles is motivated by domestic
calculations in times of democratic transition (Moravcsik, A. 2000) while for
constructivist the process is driven by national identities especially democratic ones, local
ideas and institutions (Risse-Kappen 1996; Brysk 2007; Acharya, 2004; Checkel 1998,
Sikkink 2004).
The following subsections test these theories against the Brazilian case and, in
light of their apparent explanatory power or lack thereof, offer some explanations about
this country’s human rights diplomacy starting with the transition to democracy up to the
end of Lula’s second term in 2010. Brazil’s late adoption of international human rights
treaties and its longstanding reluctance to become a more active human rights promoter is
a good case to test these ideas. The literature on human rights has tended to look
exclusively at the successful cases. That is, countries that are part of the selected group of
the so-called “Global Good Samaritans” (Brysk 2007). Brazil is part of a group of
countries accepting international human rights that at the same time has the capacities to
act more strongly as a human rights promoter, yet the country remains a low key actor in
this field.
It is important to reiterate that the point of this chapter is not to minimize the
changes in Brazil’s response to the international human rights movement since the
transition to a democratic government. The previous chapter described Brazil’s path
towards accepting human rights as part of its diplomacy along with the country’s
increasing participation particularly in certain areas such as international development. It
is rather to show the relative limits of those changes and the forces restraining Brazil
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from becoming a leading promoter of a more effective international human rights regime.
As I noted above, Brazil has remained a country reluctant to participate in the shaming of
gross human rights delinquents much less to support coercive measures against even very
grave abusers of rights. In short I am proposing answers to the question: Why does Brazil
remains reluctant to become an international human rights promoter?
International Influences
Brazilian diplomats and foreign policy scholars have traditionally highlighted
Brazil’s capacity to shape its international priorities relatively independently of external
forces. This section argues that international influences since mid-1990s prompted Brazil
to increase its international credibility through the promotion of international human
rights. However, previously during the transition process and later in 2000s international
influences were not a determinant driver of Brazil’s approach to international human
rights.
The low impact of international pressures promoting accountability for past
human rights abuses and the relatively slow incorporation of these principles into foreign
policy were particularly evident during the first decade after the transition to democracy
that started in 1985. During the military regime and unlike Chile or Argentina, Brazil was
not subject to formal condemnation at the UN Human Rights Commission; only private
sessions were conducted between 1974 and 1976 to discuss the case. As human rights
violations increased in other South American countries, the situation in Brazil was also
seen as less urgent, and the international pressure upon the Brazilian government, such as
it was, decreased. The transitional government of Sarney, as a consequence, started in a
much better shape compared to other Latin American countries undergoing similar
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circumstances: no formal international condemnation against Brazil was issued by and
international institutions and external criticism due to human rights violations was
relatively low. Brazilian elites perceived no apparent need to critically reformulate the
country’s foreign policy for transitional times since, unlike countries like Argentina,
Chile and Uruguay, it had never been classified as a kind of international felon. Hence its
diplomats did not feel pressure to demonstrate national rehabilitation after a long period
of notorious criminality.
At the same time, while the Brazilian military engaged in widespread abuse-institutionalizing torture and impunity, as well as violations of due process by special
courts set up to try suspected insurgents, the number of victims was significantly less
than in a substantial number of other Latin American dictatorships. The total number
killed or disappeared for political reasons was much lower than in Argentina or Chile, for
example, particularly in light of the size of Brazil. Argentina’s dirty war—in a period of
seven years—killed at least twenty and possibly sixty times as many as in Brazil. Per
capita, the Argentina security forces killed between fifty and two hundred times as many
as their counterparts in Brazil. In Chile, security forces killed six times as many in
absolute terms and sixty times as many in per capita terms (Carvallo, & Delgado, 2011:
35). The relatively low number of victims partly explains the lack of engagement of
transnational NGOs effectively pressuring the successive democratic governments to be
more active in the search for transitional justice or in the monitoring Brazil’s
international stands regarding democracy and human rights.
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Brazil’s civil society organizations were at the same time much less
internationally connected than some of their counterparts in other national contexts.
Further,
with the exception of the business and economic elite (which includes more
inwards looking ISI beneficiaries as well as business interests linked with
multinational and exporting interests, which are more outward looking) and the
unions (repressed under military rule and linked to a sui generis Workers Party
with no international affiliations), civil society organizations [in Brazil] were few
and far between. (Barahona de Brito, A.: 18)
This relative isolation of Brazil’s civil society groups was even more noticeable when
compared to other human rights organizations throughout the region. In contrast with
Chile, where human rights organizations emerged simultaneously with repression, in
Brazil repression began in 1964 and the first organizations only appeared in 1972
(Clearly, E. 1997). During the transition process this situation continued. A more recent
study assessing the low impact of transitional justice in Brazil indicates that while
networks between and among Spanish-speaking Latin American rights and solidarity
groups have been strong for decades, it is only in the past decade with the advance of
modern communications that Brazilian groups have engaged more fully (Carvallo &
Delgado 2011: 36).
Brazil’s comparative low involvement in the Inter-American system for the
defense of human rights especially at the beginning of the 1990s is also a reflection of the
lack of human rights advocacy groups. As an example, as recently as 1994, while
activists were filing and litigating scores of cases against almost every other state in Latin
America, only two cases were pending against Brazil (Carvallo, 2002).
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In sum, the exchange of experiences and support among domestic, regional and
international human rights advocacy networks was remarkably low during the struggle
for democratization in Brazil and continued to be so at least a decade afterwards.
Furthermore, the lack of ties among Brazilian opposition leaders and international
advocacy groups during the dictatorship was also weak compared to other countries in
Latin America.56 Unlike the case of Chile in which part of the political leaders entering
the new democratic administration (including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) during the
transition had been either part of these human rights transnational networks or had a
substantive connection with these groups, Brazilian elites were not connected to these
networks and the doors of the bureaucratic apparatus were largely closed to these groups.
The low impact of international influences on Brazil’s foreign policy during the
transition and the fragility of transnational advocacy networks in the country did not
prevent completely further changes as a result of a fluctuating global scenario. The end of
the Cold War and the effects of US economic, political and military prominence
prompted Brazilian policy-makers to reformulate their international strategies and to
review Brazil’s role in the world. President’s Collor de Mello’s (1991-1992) quest for the
“modernization” and “creative adaptation” of Brazil’s international policies in
accordance with new international rules and practices were further reinforced by the
subsequent administration of President Cardoso. The aforementioned strategy of

This difference is very noticeable when comparing the ties of Chile’s traditional political
parties such as the Christian Democrats and Socialist with its international counterparts as
opposed to Brazil’s more self-referential political parties.
56
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“autonomy through diversification” was Cardoso’s attempt to accommodate Brazil’s
national interests to US power and to liberal globalization.
Greater emphasis was given during the Cardoso years to the idea that Brazil
needed to re-established its credentials as a modern liberal democracy with an effective
state and a coherent foreign economic policy. In this view, “Brazil’s status was very
much seen as flowing from successful economic development and the successful
navigation of the transformed world of liberal globalization” (Hurrell, 2010:6). Cardoso
even stressed the correspondence between universally prevailing values and national
identity: “The Brazil that enters the twenty-first century is a country whose primary
objectives for international transformation and development are in harmony with values
universally disseminated on the international level” (Cardoso in Vigenani and Cepuluni
2009:57). In consequence the government moved towards increasing the acceptance of
international norms and to actively adhere to international regimes in trade, security,
environment, human rights and democracy. Human rights was a key area in which the
government could easily signal its liberal credentials and Cardoso himself pushed for an
international policy more in tune with these ideas. As the previous chapter illustrates,
many of the most important reforms accepting and institutionalizing human rights as part
of Brazil’s foreign policy were crafted during this period.
By Cardoso’s second term in the end of the 1990s, the policy of “autonomy
through participation” had come to face increasingly serious challenges (Hurrell, 2010).
In addition to the country’s continued economic vulnerability to global economic forces
and its difficulty in adapting to them, Brazilian decision-makers had also to respond to
increasing unilateral policies from the new administration of George W. Bush, a situation
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that was hugely aggravated in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in Washington and New York.
When Lula came into power in 2003 the government sought to differentiate its own
“assertive” foreign policy from that of its predecessor that was seen as “insufficiently
resolute in the defense of Brazilian interests and too closely tied with the liberalizing
agenda of the 1990s” (Hurrell, A 2010:8). As Par Engstrom (2010) puts it:
The foreign policy of the Cardoso administration drew more actively on the other
side of Brazilian national identity emphasizing Brazil’s convergence with the
liberal norms of the 1990s. Whilst under Lula the emphasis has been on economic
and political sovereignty and on seeking alliances within the Third World against
the West.
Lula’s renewed emphasis on an international strategy based on the prominence of
the principles of autonomy and development had important consequences for Brazil’s
human rights foreign policy. To be sure, Brazilian diplomats continued to stress the role
of international institutions and the international human rights regime and its support for
global liberal values. In fact, Brazil has been selected twice as a member of the Human
Rights Council since 2006 and led a series of initiatives in this capacity. But international
changes since 2000s and the rising status of Brazil and other emerging powers produced a
renewal of what might be called “human rights skepticism” that tinted the rhetoric and
practice of Brazilian international policies during Lula’s term. Three factors illustrate this
tendency.
First, U.S. dismissiveness of multilateral institutions combined with Bush’s
discourse on the fight against terrorism and pre-emptive war augmented Brazil’s
perception that human rights are selectively used by great powers when their national
interest are stake. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 by a US-led coalition, acting without
United Nations authorization, and faintly invoking human rights as a supplementary
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justification, further damaged the appeal of humanitarian ideas among governing elites in
the global south and Brazil in particular (Farer & Fuentes 2014). As a Brazilian diplomat
has said, “there is a strong belief and also a historical international practice—Iraq is a
good example— that shows that great powers intervene on selective basis and not with
the primary objective of advancing universal human rights but their own strategic
interests” (Anonymous, personal communication, September 2013). The described
international environment gave Brazilian diplomats an extra justification to abstain more
than a majority of Latin countries at the UN when faced with resolutions condemning
human rights abuses in named foreign countries.
Reinforcing Brazil’s traditionally reluctance to criticize the human rights record
of other countries was Lula’s determination that Brazil play a leading role in the
developing world and increase cooperation with other emerging powers. Enforcing
international human rights had a lower priority. This is easy to illustrate. For example,
when examining Brazil’s voting behavior at the UN Human Rights Council on the
resolutions about Sri Lanka and North Korea in 2009, Brazil sided with countries such as
China, India, Russia, and South Africa that either reject or abstain from condemning
these countries. Brazil’s followed a similar pattern of behavior at the United Nations
General Assembly, joining other emergent power refusal to condemn Iran, North Korea
and Myanmar. Speaking of Brazil’s policies during the Lula Administration, a
representative from an important NGO based in Washington interviewed for this
dissertation underscored that “Brazil regards human rights as an obstacle to accomplish
its political and strategic goals”. Moreover,
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The rising Brazil designed a deliberate strategy to be recognized as the leader of
the developing world, implementing a South-South agenda with a decisive anticolonial and anti-imperial discourse. Clearly this strategy took precedence over
human rights considerations. (Anonymous, personal communication, September
2013)
Third, in tune with the objective of consolidating South-South relations, Lula’s
administration decided to pursue an international policy of “solidarity”. This strategy was
put into practice by increasing the international aid granted by Brazil, by transferring
resources and technology and by the emphasis placed on conveying to partner countries
some of the domestic social policies and programs developed successfully by the
Brazilian government (Pimenta de Faria & Goulart Paradis 2013). This agenda very
much emphasized economic and social rights that are critical for universal human rights
and in this sense Brazil has enhanced its status as a “Global development power”
(Dauvergne & Farias 2012). Yet, this strategy has downplayed the use of the human
rights language choosing to highlight solidarity and cooperation instead.
Domestic Determinants
Domestic factors played an even greater role in constraining the possibilities of
Brazil for adopting full-fledged human rights diplomacy. This subsection analyzes three
factors that are critical to explain Brazil’s international behavior in the area of human
rights: a) Transition to Democracy and the “Lock in” effect; b) The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs (Itamaraty) and political leadership; c) Civil Society.
Transition to democracy and the “lock in” effect. It is possible to say that
Brazil’s transition to democracy started in 1973 with Military President Ernesto Geisel’s
decision to initiate a “slow, gradual, and careful” liberation of the regime and ended in
1989 with the first direct presidential elections in three decades. The length of the
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transition is one of the most notable features of the Brazilian case considering that it took
almost sixteen years, almost twice as long as the Portuguese transition. The length of the
transition is even more dramatic when we consider that the Brazilian authoritarian regime
only began on March 1964 (Linz & Stepan 1996). As indicated by Linz and Stepan,
Both the extraordinary length of the Brazilian transition and the fact that the
military ‘opening’ was six years longer than the military ‘closure’ seem to us
directly related to the fact that the authoritarian regime, although never fully
institutionalized, was hierarchically led by a military organization that had
sufficient power to control the pace of the transition and strike a high price for
extrication. (p. 68)
Another feature of the Brazilian transition is key to mention: the military attempts
to maintain control over the process. The result was a set of constraining conditions
securing important degree of military power in the following administrations. For
example, throughout the entire government of the first civilian President, Jose Sarney,
there were six military ministers in the cabinet. The military also had important leverage
on the writing of the new Brazilian Constitution that came into being in 1988: “the
military, via a skillful combination of threats and lobbying, succeeded in eliminating,
softening, or subverting most of the proposed constitutional clauses that would have
curtailed military autonomy” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 169).
A third element that is important to highlight relates to the unwillingness of key
democratic political forces to precipitate a decisive rupture with the authoritarian regime
(Keck, M. 1992) and the fact that the legacy of the military was perceived by Brazilian
elites in a more favorable or at least ambivalent manner compared to other Latin
American countries. Not only the number of human rights victims of human rights was
significantly smaller compared to its regional counterparts, the strength of the military
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was based on the significant economic growth that the country experienced especially
from 1968 to 1973. Moreover, the gradual transition in Brazil contrasts with the collapse
of the military regime in Argentina, where the armed forces were discredited by their
military defeat in the 1982 Malvinas War (Hagopian, 1993: 468). Like most other
military regimes in Latin America, the Argentinean regime imploded amid financial
disaster, whereas Brazil’s regime achieved significant levels of economic growth during
the so-called economic miracle (Hagopian, 1993: 468).
Liberals perspectives explaining why states accept international human rights
treaties, would predict Brazil’s adherence during the transition process. Yet, if anything,
the Brazilian case highlights the lack of evidence indicating any inclination or willingness
of the political elites to accept international human rights commitments either as a
formula to lessen the political uncertainties of the new transitional government or as a
strategy to consolidate domestic goals. Even though it was Sarney’s decision to ratify
major international human rights Conventions, it took more than a decade for Brazil to
recognize the jurisdiction of the oversight bodies associated with these treaties. Brazil
recognized the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights only in 1998,
ten years after President Sarney assumed office. Brazil’s case illustrates that not all
governments transitioning to democracy are likely to adhere to international human rights
treaties or to enhance their participation with international human rights institutions. Not
at least as an immediate result of domestic calculations due to the uncertain
circumstances of the political process. The type and the particular characteristics of the
process largely shape the responses of the new civilian leaders.
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As explained before, Brazil’s transition was gradual, the levels of uncertainty
were lower than other similar cases due to its negotiated character, the legacy of the
military evoked ambivalence, and there were markedly fewer pressures to address the
legacy of human rights abuses. Under these circumstances, Brazilian governing elites did
not perceive any immediate gain by adopting international human rights treaties that
could lead to international scrutiny of domestic matters. Brazil’s case contrast most
notably with Argentina, a country that adhered to international human rights regimes at
the outset of its transition process. But unlike Brazil, Argentina’s elites were facing
greater level of pressures to inflict domestic changes due its transition by rupture after the
Malvinas war, the complete discrediting of the armed forces and the decisive society push
for moving forward with transitional justice.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty) and political leadership. Appreciating
the institutional and ideological authority of The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Itamaraty,
is essential for a full understanding of foreign policy decision-making in Brazil. Scholars
have been almost unanimous in their assessment that Itamaraty has historically
centralized this process (Cheibub, 1985; Faria, 2012; Pinheiro, 2009). Cason and Power
(2009) highlights three elements to explain Itamaraty’s preponderance in the foreign
policy decision-making process. First, the ministry is admired both inside and outside
Brazil for the high level of professionalization of its diplomats. Second, although
embedded within a fragmented and penetrable state apparatus, Itamaraty maintained an
impressive degree of bureaucratic autonomy and isolation. It benefits from the formal and
informal boundaries separating it from other ministries and agencies. Third, until recently
its policy responsibilities were monopolistic. Although there were minor variations across
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time, it is fair to say that in postwar Brazil Itamaraty had virtually complete control over
the design and execution of foreign policy, including trade policy. Finally, other authors
have pointed out to the strong “esprit de corps” of the Ministry, which has been
reinforced by an elitist diplomatic service along with a strong political culture that “forge
among professional diplomats a sense of monopoly over what is understood as the
national interest, which involves foreign policy formulation and implementation”
(Burges: 2013; Pimienta & Belem & Casaroes 2013:468).
Itamaraty was able to maintain its centrality along with important levels of
bureaucratic autonomy throughout the process of democratic transition. This situation
was maintained— not without modifications due to the increasing pluralism of actors
involved and the importance of Presidential diplomacy—during the administration of
Cardoso and Lula. The maintenance of the main tenants of foreign policy despite regime
change is peculiar of the case of Brazil and it goes against foreign policy theories
predicting changing policy behavior according to type of political regimes. A recent
article by Pimienta & Belem & Casaroes (2013) explaining the persistence of Itamarity in
Brazil’s foreign policy decision-making after the transition to democracy provides at least
two reasons explaining this phenomenon. The first, and most obvious, concerns the lack
of competition: the ministry maintained its central position as it found no external actors
to systemically counterbalance its weight. Second, there is a set of institutional
characteristics and historical developments of the Brazilian state, especially evident in the
last couple of decades, which favours the centralisation of the process of foreign policymaking. They are: (a) the country’s constitutional framework, which grants greater
autonomy to the Executive in this matter, leaving the Legislative to a marginal position;
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(b) the fact that the Brazilian Congress permanently delegates to the Executive
responsibility in matters relating to foreign policy; (c) the ‘imperial’ character of
Brazilian presidentialism; (d) the fact that the development model of import substitution
has generated introversion and isolation of political and economic processes, thus
allowing for a controlled opening to international trade (e) the largely adaptive and
flexible character of Brazil’s diplomatic service; and, last but not least, (f) the substantial
and early professionalization of Brazilian diplomats, associated with the prestige enjoyed
by Itamaraty, both domestically and internationally.
To be sure, during Cardoso and Lula ‘s governments there were foreign policy
areas particularly in the economic and trade sector in which Itamaraity partly lost its
decision making power over Presidential diplomacy (Cason & Power, 2009). Yet, on
political issues related to human rights and humanitarian intervention, the Ministry was
able to continue its traditional policies of maintaining a “tight Westphalian focus on
sovereignty and autonomy” without any significant force willing to counterbalance its
power (Burges 2013). National autonomy and the defense of economic and political
sovereignty that follows from it, is considered by Brazilian diplomats a key national
interest and remained almost exclusively in the hands of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The tight defense of sovereignty and non-intervention comes from set of foreign
policy ideas and worldviews that have been historically transmitted and implemented in
different policy decisions by several generations of diplomats serving at Itamaraty. Celso
Lafer, former Minister of Foreign Affairs and prominent intellectual states that Brazil’s
international identity and its foreign policy orientation has historical roots dating from the
beginning of the 20th century:
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From the 1930s on, these reflections clearly oriented Brazilian foreign policy and
diplomatic action by means of two principal guiding lines. One was to obtain and
cultivate space for the exercise of autonomy-that is, in the words of then-minister
of external relations Horacio Lafer in 1959, the zeal ‘to preserve the freedom to
interpret the country's reality and to find Brazilian solutions to Brazilian
problems.’ The second was to identify which external resources could be
mobilized in different international situations in order to respond to the internal
imperative represented by the challenge of development. (Lafer, Celso 2000)
These two principals were reinforced even further with the rise of dependency theory and
the import substitution industrialization model embraced by Brazil with the systematic
support of the Foreign Ministry during the 1960s to early 1980s. As Soares de Lima and
Hertz indicate, “Itamaraty acquired a powerful ‘institutional memory’ in which many of
the characteristics and values associated with ISI retained their influence and
attractiveness even after the decline of the particular development model” (1994: 24).
Another principle that is historically rooted in Brazil’s diplomatic practice is the
rejection to the use of force as a mechanism of conflict resolution. Rio Branco who drew
the Brazilian map, first as representative and Brazilian counsel in international
arbitrations, then, from 1902 to 1912, as minister of external relations, established
Brazilian borders with little bloodshed during the ninetieth century. Celso Lafer, stresses
the significance of this historical event for the construction of Brazil’s international
identity:
Not only did Rio Branco bequeath to Brazil a peacefully obtained map of
continental proportions, he was also the great institution-builder of Itamaraty, the
Brazilian Ministry of External Relations. He inspired the style of diplomatic
behavior that, in my view, characterizes Brazil. Such a style is one of constructive
moderation and expresses itself, in the words of Gelson Fonseca Jr., as the
capacity to ‘de-dramatize the foreign policy agenda, that is, to reduce conflicts,
crises and difficulties to their diplomatic bedrock.’ Such constructive moderation
is influenced by a Grotian assessment of international reality-that is, by a
concentration on the value of diplomacy and law in international intercourse as
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appropriate ways to deal with conflict, foster cooperation, and reduce the impetus
of power politics. (Lafer 2000)
In sum, Brazil’s continuous emphasis on the peaceful settlement of disputes, its reticence
to accept the concept and practice of humanitarian intervention when it entails the use of
force and the preference for conflict prevention and mediation have historical origins
back to more than a century of diplomatic practice.
These set of ideas and principles guiding Brazil’s diplomacy continue to
predominate after the return of democracy. Despite important foreign policy innovations
due the economic opening of Brazil, the consolidation of the democratic system, and two
different coalitions of government since 1995, Itamaraty has retained its historically
acquired desire for implementing an autonomous foreign policy based on the defense of
economic and political sovereignty. The fact that the Foreign Ministry after the
democratization period retained its political and bureaucratic capacity to centralize the
decision-making process allowed these principles to persist. The impact of these ideas on
Brazil’s international policies can be traced directly to the human rights arena and easily
recognized when examining the country’s unalterable behavior in this area: a long
stressed resistance to coercive measures as a response for humanitarian emergencies and
opposition to the idea of humanitarian intervention; an enduring resistance to criticize
human rights violations occurring in foreign nations; and a permanent denouncing of
what has been viewed as politically driven selectivity in relation to certain countries
human rights records and on countries that are choses as target of humanitarian
intervention.
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The lack of new political leadership supporting human rights inside the Foreign
Ministry also explains the prevalence of the former ideas. The bureaucratic insulation of
Itamarity and its high levels of autonomy vis-à-vis other state institutions combined with
the prestige of its diplomatic corps, prevented any institutional reform of the Foreign
Ministry once new democratic government and the following ones came to power. There
were no key appointments from outside the Foreign Service and therefore there was no
renewal of people prompting a surge of new foreign policy ideas. It is true that Fernando
Henrique Cardoso explicitly identify itself as a human rights person and as such he
played an important leadership role as a Foreign Minister and after as President
promoting human rights internationally and domestically among other measures through
the creation of the National Human Rights Program and the Human Rights Department in
Itamaraty. Furthermore, Cardoso himself decided to accept the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court and was able to get it approved despite the internal resistance of the
Foreign Ministry (P. Pinheiro, personal communication, August 2013). Yet, political
leadership on human rights in the area of foreign policy has been limited since the
democratization process and the Ministry remained relatively unaffected on this issue.
Considering the dimensions of the country, very few Brazilians have occupied
important human rights positions internationally. This situation is clearly a reflection of
the lack of engagement between Brazil’s diplomats and the international human rights
institutions. At a regional level, only three Brazilians have been elected to the InterAmerican Commission for Human Rights: Carlos A. Dunshee de Abranches, 1964-1983;
Gilda Maciel Correa Russomano, 1984-1991; and Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, 2004-2011.
Cançado Trindade is the only Brazilian who has served as Judge on the Inter-American
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Court. Internationally, the situation is no different. One of the most prominent figures in
the global human rights machinery, Sergio Vieira de Mello, received practically no
official or diplomatic support from his country of birth (Power, 2008) and
the absence of any voluntary Brazilian financial support of the UN office that
Vieira de Mello was heading at the Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, is all the more glaring in light of modest, yet diplomatically significant,
funding given by countries such as Mexico, Argentina and Chile. (Ergstrom 2010:
14)
Civil society. Brazilian civil society is seen today as vibrant, dense, active and
able to mobilize against issues of importance. The transition to democracy brought a wide
scope of political activism to the fore. Urban social, women’s and landless peasant
movements joined Afro-Brazilians, workers’, environmental, and consumer movements.
Overall, even though the focus of these movements was particular to their issue agenda,
these groups have significantly contributed to expand citizenship through social
mobilization around the “rights to have rights” (Montero 2014:95). Unfortunately, the
strength and activism of Brazil’s civil society around foreign policy is much weaker than
other issue-areas at least up to the beginning of the 2000s. Since civil society
organizations are important drivers of ideas into domestic institutions (Sikkink 1993;
Keck & Sikkink 1998), the lack of organizations monitoring foreign policy creates
further constraints on more actively including human rights in Brazil’s international
policies.
The centrality and insulation of the Foreign Ministry and the perception of the
majority of the Brazilian society that foreign policy is a question of “high politics” and
not a public affair, played against the formation of a vibrant civil society on this subject.
In an interview with Paulo Sergio Pinheiro, he recalls how the Ministry of Foreign
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Relations during the transition to democracy was not receptive to the idea of exchanging
information with NGOS particularly about human rights concerns. “Foreign policy was
always a monopoly of Itamaraty and the federal government. An opening to other sectors
of the Brazilian society was unprecedented and very much rejected especially by the
‘soveranistas’ sector within the Ministry,” emphasizes Pinheiro.
Yet, the 1990s brought some incipient changes. The incorporation and
participation of local NGOs to forums and international events started in this decade.
Civil society participation in the context of international conferences such as the Vienna
Convention in 1993 and the increasing inclusion of some of these groups in ad-hoc
consultation process with the Ministry on matters of interest are among the examples. At
the same time and almost ten years after the transition to democracy, there has been
increased interaction between local NGOs and transnational networks as evidenced in the
creation of Justiça Global in 1999 by human rights professionals who previously worked
at Human Rights Watch and CEJIL (Engstrom 2010). Yet, despite the importance of
these developments, these changes have been insufficient to counterbalance societal
perceptions on the subject.
In 2001, as Cardoso government was coming to an end, local researchers
surveyed 149 members of Brazil's “foreign policy community.” These included officials
from the executive branch (the presidency, the key ministries, the diplomatic corps, the
armed forces, and the Central Bank), the National Congress (deputies and senators
involved in foreign relations and defense policy), business leaders, representatives of
trade unions and NGOs, journalists, and many key academic specialists in international
relations. When queried about how much attention the MRE gives to various actors from
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political and civil society, the foreign policy community essentially endorsed the idea of
an autonomous Itamaraty (Cason & Power 2009:120).
It was only in the mid-2000s that significant changes took place regarding a more
active and continuous civil society involvement on Brazil’s international affairs. The
initiation of activities of the local NGO CONECTAS in 2001 and its acquired UNECOSOC status as observer in 2006 with the objective of strengthening human rights
defenders in the global south and monitoring and influencing Brazil’s human rights
foreign policy is unprecedented in Brazilian politics. Some years later, the Brazilian
Committee on Human Rights and Foreign Policy—a network of civil society
organizations and state institutions—was also created with a similar aim of stimulating
citizen participation and strengthen democratic control of Brazilian foreign policy as it
relates to human rights. These organizations have sought to influence Brazil’s
international policies on human rights.
CONECTAS, for example, since 2007 issues a annual report monitoring Brazil’s
positions regarding human rights matters at the UN system and denounces situations in
which the country does not vote according to universal human rights standards such as
the resolutions on Sri Lanka and North Korea in 2006. It has also been active lobbying
the congressional committee on human rights and foreign policy and soliciting detailed
information regarding foreign policy decisions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
CONECTAS has also been active networking with global human rights organizations
especially from developing countries and in international debates at the UN Human
Rights Council. Finally, CONECTAS has been able to fundraise important amount of
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money from international donors to run their activities (L. Nader, personal
communication, August 2013).
The increasing activism of local NGOS with the aim of monitoring and
influencing Brazil’s foreign policy decisions is too recent to permit a confident evaluation
of its impact. The rise of these local NGOs coincides with the ascension of Lula to the
Presidency and so far there is no concrete example of important policy changes on
international human rights responding to civil society pressures. However, these
organizations are asserting their presence by using advocacy strategies of agenda setting,
“name and shaming”, and networking with international organizations in order to
influence governmental decisions. These organizations might play an increasingly
influential role in the future. However, for the majority of the time period covered in this
study (1985-2010), civil society organizations were still marginal in foreign policy
decisions and were unable to gain legitimacy among the most relevant foreign policy
actors in Brazil.
Conclusions
This chapter attempts to understand why Brazil remains reluctant to become an
international human rights promoter and looks at international and domestic factors as
explanatory variables. It argues that on the impact of international influences on the
adoption of international human rights this case illustrates how some countries are less
permeable to external forces than others and how a foreign policy guided by the
principles of autonomy and national development could be less receptive to the idea of
international human rights. It is true that the need to obtain international credibility and
legitimacy drove Brazil’s diplomacy to the adherence of international human rights and
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to participate more actively on international human rights institutions during the 1990s.
Yet, international conditions were not a powerful force to change traditional conceptions
overstating the importance of sovereignty in international affairs and longstanding
perceptions regarding the role of Brazil in the world.
At the domestic level, it shows that democratic transitions not always generate
local incentives for accepting international human rights norms. Most importantly, it
highlights how history, institutional and bureaucratic practices, and the predominant
ideology of decision-makers and political elites affect the ways in which international
norms are perceived locally. Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been dominated by
a powerful Foreign Ministry that has been somewhat suspicious of international human
rights and that had tended to disregard humanitarian interventions as a cover for great
power involvement in the domestic affairs of other states. The lack of powerful
transnational advocacy networks working on monitoring and influencing foreign policy
decisions further constrained the prospections of a more active inclusion of human rights
into Brazil’s international policies.
Alternative explanations to the ones presented here come from two major
perspectives. Realism will underscore that Brazil’s reluctance to become a human rights
promoter is driven by its size, the economic strength of the country, and its growing
international stature as a rising state. Brazil’s foreign policy, however, does not respond
to the major tenants of power politics. The country has limited military capabilities and
its international policies have historically been driven by international law,
multilateralism and participation in international institutions. Furthermore, a realist
perspective would predict that Brazil’s rising status since 2003 would increase the
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nation’s reluctance toward international human rights. Yet despite some changes in the
country’s foreign policy under Lula, this study shows that the country has been a slow
and reluctant human rights promoter before Lula’s government and arguably since the
transition to democracy in 1985.
Another alternative explanation comes from liberalism and its assumption that
economic opening prompts the search of liberal values internationally such as democracy
promotion and human rights protection. This approach foresees that countries that decide
to open their economies will almost automatically become part of a global liberal order of
sorts. What this perspectives fail to capture is that countries like Brazil did develop
important reforms to fully integrate itself to a market economy. Yet, these economic
measures did not signify a complete alignment with liberal values internationally. To be
sure, Brazil is clearly a Western society. However, as Andrew Hurrell puts its: “that
identity [western] has only rarely been particularly significant in shaping either foreign
policy ideas or foreign policy behavior” (Hurrell 2010). This chapter also demonstrates
that a similar liberal argument stating that countries in transition to democracy are likely
to adopt international human rights is also subject to criticism. Brazil’s case highlights
that not all governments transitioning to democracy will adhere to international human
rights treaties or decide to enhance its participation with international human rights
institutions. Not at least as an immediate result of domestic calculations due to the
uncertain circumstances of the political process. Furthermore, the case of Brazil
underscores that those countries adopting political and economic liberal reforms at home
are not necessarily destined to be “liberal internationalist” adopting straightforward
strategies of democracy and human rights promotion abroad. The latter can shed some
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light on the incipient debate about emerging democratic powers such as India and South
Africa and their conception of and international liberal order along with their potential
role shaping the future of the international human rights regime.
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
This research seeks to understand the ways and extent to which newly
democratized states in Latin America support human rights beyond their borders. Using
Chile and Brazil as case studies, it offers an explanation as to why Chile has been an
active human rights promoter while Brazil has a more ambivalent policy towards
international human rights.
The main findings point out that states that commit to international human rights
are the result of the intersection of domestic and international influences. At the
international level, the search for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition
and credibility affected the adoption of international human rights in both cases but with
different degrees of impact. However, international values and pressures by themselves,
while necessary, are an insufficient condition for human rights initiatives perceived to
have not insubstantial political, economic or strategic costs. New democracies will be
more or less likely to actively include human rights in their international policies
depending on the following four domestic conditions: political leadership legitimizing the
inclusion of human rights into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to
international human rights advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign
policy decisions of their government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards
international human rights and the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of
the foreign policy process.
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The results of this research have important theoretical and policy implications to
understand the means and circumstances in which states are likely to act to prevent or to
terminate violations of human rights or to strengthen the normative and institutional
framework for defending human rights. Important policy lessons can be extracted from
the foreign policy experience of these two countries that can serve as guidelines for
government officials, local and international norms entrepreneurs, NGOs, and scholars
interested in the promotion of human rights internationally.
Theoretical Contributions
This study challenges the assumptions of the main approaches in international
relations theory explaining why states incorporate human rights into their international
policies and offers an account that particularly complements constructivist research on
the subject.
This research concurs with other studies indicating that realist theories have
trouble accounting for the adoption and implementation of international human rights
policies, except by dismissing them as insignificant (Sikkink 1993). There are few realist
efforts to explain difference in human rights policies. The work of Egeland argues that
“small and big nations are differently disposed to undertaking coherent-rights oriented
foreign policies” (1988). According to this perspective, large states have multiple
interests that preclude the pursuit of human rights objectives while at the same time these
countries tend to base their policies on bilateral arrangements because they are more
likely to have power to achieve their goals without multilateral support. Small states
rarely have to choose between human rights and other foreign policy goals and their
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foreign policy strategies are based on multilateral arrangements to increase their
opportunities for influence.
On the surface, the case of Chile and Brazil support realists accounts. Yet, there
are several factors indicating that the differences in human rights foreign policies of these
two countries are driven by other non-realist factors. First, despite its giant size Brazil has
historically pursued an intense multilateral agenda and has permanently strived for
occupying an active role within international institutions. The size of a country does not
prevent the use and even the prioritization of multilateral strategies. In fact, Brazil has
ratified all the major international treaties on human rights. Second, from a realist
perspective Brazil’s emerging power since the beginning of the 21st century should be a
powerful indicator that the country would be less inclined to participate in international
human rights regimes. However, this study shows that Brazilian diplomacy was even
more skeptic to include human rights at the beginning of the 1990s when the country was
much more weaker economically and less influential internationally than it is today.
Third, Chile is a small state pursuing human rights policies. But its size and its relatively
low economic power do not explain the preponderant interest for human rights. Similar
small countries in the region such as Ecuador or Peru have not assigned an important
value to human rights into their foreign policy as Chilean diplomacy does. In sum, size
and the relative power position of state cannot explain differences in human rights
policies.
Liberal accounts predict that new democracies are likely to commit to
international human rights as a way of protecting regimes that are unstable during the
transition process (Moravcsik 2000). This study tested this hypothesis and found that
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only for the case of Chile this assumption holds. Chilean elites rapidly moved to sign
international human rights treaties and to participate in international human rights
institutions as way of protecting an unstable democracy and for containing the power of
the military during the transition. Liberal explanations, however, cannot explain why
Chile’s commitment to international human rights persisted once democratic
consolidation took place. On the other hand, due to the character of Brazil’s transition,
the new authorities had no incentives to subscribe to international human rights treaties.
Not at least as an immediate result of domestic calculations due to the uncertain
circumstances of the political process.
Three general conclusions derive from these two cases when comes to the
explanatory power of the liberal accounts. First, not all new democracies will
instrumentally use international human rights to attain domestic goals. In some political
transitions such as the case of Brazil, the political elites do not have sufficient incentives
to pursue human rights policies or the perceived price of signing international treaties or
accept international scrutiny is higher than the possible domestic gains. Second, in other
cases such as in Chile, domestic incentives are crucial for triggering international human
rights policies during the transitional period. However, the persistence of those policies
after the transition depends the deep integration of human rights concerns as a standard of
legitimized behavior domestically. Third, the case of Brazil underscores that countries
undergoing democratic transitions are not necessarily destined to become “liberal
internationalists” adopting straightforward strategies of democracy and human rights
promotion abroad. The rise of new democracies does not necessarily imply the rise of
new states supporting human rights standards worldwide.
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Constructivist approaches investigate the role of ideas, norms, and identities as
influences on state action. The national interest and foreign policies, they argue, are the
product of the identities and values of a state. Therefore, it can be expected that
democratic and right-protective states will seek to extend their domestic values abroad
and recognize other states that do so (Risse-Kappen 1996; Brysk 2007). As for the
domestic commitment to human rights in non-democratic states or in countries with low
levels of human rights compliance, constructivist research has shown that states adopt
human rights norms through a process of international socialization that is driven by the
local regimes’ need for enhancing their international legitimacy and credibility and the
persistent work of transnational advocacy networks in persuading governments to include
normative concerns into their agendas (Finnemore & Sikkink 1998; Keck & Sikkink
1998; Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999, 2013).
The diplomatic experience of Chile and Brazil illustrates some of the
shortcomings of the constructivist research on the subject and offers some clues as to how
better understand the inclusion of human rights or lack of thereof in the foreign policies
of new democracies. The comparison of the human rights diplomacy of these two
countries shows that political transitions from authoritarian regimes in which the state
itself is the perpetrator of human rights abuses into a democratic system respectful of
citizen’s rights does not assure a state commitment to “protect strangers” internationally.
The diplomatic trajectory of Chile and Brazil since their respective transitions to
democracy is especially telling on this point. Despite the fact that both countries
developed into democratic political systems respectful of human rights values, the foreign
policy projection of those values differs significantly. Chile gives priority to the
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promotion of human rights internationally while Brazil is still reluctant to become a more
active participant within the international human rights regime. In other words,
democratic and human rights values at home are not automatically translated into
principled human rights foreign policies.
This study shows that the adoption of human rights into a state foreign policy is
conditioned by international as well as by domestic factors. Constructivist’s studies are
right in pointing out the socializing effects of international norms and ideas into the
behavior of states. In fact, this study shows that for Chile as well as for Brazil the search
for international legitimacy and the desire for recognition and credibility is a necessary
condition for new democracies to pursue human rights objectives. Yet, constructivists do
not pay sufficient attention to the fact that in some cases the openness to international
norms can vary and, as the case of Brazil demonstrates, a state can be less permeable to
international influences due the predominance of local ideas that dot not readily
harmonize with international human rights values. The predominant idea of an
autonomous foreign policy and the priority given to sovereignty and non-intervention
among Brazil’s foreign policy decision-makers underscores this fact.
Domestic factors are critical to understand the degree of a state commitment to
international human rights. Constructivist work provides important insights about the role
of norms and ideas at the international level but they have overlooked the process and
mechanisms by which those values and ideas translate into the domestic settings and, in
particular, into the foreign policy process. This study fills this gap and suggests that the
inclusion of human rights into their international policies of new democracies is
dependent on three conditions: political leadership legitimizing the inclusion of human
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rights into a state’s policies, civil society groups connected to international human rights
advocacy networks with a capacity to influencing the foreign policy decisions of their
government, and the Foreign Ministry’s attitudes towards international human rights and
the degree of influence it exercises over the outcome of the foreign policy process.
A brief summary of the analysis of the country cases help to illustrate how these
variables work in practice. In the case of Chile, human rights diplomacy gained a
prominent place because human rights values were mobilized, promoted, learned and
legitimized by local actors (political elites and advocacy networks) and effectively
channeled into the Ministry of Foreign affairs bureaucracy. Brazil’s case, on the other
hand, illustrates how the lack of exposure to human rights ideas of foreign policy
decision-makers, the institutional and bureaucratic practices at the Foreign Ministry that
did not easily fit with international human rights values, and an inward looking civil
society can negatively affect the inclusion of human rights into foreign policy.
Policy Contributions
There are several policy lessons that can be derived from the study of these two
countries human rights foreign policies that are helpful for other governments, policymakers, and civil society activists willing to invest time, resources and political capital on
the promotion and protection of people beyond their boundaries. This conclusions focus
on four areas.
Bureaucratic Barriers
The main governmental agency implementing international human rights policies
is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Yet, as the case of Brazil illustrates, bureaucracies can
turn out to be fundamental barriers for introducing human rights into the foreign policy
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process. The case of Chile illustrates a Ministry of Foreign affairs in which key positions
are occupied by governmental officials that have signaled the importance of human rights
as a main component of the country’s national interest. However, Chilean diplomacy still
needs a stronger foreign policy machinery that is further institutionalized and that relies
less on individual commitments. Chile and Brazil created human rights units within the
Ministry but in both cases this topic is far away from being effectively integrated into the
work of the different institutional compartments of the respective Ministries. There is an
important degree of insulation of the human rights unit versus the other departments
especially with ones dealings with political affairs. At the same time, the diplomatic
corps as in any other country work on a rotational basis (two or three years) which in
many cases decreases the development of acquiring human rights knowledge (if the
person is assigned to the specific unit or Geneva) and civil society relationships that are
particularly important for effective human rights interventions (Brysk 2007).
The experience of countries such as Canada and Sweden when comes to
“mainstreaming” human rights into the Ministry are particularly interesting. These
countries not only brought a team of human rights experts to work into different units the
Foreign Ministry but they also set up new thematic units and directly connected the
country desks with related thematic units such as women, children, indigenous rights, etc.
Some of these experiences could be brought into the Foreign Ministries of countries from
the Global South.
Training is another fundamental aspect to break bureaucratic barriers against
human rights. The Diplomatic Academies of Chile and Brazil for the past five years have
included new courses on human rights and some of their students have written original
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thesis on diverse human rights issues. Yet there is a need in both countries to create new
courses for diplomats in the middle of their careers that are willing to update their
knowledge. Human rights could be included as a compulsory part in such training
programs. Finally, it is important to create mechanisms of periodic consults between
Ministry officials and local NGOS particularly on human rights issues. The work
developed in the context of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) for the Human Rights
Council has been very useful in both countries as a way of creating new channels for
communications between governmental officials and NGOs and other national
institutions.
NGO Leadership
This study shows that civil society groups systematically monitoring their
government’s international policies are fundamental drivers for the effective inclusion of
human rights into foreign policy. Here the recent experience of Brazil is particularly
significant. Only in the last eight years, local Brazilian NGOS entered the foreign policy
world. However, these organizations led by the work of CONECTAS are already
showing important results. These includes an increasing visibility and public scrutiny on
foreign policy on human rights, raising media coverage of the Brazilian foreign policy,
improvements on the checks and balances in the foreign policy making process, and
better coordination and higher presence of Latin American civil society in the UN. It is
important to note that other transnational advocacy networks have contributed substantive
resources and capacities to strengthen the work of Brazilian NGOs.
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Diversity
This study shows that there is a great diversity in the ways in which countries go
about pursuing international human rights. Chile has focused on generating and
supporting international initiatives especially at the UN Human Rights Council on civil
and political rights with an emphasis on women’s rights and peace promotion. Brazil, on
the other hand, focuses on economic and social rights. In fact, the country has been at the
forefront of important international initiatives at the United Nations on the right to health,
development and non-discrimination. Specialization on certain human rights areas
considering the particular strengths of the countries involved could be a good way to get
more countries especially from the Global South more involved.
Coordinating Inter-institutional Policies
Better coordinating and mainstreaming human rights inside the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs is as fundamental as harmonizing inter-state institutions that play a role
in the international human rights policy. The case of Chile and Brazil shows the need for
better coordinating the policies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of
Defense specifically on issues such as peacekeeping, humanitarian de-mining, disaster
relief, among other matters. The presentation of the UPR also underscored the necessity
to create better coordination with the Ministry of Justice and other relevant state
institutions. Most notably, in Chile and Brazil, domestic foreign aid agencies with an
important budget for humanitarian initiatives develop their work semi-autonomously
without coordination or even monitoring from other state institutions.
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